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ABSTRACT: 
 
Although initially dismissed as superficial, Harold Pinter’s Betrayal, Tom Stoppard’s The 
Real Thing, and Patrick Marber’s Closer use the theme of marital betrayal as a trope to 
investigate metatheatrical and epistemological issues. This study aims to demonstrate how 
these three plays define and explore the concept of authenticity within the fictional as well as 
the actual world; how arbitrary the construction and mediation of the characters’ identities are, 
not only from their own perspective, but also from the audience’s; the significance of the 
audience’s role in these plays and how issues of authenticity, fictionality and dishonesty 
impact on a genre that depends on illusion. 
 This study intends to provide a new interpretation of these three texts through an 
analysis drawn from postmodern and poststructuralist theories, concerning the concept of 
authenticity within art and language. 
 This study finds that the fictional worlds in these plays are created through mediation, 
which includes everyday language as well as complex works of art. Authenticity is shown to 
be an elusive concept. Language is either unsuccessfully used to force authentic responses 
from characters, or as a shield. In Betrayal, language functions as a protective barrier, 
preventing the characters from knowing one another. The Real Thing suggests that although 
inauthenticity may be established, the inverse is not necessarily true. In Closer, the characters 
try in vain to access authenticity through different registers of language. Furthermore, neither 
the body nor the mind is shown to be the locus of authenticity in Closer. Within the 
postmodern context where originality is impossible, mimicry is not seen as something external 
and inauthentic, but as inextricably part of human existence. 
 The audience is drawn into the fictional world of these plays as its members are able to 
identify with the disillusionment of the characters and their inability to form a definitive view 
of each other. Simultaneously, the audience is ousted from the fictional world by being 
reminded of the author’s presence through metatheatrical devices. These plays take advantage 
of the fictional status of theatre to explore issues of authenticity, positioning them in direct 
opposition to postdramatic and verbatim plays. 
Keywords: authenticity; Betrayal; Closer; fictional world; Marber; metatheatre; mimicry; 
Pinter; postmodernism; poststructuralism; Stoppard; The Real Thing 
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT: 
 
All quotations in this document were taken verbatim from the relevant editions used. Apart 
from obvious errors I have neither indicated any variant forms of spelling nor gender bias in 
quotations taken from older texts. When quoting from the plays, capitalisation, punctuation, 
and any textual notation are left intact. Marber uses a system of textual notation to indicate 
where and how his actors should emphasise certain words. Any underlined, italicised or 
capitalised words therefore appear as in the original text.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Just because you feel it 
 Doesn’t mean it’s there  
 – Radiohead, “There there. (The Boney King of Nowhere.)” (2003)  
 
 
 
1.1. Contextualisation 
 
When Harold Pinter’s play, Betrayal (1978), was first performed in that year, it was poorly 
received by theatre critics, with the single exception of Benedict Nightingale (in Elsom, 
1981:254). The play was dismissed as an uninteresting, bourgeois soap opera. In fact, 
according to Elsom (1981:249), Pinter had not received such negative reviews since The 
Birthday Party (1960) in 1958. Billington (2001:129) states in the Guardian of 16 November 
1978, that in Betrayal, “Pinter has betrayed his immense talent by serving up this kind of 
high-class soap opera.” Kennedy (in Page, 1993:57) also disliked the play and felt that “the 
characters and their petty, bourgeois concerns fail to suggest a significance wide enough or 
deep enough to justify sustained interest.”  
 Billington (1996:258) did review his initial reaction to Betrayal later, while more 
recent critics such as Gray (2004:149) and Scolnicov (2012:106) do point out that the early 
reviewers of the play ignored the fundamental epistemological questions that it poses. Pinter 
chose to explore the question of “how can we trust what we know?” specifically through the 
plot line of adultery in this play, to focus on the social grouping of a romantic couple: the most 
intimate relationship between people. Subsequently, two other playwrights have also used 
marital betrayal as a means to explore the concept of authenticity or the question, “how can 
we know what is real?” Tom Stoppard’s The Real Thing (1983) was first produced in 1982 
whereas Patrick Marber’s Closer (2004) – which Dromgoole (2000:194) dismissed as “not 
art” – debuted in 1997. Hence, through the 1980s and into the 1990s, two other notable 
dramatists returned to the themes of infidelity and jealousy to investigate epistemological 
issues.  
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 Plays that deal in one way or another with infidelity or sexual jealousy are not new. 
The plots of Euripides’ Medea (431 BC), Shakespeare’s Othello (1604), and Émile Zola’s 
Thérèse Raquin (1873), for example, are all dependent in some way on marital betrayal or 
envy. Yet, when this theme is coupled with postmodern and poststructuralist concerns about 
the elusiveness of authenticity, it adds a new layer to the play’s significance.  
 
1.2. Postmodernism, poststructuralism and the concept of authenticity in popular culture 
 
The epistemological questions that Pinter, Stoppard, and Marber probe in their respective 
plays resonate with postmodern and poststructuralist scepticism about truth and authenticity. 
Postmodernism and poststructuralism are both rooted in the concept that no essential truth can 
be established in the centre of what was generally conceived as the structures of knowledge. 
In the 1880s already, Nietzsche (1998:82) was arguing that no authority or “higher being” 
exists who can “with absolute knowledge” criticize the human intellect and distinguish reality 
from appearance. According to Nietzsche (1998:83) there are no such things as facts, but only 
interpretations. Even the concept of the subject (in popular psychology often referred to as the 
“authentic self”) is for Nietzsche (1998:83) “something added and invented and projected 
behind what there is.”  
 Castle (2007:145) therefore describes postmodernism as questioning “language, truth, 
causality, history, and subjectivity.” It is incredulous towards master narratives as well as 
totalising and unifying discourses as representative of progress and “human perfectability” 
(Lyotard in Barry, 2002:86-87). Postmodernism rejects any notions of authenticity, regarding 
them as “romanticised myths that disguise interminable conditions of repetition, deferral, and 
self-reference.” Metadiscourse is therefore prevalent within postmodernism as a means to 
investigate a self-conscious attitude towards literary structure (Castle, 2007:146). 
 Poststructuralism, on the other hand, emerged as a reaction to structuralism and rejects 
the idea that all of Western thinking depends on a notion of a fixed foundation to all 
knowledge, the so-called “ever-active yet always absent centre” (Abrams, 2005:247). For 
poststructuralists, there is no “fixed landmark” with which to interpret the world, beyond 
linguistic processing (Barry, 2002:61). We use language not only to describe the world, but to 
create it. According to Barry (2002:61), “how we see is what we see.” Although 
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postmodernism and poststructuralism thereby share a distrust of any stable foundations of 
knowledge, postmodernists generally avoid the linguistic and semiotic solutions and discourse 
analysis that poststructuralists favour. Rather, postmodernists focus on “language games, 
chaos theory, and information theory” (Castle, 2007:145).1  
 Eco (1983a:67) describes the postmodern attitude as 
 
 that of a man who loves a very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, “I 
 love you madly,” because he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he 
 knows) that these words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a 
 solution. He can say, “As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.” At this 
 point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no longer possible 
 to speak innocently, he will nevertheless have said what he wanted to say to the 
 woman: that he loves her, but he loves her in an age of lost innocence. 
 
Eco (1983a) demonstrates in this quotation that, in postmodern times, everything has already 
been said. The postmodern speaker is aware of this, and therefore communicates through 
irony, parody, and citation.  
 In postmodern times, language is, in consequence, unoriginal. Yet, it is the medium of 
our ontological perception. As Hartman (1985: xii) puts it, “nothing can lift us out of 
language.” Both perception and language are regarded as complex phenomena. Within 
postmodernism it is therefore impossible to use original language to proclaim a particular 
subject or object as authentic.2 
 Nonetheless, amidst these notions of language and authenticity, a troubling debate has 
arisen in popular culture. Despite the fact that postmodernists regard terms such as 
“authenticity” and “truth” with scepticism, these terms seem to be accepted without scrutiny 
in popular culture today, where a reductive binary between what is “real,” or authentic, and 
what is “artificial,” or inauthentic, has been formed.  
 According to Taylor (1991:3) and Guignon (2004:3), the concept of authenticity, and 
especially the quest for an “authentic life”, has indeed become a buzzword and fad in 
contemporary society, obsessed as it is with “real life stories” and reality television. Guignon 
(2004:4) argues that this “fad” is fuelled by pop psychology, self-help trends, and a talk-show 
                                                            
1 Although postmodernism and poststructuralism are two separate approaches, this study focuses on the 
overlapping concerns between them with regard to issues of language, identity and intertextuality. The terms will 
sometimes be used interchangeably – unless otherwise denoted. 
2 Authenticity is defined, for the purposes of this study, as that which is genuine or original, in the sense that it is 
not an imitation, mimicry, or copy of something else. 
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culture. Pop psychology “generally presupposes that we have something within us that we are 
unwilling or unable to raise to expression” (Guignon, 2004:4). According to pop psychology, 
there is a very definite authentic core to each human being which can be accessed with the 
right psychological guidance.  
 This obsession with what is real also permeates much of current journalism. According 
to De Kock (2008:89), anti-intellectualism is a widespread phenomenon resulting in a 
preference for “real” journalistic content versus “intellectual” content. Journalistic content 
with a more intellectual angle is consequently regarded as somehow less authentic or further 
removed from reality than content without such an angle. As De Kock (2008:89) states, this is 
“an extremely vicious and reductive binary,” since “intellectualism” is unfortunately usually 
defined as concepts which need more than two or three syllables per word to be described in 
these discourses, ignoring Spivak’s crucial statement that “plain prose cheats, and […] clear 
thought hides” (in De Kock, 1992:40). De Kock (2008:89) therefore argues that more 
accessible journalistic content is not necessarily as transparent as it seems. 
 Authenticity is generally regarded as that which is original or genuine, in the sense that 
it is not an imitation, mimicry, or copy of something else. Yet, according to Guignon 
(2004:82), there has been a conflation of various dichotomies within popular culture to form a 
master binary. What is deep, spiritual, innocent, childlike, sensual, and emotional is conflated 
and regarded as “authentic,” while that which is superficial, materialistic, knowledgeable, 
mature and intellectual is regarded as “inauthentic.” 
 The quest for authenticity can also be found in contemporary theatre where the 
fictional is often shunned in favour of reality, or the actual, which is supposedly more 
authentic.3 According to Kron (in Greenfield, 2006:168), there has been a preference for 
autobiographical mono-drama on American stages. Greenfield (2006:168) attributes this to an 
“obsession with personal stories, brought about by the talk-show revolution.” She adds that 
“we might even consider the degree to which so-called reality television whets the appetite for 
telling and hearing ‘real’ stories on the stage.” Correspondingly, Sierz (2011:58) ascribes the 
high prevalence of verbatim drama on British stages in the 2000s to “a hunger in audiences for 
factual truth, theatre’s answer to reality TV, when what you see is not fiction at all.”  
                                                            
3 When distinguishing between fictional levels or frames in film, Crous (2011:283) employs the terms “actual” 
and “fictional” to distinguish between real life and artistic creation. These terms are useful to distinguish also 
between the different ontological levels in theatre, since they avoid the pitfalls surrounding the word “reality.”  
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 The idea that theatre should conform to a standard of authenticity, based on a reductive 
binary which shuns the fictional as inauthentic, is, however, problematic, since theatre is 
inherently fictional. Theatre, as live performance, necessarily represents. According to Elam 
(2002:7), everything on stage is shown within a fictional frame. In theatre, x always stands for 
y. As Elam (2002:7) states, “a table employed in dramatic representation will not usually 
differ in any material or structural fashion from the item of furniture that the members of the 
audience eat at, and yet it is in some sense transformed: it acquires, as it were, a set of 
quotation marks.” In other words, all objects acquire the same ontological status, that of being 
fictional, on stage. This is the case irrespective of the resemblance this object may have to that 
which it is supposed to represent. 
Playwrights, then, often refer to theatre’s necessary fictionality through metareferences, 
or metatheatrical devices, but these devices still function within the fictional frame of theatre. 
Theatre accordingly functions within a fictional frame, regardless of forms such as 
autobiographical mono-drama or verbatim drama which suggest the converse. Theatre is thus 
directly opposed to the popular notion of “authenticity.”  
 
1.3. Pinter’s Betrayal, Stoppard’s The Real Thing, and Marber’s Closer 
 
The antithesis between that which is actual and that which is fictional, both in life and in art, is 
explored in Betrayal, The Real Thing and Closer. Each of these plays compares marital 
fidelity with honesty in art. Pinter’s Betrayal concerns the love triangle between two best 
friends and one of their wives. It is set in upper middle class London, where both men work in 
the literary field: Robert (the husband) is a publisher, Jerry (the adulterer) is a literary agent 
while Emma is an art curator. The events of the play are presented (mostly) in a reverse 
chronological order, and the audience therefore first encounters Jerry and Emma two years 
after their affair has ended. As the play moves backwards in time, the audience uncovers – 
with the characters – not only the one major betrayal of Jerry and Emma’s affair, but also 
various layers of inextricable betrayals between the three characters. Layers of dishonesty are 
stripped off, only to reveal more layers of deceit. 
 Stoppard’s The Real Thing is a distinctly metatheatrical play about infidelity. Henry is 
a playwright married to an actress named Charlotte. Charlotte stars in one of Henry’s plays, 
6 
 
incidentally also about infidelity, alongside Max. Max’s wife Annie is having an affair with 
Henry, and the two of them divorce their spouses and marry each other. But this is not the end 
of the infidelities. Charlotte reveals that she conducted nine affairs while married to Henry and 
Annie also cheats on him in the second act with Billy, a young actor and her co-star in a play 
written by a convict named Brodie. Stoppard mixes up scenes from Henry and Brodie’s plays 
with scenes from the characters’ real lives. The audience is thus deliberately confused as its 
members are obliged to work out which scenes are plays-within-the-plays, and which are 
happening in the outer play (and consequently “really” happening in the lives of the 
characters). 
 Patrick Marber’s Closer is also a play dealing with infidelity, and it too is set in 
London. It is about four characters (from the middle and working classes respectively) who 
are in a succession of (relatively) short lived relationships or affairs with each other. Dan and 
Alice are a couple, but Dan has an affair with Anna, who is married to Larry, who later 
becomes Alice’s lover after she has left Dan. Dan is a novelist and Anna a photographer, and 
the characters debate the authenticity of photographic or literary interpretations of identity. In 
the unfolding of the plot, Marber only shows the audience snippets from the lives of these 
characters, either at the beginning or the end of a relationship. The audience is thereby given 
limited, but crucial, information to piece together the plot of the play and, like the characters, 
struggles to form a clear image of each character, because each scene exposes the image 
created in the previous one as a lie.  
 All three of these plays thus use literature and/or art to explore the deceptive ways in 
which we make sense of the world around us, using a combination of realist and 
metatheatrical forms. The characters’ encounters with each other are shown to be based on 
unstable, shifting versions of themselves, frequently including deliberate lies. In these plays, 
art and language fulfil similar functions and both prove to be, if not inadequate, misleading. 
Instead of uncovering a firm or stable identity, language, rather, obscures, conceals, and 
deceives, functioning as a fiction. The motif of betrayal in all three plays is expressed in the 
romantic relationships of the characters, but these infidelities also point to an even more 
fundamental epistemological betrayal. The concept of dishonesty not only concern the 
characters within the play, but also point outward towards the actual world of the audience 
and questions the way in which its members trust what they know to be true.  
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1.4. Literature survey 
 
To ensure that duplication of research did not take place, various databases were consulted. 
The NRF Nexus database and ProQuest were respectively consulted for South African and 
international theses and dissertations. For other studies, Academic Search Premier, JSTOR, 
Literature Online, Literature Resource Centre (Gale) and Wilson Web were consulted.  
 Although a multitude of studies have been conducted on the plays of Pinter, none that I 
could find discuss the metatheatrical aspects of Betrayal in depth. While Stoppard’s The Real 
Thing has been discussed as a metatheatrical text, I do not believe that it has been read in 
tandem with Betrayal and Closer, a reading which more clearly uncovers the link between 
metatheatre and romantic relationships. The link between Betrayal and Closer has been 
explored by Shaw in his doctoral thesis entitled “Positive influence: Harold Pinter and the in-
yer-face generation” (2008). Still, Shaw focuses mainly on the gender construction of the 
characters in the two plays. He compares the identities of Betrayal’s characters with Closer’s 
from the perspectives of feminism and Girard’s model of mimetic desire. Consequently, Shaw 
does not investigate issues of fictionality in either play. 
 Hence, to my knowledge, no prior study has investigated the metatheatrical aspects 
concerning authenticity and fictionality comparatively in the above mentioned texts. 
 
1.5. Research problem and objectives 
 
In the light of the given context, the following research questions are addressed by this study: 
 How is the concept of authenticity portrayed in Pinter’s Betrayal, Stoppard’s The Real 
Thing, and Marber’s Closer? 
 How are the characters’ identities constructed and conveyed to the other characters as 
well as the audience? 
 How and to what extent does the audience become involved in the fictional world of 
the characters?  
 What are the implications of these findings for theatre as an art form? 
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The aims of the study are the following: 
 To demonstrate how Pinter, Stoppard, and Marber define and explore the concept of 
authenticity in the fictional and the actual through their metatheatrical plays. 
 To show how arbitrary the construction and mediation of the characters’ identities are, 
from the perspective of the other characters as well as that of the audience. 
 To show the significance of the role that the audience fulfils in these plays, not only 
within the fictional world of the play, but also in the actual world of the audience. 
 To show how issues of authenticity, fictionality and dishonesty impact on a genre that 
by definition depends upon illusion. 
 
1.6. Thesis statement 
 
This study argues that the three plays in question explore the boundary between the actual and 
the fictional by presenting authenticity as something which cannot be accessed directly by 
either the characters or the audience. Therefore, what is perceived as authenticity is 
inextricably linked to mediation, which comprises language and artistic expression. These 
forms of communication prove to be evasive and misleading, continually betraying 
authenticity. And yet, mediation remains the only way through which to perceive and interpret 
the world. 
 The identities of the characters in the three respective plays are consequently and 
inevitably constructed and conveyed through mediation, evasive as it may be. In these plays, 
language is not a simple, linear process but represented as a way to depict constructed 
“versions” or “fictions” of the characters’ identities. These perceived versions of the 
characters’ identities are continually dismantled and recreated when they turn out to be 
deceiving. 
 The spectators are drawn into the fictional world of the characters since they also have 
to navigate their way through the various fictions presented on stage. The hand of the 
dramatist is in each case clearly perceptible as the audience members are confused by a 
proliferation of fictions which point outwards toward their own actual existence. They are 
therefore invited to evaluate their own actual world according to the standards of the fictional 
play and are therefore simultaneously pulled into and pushed out of the fictional world.  
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 By exploring the boundary between the actual and the fictional through a combination 
of realist and metatheatrical forms (as opposed to verbatim drama or autobiography), these 
plays do not presume to bypass the fictional in favour of the actual. Instead, they demonstrate 
that the boundary between the fictional and the actual may easily become confused. Although 
art implies artifice and theatre necessarily represents, fiction is not confined to art and theatre. 
Nor is artifice confined to intellectual discourse: fiction permeates every aspect of human life, 
from the interpretation of an intellectual play by a canonised playwright to the love affairs of 
working class people.  
 
1.7. Methodology 
 
This is a text-based study, aiming to provide a new interpretation of the selected texts of 
Pinter, Stoppard and Marber. Since the evasive nature of language and scepticism about 
authenticity are salient themes in all three texts, a theoretical framework, drawing on 
postmodernism and poststructuralism, is appropriate for the analysis of these texts. 
 The notions of Guignon (2004) and Baudrillard (1994) about the concept of 
authenticity within the postmodern context, were valuable in explaining certain 
misconceptions about the term, relevant to these plays. The poststructuralist thought of 
Hartman (1985) and Derrida (1978), which in turn draw on Nietzsche (1998) and Heidegger 
(2010), is useful in the investigation of the use of language in these plays. The theories 
advanced by Bakhtin and Maturana, on the other hand, explain how meaning is constituted 
through interaction whereas Eco’s (1992) writing sheds light on how to navigate through a 
proliferation of fictions.  
 With regard to literature and art as mimesis, the studies of Potolsky (2006) and 
Melberg (1995) (respectively titled Mimesis and Theories of mimesis) proved insightful. 
Beaumont’s (2010) A concise companion to realism and Wolf’s (2009) seminal Metareference 
across media were useful in mapping out the interplay between the forms of realism and 
metatext within a postmodern context, as also discussed by Hutcheon (1984). 
 While applying these lines of thought to the genre of theatre, I relied on the research of 
Bogatyrev (1976), Kurman (1975-1976), Bigsby (1980), Hornby (1986), Elam (2002), 
Carlson (2004), Eversmann (2004), Filmer (2008), and Klimek (2009) to explain the concepts 
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of ostension and duplexity in theatre. In the testing of the fictionality of theatre, I refer to the 
theories of Sartre (1976), Artaud (1968), Brecht (1968), and Grotowski (in Kumiega, 1982) as 
well as studies by Sayre (1999), Jurgensen (2007), Schmidt (2013), and Wake (2013). 
 In my discussion of metatheatre, I consulted the work of Abel (1963), Hornby (1986), 
Esslin, (1987), Klimek (2009), and Wolf (2009) while Sierz’s (2000) study, In-yer-face 
theatre: British drama today was seminal in defining and establishing the significance of in-
yer-face theatre. 
 In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, I investigate the concepts of authenticity and 
mediation in the actual and fictional levels of the texts of Pinter, Stoppard and Marber, making 
use of the aforementioned theories, which not only sheds light on the significance of these 
concepts in the selected plays, but also aids in directing the discussion. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that these works tackle infidelity, Pinter’s Betrayal, Stoppard’s The Real 
Thing, and Marber’s Closer grapple with uncovering the truth: about each other, about life in 
general and about art. The characters question the authenticity of art and accuse it of being 
inauthentic, sometimes relying on popular notions of the term. However, in the three plays, 
the fictional is shown to be inextricable from the actual, and the characters’ own 
interpretations of the world are thus no more “authentic” than the artistic expressions in the 
plays. 
 This correlates closely with poststructuralist theories of language which assert that 
meaning cannot be separated from perception. Our explanations of the world therefore are not 
recordings of the world, but constitute it. Therefore, as suggested in these plays, after an 
illusion is broken, there is no objective truth behind it, only more interpretations or 
representations.  
 In addition, these plays are self-reflexive. The audience is thereby drawn into the 
fictional world of the characters, complicating the boundary between the fictional and the 
actual. 
 In the next chapter, I discuss the above mentioned theories regarding authenticity, 
language, mimicry, and theatre. Chapters Three, Four and Five apply the theory discussed in 
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Chapter Two to investigate the use of language and art as a kaleidoscope, hall of mirrors and a 
mirage in Betrayal, The Real Thing, and Closer respectively, thereby answering the research 
questions about authenticity, mediation and audience involvement articulated above. Chapter 
Six concludes the study by articulating the salient findings of the preceding chapters and 
discussing the significance of reading the plays in tandem. 
  
12 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
THEORIES ABOUT TRUTH AND ARTIFICE IN 
LITERATURE AND THEATRE 
 
 In any case, the person who finds this diary will have one certain advantage over me: with a written 
 language it is always possible to reconstruct a dictionary and a grammar, isolate sentences, transcribe 
 them or paraphrase them into another language, whereas I am trying to read in the succession of things 
 presented to me every day the world’s intentions toward me, and I grope my way, knowing that there 
 can exist no dictionary that will translate into words the burden of obscure allusions that lurks in these 
 things. – Italo Calvino, If on a winter’s night a traveller (1981) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In the epigraph above, Italo Calvino’s character suggests that it is easier to make sense of 
sensory experience once it has been written down, implying a definite distinction between 
actual experience and writing. This distinction is, however, often muddled in postmodern 
times, when the idea of the core or essence of reality is regarded with scepticism and the 
writing or mimicry of experience, certainly seems more trustworthy than actual experience.  
 Having, in the previous chapter, posed certain questions about authenticity and theatre, 
I shall now proceed to discuss the most important theoretical discourses within 
postmodernism and poststructuralism in this regard. I start with a discussion on the way in 
which these regard authenticity as impossible, following with a discussion on how language 
and literature represent actual experience. Towards the end of the chapter, I narrow my focus 
to theatre’s unique relation to actuality, emphasising the tension between the actual and the 
fictional in each instance. 
 
2.2. The impossibility of authenticity 
 
In Chapter One, I suggested that the current binary opposition between authenticity and 
intellectualism is rooted in the dichotomy between nature and culture. Derrida (1978:283) 
traces this dichotomy back to the time of Plato, stating that it is “at least as old as the 
Sophists.” He argues that the claim that nature is opposed to law, education, art, technics, 
liberty, the arbitrary, history, society and the mind, has been passed on through history.  
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In On being authentic (2004), Guignon traces notions about authenticity from 
premodern times to pop culture’s current preoccupation with it. Guignon (2004) refers to 
various worldviews dating from the 16th, 17th and 19th centuries respectively, which directly 
influence our concept of authenticity, based on the nature/culture binary to which Derrida also 
refers.  
The Romantic worldview developed at various times in diverse ways in different parts 
of Europe. It was a reaction against the modern worldview, which saw the pursuit of 
happiness as the highest goal in life, whose most influential advocate was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau attempts to recover a sense of wholeness that was lost with 
the rise of modernity and claims that “truth” is discovered, not by rational reflection and 
scientific method, but by a total immersion in one’s own and most intense feelings. According 
to Rousseau, the self is the highest and most all-encompassing of all that is found in reality. 
Rousseau urges humankind not to listen to society, but to listen to nature, which he sees as the 
voice of God, and aims to discover the shape of life through self-expression, or 
autobiographical writings. He thus regards individual perception as truth and his worldview is 
clearly in keeping with the time in which he lived – before Darwin and Nietzsche questioned 
the existence of a God (Guignon, 2004:52-60).  
Rousseau (1953:262) does, however, find unfiltered self-expression problematic, as 
memory is fallible and finite: “I may omit or transpose facts, or make mistakes in dates; but I 
cannot go wrong about what I have felt or about what my feelings have lead me to do.” 
Therefore, Rousseau makes a distinction between subjective truth and objective truth, 
favouring the former. 
Rousseau’s distinction may be linked to the nature/culture dichotomy to which Derrida 
(1978) refers and which still permeates academic and philosophic discussions as well as 
popular culture and journalism (De Kock, 2008:89). Guignon’s (2004:82) binary of the 
authentic versus the inauthentic, with its implied bias towards the “natural” or “authentic”, 
may in turn be linked to what De Kock (2008:89) refers to as “anti-intellectualism,” a 
widespread and undesirable phenomenon. As stated in Chapter One, De Kock (2008:89) 
argues that the South African media has, for example, a prejudice against “intellectual” 
content as opposed to “real” content and describes this distinction as “an extremely vicious 
binary.” For De Kock (2008:89), regarding intellectual journalistic content as inauthentic, or, 
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somehow less “real” than, for example, human interest pieces, narrows the public sphere. This 
is particularly so when the intellectual is defined as that which needs to be expressed in words 
of more than two syllables, which is often the case. 
This dichotomy exists despite various philosophical and academic discourses which 
have debunked it altogether. Drawing from Kant, Eco (1999:76) rejects a binary between the 
senses and intellect on the grounds that “information provided by the senses is insufficient, 
because you need the intellect that reflects on what the senses have put before it.” Eco 
(1999:145-146) argues that the environment is overwhelmingly complex and that we 
consequently tend to categorise it, making “different things equivalent, grouping objects and 
events into classes.” This conflation of things and concepts ultimately leads to binary 
oppositions, such as that between nature/culture.   
Derrida (1978:283-284) sets out to invalidate the nature/culture binary by referring to 
the sociological work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. According to Lévi-Strauss’ observations, the 
nature/culture binary depends on the assumption that nature includes “that which is universal 
and spontaneous, and not dependent on any particular culture or any determinate norm” 
(Derrida, 1978:283). On the other hand, culture is “that which depends on a system of norms 
regulating society and therefore is capable of varying from one social structure to another.” 
Yet, the incest prohibition confounds this distinction since it requires the predicates of both 
nature and culture. This prohibition is a phenomenon which Lévi-Strauss found to be 
universal – therefore belonging to nature. Yet, it is also an imposed prohibition, suggesting 
that it belongs to the domain of culture. By belonging to both the domains of nature and 
culture, the said prohibition resists the clear cut distinction between that which is natural and 
that which is imposed, or cultural. According to Derrida (1978:284), the incest prohibition is 
only one of various such examples which dismantles the binary between nature and culture. 
 Furthermore, in his work, Of grammatology, Derrida exposes a contradiction in the 
roots of this binary: that of Rousseau’s Confessions (Murfin, 1996:188): 
 
Rousseau – who has often been seen as another great Western idealist and believer in 
innocent, noble origins – on one hand condemned writing as mere representation, a 
corruption of the more natural, childlike, direct and therefore undevious speech. On the 
other hand, Rousseau acknowledges his own tendency to lose self-presence and blurt 
out exactly the wrong thing in public. He confesses that, by writing at a distance from 
his audience, he often expressed himself better. 
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As Derrida points out, Rousseau in consequence fails to illustrate the nature/culture dichotomy 
in his own writing. When trying to draw a line between that which is inherently part of a 
person and that which culture or convention imposes, it quickly becomes clear that this line is 
blurred.  
 While Heidegger distinguishes a “they-self” from an “authentic self,” where the 
former is “a form of being, which has been dispersed into the ‘they’ or mass of otherness 
found in groups of others” (Ekberg, 2011:76), Waskul (2009:59) finds such a demarcation 
impossible. Waskul (2009:51) performs a hypothetical “Garfinkelian” social experiment in 
which, for one entire day, he proposes to perform only actions which are completely sincere 
and express him authentically. In exploring such an hypothesis, Waskul (2009:53) finds that 
simple, everyday tasks, such as picking an outfit to wear, become overanalysed: 
 
The decision is agonising because clothing is one of many “sign vehicles” (Goffman, 
1959): a source of information about a person’s character. On any other day, I 
wouldn’t have given it a second thought. Today, however, in my efforts to be utterly 
sincere and authentic, I am paralysed by choices. 
 
Waskul (2009:58) thus draws the conclusion that sincerity and authenticity are shifting and 
nebulous concepts. They are 
 
…neither concrete nor tangible but performances that are patently emotional and 
affective. As much as people may value sincerity and authenticity they are relative 
definitions of the situation, emergent in shifting fields of meaning, attainable only in 
partial degrees, and rather irrelevant to self and society.  
 
The relationship of a person to nature and culture is accordingly not one of a metaphorical 
face and mask. One does not have a natural face which is hidden with a cultural mask. The 
self is, rather, plural and multiple: “people have as many selves as they have unique situations 
for interaction” (Waskul, 2009:60). By trying to separate what is natural or authentic from 
what is cultural or inauthentic, Waskul realises that this is impossible, as a quest for “purely” 
authentic behaviour leads to heightened levels of introspection which destroy any attempts at 
spontaneity and “normality.” Waskul (2009:62) concludes by quoting Goffman (1959:13) who 
argues that although it is quite possible to determine if something is “unreal,” or, for that 
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matter, “inauthentic,” this does not mean that “reality” or “authenticity” is clearly 
recognisable or definable.  
In agreement with Waskul, Guignon (2004:112-113) applies Nietzsche’s conception of 
reality to the postmodern condition, describing the postmodern self as comprising “many 
identities inhabiting one body and showing themselves to greater or lesser degrees in the 
public arena, many characters making their entrances and exits as the context demands.” 
Durham (1998:11) explicates Nietzsche’s notion by observing that 
 
…no image is so well-founded that it is not subverted by movement of difference and 
divergence. No identity is so well-established that it is not haunted by a series of 
masks and simulacra expressing a virtual potential that remains as yet unactualised 
within it: the power to assume another role, to become other than itself.  
 
Since, as stated earlier, there can be no core or essence to truth, according to Nietzsche, there 
also cannot be a core or essence to any person’s identity. According to Schmidt (2005:49), 
masks can effectively express the illusory nature of a supposedly “stable self,” suggesting a 
sense of self which can be transformed at will, resulting in a number of provisional selves, 
“none of which can fully represent the self.” 
Guignon (2004:120) subsequently draws the conclusion that although the self cannot 
be “boiled down” to an essence, core or “face” which may be revealed when the metaphorical 
cultural “mask” is removed, it can be constituted through interaction. Guignon (2004:120) 
cites Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism to substantiate this claim. Bakhtin (in Shotter & Billig, 
1998:16) proposes that meaning resides in interaction and that the only means to come to 
know either the self or the Other, is through dialectic discourse. According to Shotter and 
Billig (1998:16), “our sense of our own and other people’s mental states exists only ‘in’ the 
internal relations within such [observable] acts [of communication].” 
Yet, it is impossible ever to fully know the Other. According to Hitchcock (1998:92), 
Bakhtin affirms that “pure identification with the Other is a fiction (no one can fully 
experience his pain).” In this, the members of the human race are both isolated from one 
another, since no one can ever experience another’s perspective, and yet also joined together 
as this isolation is a universal attribute (Holloway & Kneale, 2000:74). This poses the 
question, to what extent can language be seen as a conduit between people? 
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2.3. Language: barrier or conduit to the real self? 
 
The fact that language is not perceived as something external to the self or some inadequate 
tool which taints the self in the process of revealing it, has led to the “linguistic turn,” 
described by Melberg (1995:4) as “the well-known signum of modern philosophy and literary 
theory, most often expressed as a discrepancy of meaning and reference.” Poststructuralist 
notions of language are thus pointedly sceptical and the failure of communication is almost 
taken for granted. And yet, Hartman (1985: xii) aptly sums up the poststructuralist attitude 
towards language by stating that “nothing can lift us out of language into a surer medium.” 
This is rooted in Wittgenstein’s view that although we know that preverbal experience exists, 
we need verbal concepts to be conscious of this (Hutcheon, 1984:91). Castle (2008:146) also 
explains the postmodern condition as a condition in which words are solely able to refer to 
other words. If nothing can lift us out of language and words cannot be trusted, 
poststructuralism leaves us in an intellectual deadlock. 
 Additionally, Heidegger’s (2010:987) ideas about consciousness and phenomenology 
reject the view of language which decrees that “speaking is expression,” that “speech is 
regarded as” a mere “activity of man” and that “expression is always presentation of the real 
and unreal.” Heidegger does not view language as a tool separate from the self with which he 
or she can refer to an objective world. According to Leitch (2010:983), Heidegger regards 
language as: “neither mimetic nor expressive: it does not represent an external reality, nor 
does it express a preexisting feeling or thought. Language shapes consciousness and 
perception, calling things into being, it does not merely designate or label objects.” 
 Similarly, Maturana and Varela (1980:88) perceive humankind as bound in 
description. Maturana and Varela (1980: xi) view language as the way in which we sculpt 
ourselves into being. In his explanation of the implications of Maturana’s theory for language 
and literature, De Kock (2008:92) argues that language is not reserved for bloodless matters of 
the intellect, but that language interactions are as powerful as physical interactions, because 
they are always entwined with emotion. De Kock (2008:92) cites the example of a 
compliment that is experienced like a stroke, or conversely, an insult, which is experienced 
like a blow in the guts. According to Maturana, our rationality and emotions are inextricable 
(De Kock, 2008:93). 
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 Maturana thus seems to agree with Nietzsche (in Zima, 1999:141) who attacks the 
binary in language between the content plane (or the meaning of what a person is trying to 
say) and the expression plane (or the manner in which he or she expresses him- or herself). 
The world is not revealed by, or described with language, but created in language. According 
to Nietzsche (1998:77), the world is a fiction we create for ourselves. Since there might, 
according to Maturana and Varela (1998:212), be no limit to what we can describe or imagine 
in words or language, there may, to a certain extent, be no limit to the world. Maturana (in De 
Kock, 2008:88) accordingly refers to the universe as the multiverse, as it is continually 
recreated “in every single negotiated moment in every individual’s so-called consciousness.” 
In Maturana’s view, it is therefore impossible to distinguish between so-called reality and 
hallucination, without confirmation from an external source.  
 Maturana (1978:63) thus echoes the theories of Bakhtin regarding human 
communication, and also points out that what an individual observes, may only be observed 
from the specific position of the observer. Since each individual’s perception is thus unique to 
him or her, knowledge cannot be transferred (Maturana & Varela, 1980:5). A consensual 
domain needs to be established in which language could take place (Maturana, 1978:50). 
Since language may thus not be regarded as a stable code referring to a stable entity, meaning 
has been regarded as shifting by postmodernists and poststructuralists, such as Schechner 
(2000:4). Maturana (in Köck, 1980:88) remarks that “communication seems, once we come to 
think about it, basically unreliable, hazardous, ambivalent” because its meaning is continually 
shifting. 
 For Bakhtin, as for Maturana, meaning is always context-bound as an utterance and 
does not consist solely of linguistic matter, but also of nonverbal enunciation, which includes 
the spatial horizon, the knowledge shared by the interlocutors and a common evaluation of the 
situation (Todorov, 1984:42). Therefore, an utterance cannot be separated from “particular 
subjects in specific situations” (Holquist, 1990:68) which means that every utterance is 
necessarily unique. Even if the linguistic matter of an utterance is repeated, its exact time and 
space can never be, and in consequence an uttered word carries a meaning which it would not 
in another time or place (Holquist, 1990:69).  
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 Hence, although we try, with centripetal force, to determine the exact meaning of an 
utterance, centrifugal forces are simultaneously at work, undoing the bond between a word 
and that which it refers to; a phenomenon which also interests Derrida:  
It is of course in the nature of language, conventionally conceived, that meanings are 
sought, definitions desired. This is because we use language in the vast number of 
instances without respect for the singular or the idiomatic. Instead we ignore 
language’s figurality in favour of a single figural model whereby all language is in the 
service of representation. Conventionally language functions mimetically, or, at least, 
it is assumed to have this ability, to become a copy, to assume a likeness, of that which 
is not present, that which we seek to describe. (Wolfreys, 1998:14-15) 
 
While we try to fix definitions to specific objects, ideas or things, these definitions 
continuously collapse. Derrida draws on the theories of De Saussure who demonstrates that 
“words are not the things they name and, indeed, they are only arbitrarily associated with 
those things” (Murfin, 1996:187). 
 To believe that a word or definition may absolutely represent a thing is to rely on the 
absolute idea of truth, mentioned above, rooted in structuralist thought, which Derrida rejects: 
The assumption about such truths often lies with the idea that somewhere behind or 
beyond all the questioning and debate, all the discursive and textual movement, there 
is a guaranteed, solid, unchanging absolute, a value at the heart or centre (supposing 
such a location to exist is the work of certain kinds of thought and discourse, the 
purpose of their questions being to offer signposts to the imagined centre). This 
assumption imagines that the heart or centre around which questions are permitted to 
proliferate is self-sufficient, fully formed, and not open to questioning itself, with 
regard to the ideas, concepts, discourses which serve to structure it. (Wolfreys, 
1998:24) 
 
Again, in a manner similar to Nietzsche and Maturana referred to above, Derrida also rejects 
the binary opposition between the content plane and the expression plane, since he perceives 
the meaning of the content plane as forever shifting: there is no objective, stable truth. A 
definition, or word, alters each time it is used. Re-iteration does not lead to consolidation of 
meaning, but to disintegration (Zima, 1999:114). Thus, what Nietzsche refers to as the 
“expression plane” is never able to accurately reflect the so-called “content plane.” 
Concurring with Bakhtin, Derrida emphasises the contextually bound nature of any reading 
and asserts that “each reading differs from the one already gone and those to follow” 
(Wolfreys, 1998:14). As a result, no definition may ever be permanently fixed and the 
meaning of any utterance or text is consequently unstable. According to Murfin (1996:187), 
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“the meanings of words lie in the differences between them and the differences between them 
and the things they name.” 
 In The Animal That Therefore I Am (2002:378), Derrida illustrates this notion with an 
excerpt from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (1971): 
[Alice] seems [...] to believe that one can in fact discern between a human “yes” and 
“no.” She seems confident that when it comes to man it is possible to guess whether 
yes or no. Let us not forget that the Cheshire Cat had told her, in the course of a scene 
that deserves a long meditation: “‘We’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad’” (AW, p. 
72). After that he undertakes to demonstrate to her this collective folly. It is the 
moment of simulacrum of discussion, but which comes to grief as they are unable to 
agree on the sense of the words, on what a word means, and in the end no doubt, on 
what word, what the term word could ever mean. “‘Call it what you like,’” the Cat 
ends up saying concerning the difference between growling and purring. 
 
According to Derrida, Alice and the Cheshire Cat will never be able to reach an agreement on 
the meaning of either growling or purring. In his essay Khōra (1998b:231), Derrida explains 
the similar difficulties in defining the word khōra: 
 
at times the khōra appears to be neither this nor that, at times both this and that, but 
this alternation between the logic of exclusion and that of participation […] stems 
perhaps only from a provisional appearance and from the constraints of rhetoric, even 
from some incapacity of naming. 
 
Wolfreys (1998:30) refers to Royle who argues that a reading will necessarily differ from 
“that which it expounds,” since meaning cannot be fixed. There can accordingly never be a 
complete way to read or interpret a text. 
 Furthermore, Derrida (1998a:71-72) argues that, apart from failing to uncover precise 
meanings, language may also obscure meaning, as in the case of ancient Egyptian priests 
making theological science “more difficult to understand” through hieroglyphs. Eco (1983a:3) 
agrees with this fluidity of meaning and argues that a word (in his example the word “rose”) 
can become so rich in meaning that it “hardly has any meaning left.” He also seems to be in 
agreement with Maturana and Bakhtin in viewing knowledge as inherently private. Eco 
(1999:219) explains this by citing the example of a person’s recollection of his or her 
hometown: 
 
If I were blindfolded and taken to my hometown, and then left at the corner of a road, 
with the blindfold removed, I would recognise instantly – or fairly quickly – where I 
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was. […] This eminently visual knowledge of mine is still private, because it would be 
hard for me to give someone a description of my hometown that would enable him to 
recognise it in analogous circumstances. 
 
Yet, according to Collini (1992:8), Eco, having been one of the most influential scholars in 
investigating and emphasising the role of the reader in the production of meaning, expressed 
unease in his later work about the licensing of the reader to “produce a limitless, uncheckable 
flow of ‘readings’” associated with “that style of Derrida-inspired American criticism calling 
itself ‘Deconstruction’ and associated above all with the work of Paul de Man and J. Hillis 
Miller.” According to Eco (1999:48): 
 
While it is a principle of hermeneutics that there are no facts, only interpretations, this 
does not prevent us from asking if there might not perchance be “bad” interpretations. 
Because to say that there are no facts, only interpretations, certainly means saying that 
what appears to us as fact is the effect of interpretation but not that every possible 
interpretation produces something that, in the light of subsequent interpretations, we 
are obliged to consider as if it were a fact. 
 
While Eco (1992:24) thus acknowledges the instability of meaning, he also argues that not 
every act of interpretation “can have a happy end.” Eco (1999:274) contends that although 
meaning is arbitrarily linked to language, this should not “rule out […] the existence of a grain 
that binds our cognitive types” or “the linguistic conventions that register these bonds and 
supply the basis for successive interpretations and negotiations.” Although not permanently 
fixed or clear cut, meaning can be negotiated and determined – to a certain extent – through 
convention. 
 Although there cannot be any rules with which to ascertain which interpretations of a 
text are the best ones, there can be rules to ascertain which ones are “bad” (Eco, 1992:52). Eco 
(1992:64-65) suggests that an interpretation “of a certain portion of a text can be accepted if it 
is confirmed by, and must be rejected if it is challenged by, another portion of the same text.” 
It is consequently the “internal textual coherence” of the text that controls its valid 
interpretation. According to Eco (1999:20), we can distinguish between a dream, a poetic 
invention and an acid trip, and as a result are also able to distinguish between a “good” 
interpretation and a “bad” one. He therefore defies Maturana’s concepts which suggest that 
any interpretation needs to be externally confirmed by arguing that there are lines of resistance 
in texts which encourage certain interpretations and discourage others. 
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 Still, Culler (1992:113-114) regards Eco’s argument as a misunderstanding of 
Deconstruction and states that certain “bad” interpretations might merely enable us to reflect 
on the way communication functions. According to Culler (1992:120), Eco’s definition of 
deconstruction is flawed. For Culler, deconstruction insists rather that meaning is context 
bound than implying that a text may mean anything that the reader wants it to mean.  
 Therefore, although there is significant disagreement between scholars within 
postmodernism and poststructuralism, some issues regarding language and meaning seem to 
dovetail. In poststructuralist thought, language is not perceived as an external tool to describe 
an objective reality, but is inextricable from both human consciousness and the reality which it 
is assumed to describe. This reality exists only in language; hence no utterance can ever be 
divorced from its context. As Eco expounds, although language is sometimes proposed to be 
unreliable and hazardous, since no meaning may be absolutely fixed to any word, meaning is 
not entirely arbitrary, but may to a certain extent, be negotiated and determined. 
 We have thus established that, although determined by convention, language cannot be 
regarded as inauthentically cultural in the nature/culture binary. Language is inherently part of 
the way in which we perceive the world. But, apart from day to day communication, there is 
also another level on which language operates, and that is in literature. While language 
consists, on the one hand of “predominantly pragmatic and argumentative discourses and uses 
of sign systems,” there are, on the other hand, also “the media and in particular the arts” which 
are “at least capable of […] fulfilling non-pragmatic, playful and aesthetic functions as well as 
in many, albeit not all cases the additional function of representation” (Wolf, 2009:32-33). We 
do not communicate merely to get along in our day to day existence. Language also fulfils a 
higher, playful aesthetic function.  Clearly, language is neither barrier nor conduit to meaning. 
But can we say the same for the playful and aesthetic literary text? 
 
2.4. Literature: mimesis and metatext 
 
2.4.1. Art as reproduction of the actual world 
 
Art is often interpreted as a reproduction of the actual world and described in expressions such 
as “a slice of life.” Nevertheless, the relationship between art and the actual world is just as – 
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if not more – complex as the relationship between language and the actual world. Potolsky 
(2006:1) investigates this relationship in his study, Mimesis, in which he argues that “mimesis 
fundamentally defines the way we think about art, literature and representation – whether we 
are aware of it or not.”  
 As can be expected, Potolsky (2006) devotes an important part of his study to Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s contrasting views on mimesis, which currently form the basis of many similar 
debates. Potolsky (2006:2) ascribes the nature/culture divide and the entire history of literary 
theory to Plato’s notion that art imitates something real and natural. To him, mimesis is “more 
than a theory” about “art and images”: it connects “ideas about artistic representation” to 
“more general claims about human social behaviour” and “the ways in which we know and 
interact with others and our environment” (Potolsky, 2006:2).  
 In Republic, Plato defines art as “essentially mimetic, as a representation of something 
else,” which marks an important moment in the philosophy of art, since Greek culture 
regarded images as actualisations of what they represent prior to this claim (Potolsky, 
2006:15-16). For Plato, there is a definite divide between real objects and “semblances” such 
as miming, pictures, shadows, dreams, reflections and footprints. To him, art is in 
consequence an appearance, “not a real thing” (Potolsky, 2006:16-17). According to Plato, the 
philosopher “comes closest to first-hand knowledge of real reality.” Any “imitation” can thus 
be disregarded (Melberg, 1995:10). 
 In contrast to Plato, Aristotle defends mimesis. Unlike Plato, he does not consider 
mimesis as being opposed to reason and proposes that “tragedy offers quasi-philosophical 
insights into human actions” (Potolsky, 2006:33). For Aristotle, mimesis is “a real thing” and 
he argues that, because children tend to mimic adults and therefore learn chiefly through an 
action resembling mimesis, it can be regarded as natural and inherently part of human beings 
(Potolsky, 2006:37).4 Unlike Plato, who feels that mimesis elicits undesirable emotion, 
Aristotle avers that tragedy can lead to the purgation of emotion (Potolsky, 2006:45) since the 
fictional distance implied in mimesis protects us from what is represented and enables us to 
learn from the representation (Potolsky, 2006:37). Yet, Aristotle remains biased against the 
spectacle of theatre (Balme, 2008:66). 
                                                            
4 For the purposes of this study, “mimesis” is regarded as the imitative representation of actuality in art and 
literature, and “mimicry” as the imitation of something or someone. Although the two terms are related, the first 
refers to an aesthetic theory while the latter refers to an action. 
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 Potolsky (2006:3-4) argues that the conflict between the views of Plato and Aristotle 
led to a divide in Western thought concerning two notions about life and art, derived from a 
combined approach of Plato and Aristotle’s views. The first view proposes that art reflects the 
world as it is, functioning as a mirror to the world (another often quoted expression). 
According to the second view, art is a self-contained “heterocosm,” a simulation of a familiar 
world which copies our ways of knowing and understanding: art is thus a mirror of the 
spectator and his or her beliefs. 
 While the second view seems to carry considerably more weight than the first, the 
implication of a mirror image of the spectator and his or her beliefs is still somewhat 
problematic. Melberg (1995:1) asserts that mimesis inevitably turns to repetition. Yet, as is the 
case with the repetition of any utterance, repetition cannot lead to a reproduction, replica, or 
exact copy. Melberg (1995:2) continues: “mimesis is never a homogenous term, and if its 
basic movement is towards similarity it is always open to the opposite.” Mimesis is based on 
the “fact” that the truth cannot be reproduced as Heidegger asserts (Melberg, 1995:3). 
Mimesis therefore necessarily implies illusion, which in turn asks questions about the 
convention of realism, which supposedly mimics the actual world in a straightforward 
manner. 
 
2.4.2. Realism 
 
In his article Supernatural Realism, Smajić (2009:1) tests the boundaries of the convention 
known as realism. As a starting point, he cites the following received definition: “realism is 
thought to exemplify a mode of perceiving, comprehending, and representing persons, objects, 
and events in accordance with natural laws and rationally explicable causal relations.” 
Realism thus aims to represent a fictional world that closely resembles what is thought to be 
the actual world. And, particularly initially, realism would seem to provide a fiction 
representing the actual in contrast to the preceding romance fiction. In fact, realism was at first 
defined as non-romance fiction (Jameson, 2012:475).  
 Nonetheless, it quickly becomes clear that this term is (once again) not so easily 
defined. One could argue that because “truth” cannot be reproduced, realism is a venture 
doomed to fail from the onset. And if realism’s proposed resemblance to the actual world is 
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used as a measuring stick, then its meaning would be continually shifting. Thus, Smajić 
(2009:1) comments on the elusive nature of the term: “few key terms in the vocabulary of 
literary criticism, and criticism of the novel in particular, have consistently proven to be as 
indispensable yet elusive, unruly, or downright unmanageable as realism.” Thus, as is the case 
with many poststructuralist terms, “realism” is often defined in terms of what it is not, rather 
than what it is: it is not magic realism, science fiction, fantasy or metafiction.  
 Yet, despite his acknowledgement of the “unmanageability” of the term, Smajić 
(2009:4) agrees with Watt’s (1963:33) definition of realism as attempting “a full and authentic 
report of human experience.” Smajić (2009:4) uses this definition in order to defend the 
inclusion of phenomena such as dreams, premonitions and other supposedly supernatural 
occurrences in realist works of literature. Valid as such an argument may be, the use of this 
definition is clearly problematic as it relies on the idea that the actual world can be 
authentically “reported.” Likewise, Jameson (2012:479) finds any claims to authentic 
representation futile because they depend on Lukaćs’ concept of realism as an accurate or 
verisimilar presentation: “these conceptions seem to me static; they convey (perhaps in spite 
of themselves) the idea that reality is a kind of thing out there, to be described as faithfully as 
possible.” 
 Similar to many scholars who tend to be careful in defining realism, so as not to be 
vulnerable to the accusations that their definition is “myopic,” constricting, unable to 
“encompass the broad spectrum of its themes and expressive modalities (Smajić, 2009:1), 
Potolsky (2006:94) approaches realism with more caution. According to him, “realism” is 
“something we recognise when we encounter it, or miss when it is absent, rather than a single 
quality in any given work.” For Potolsky (2006:94), the difficulty in defining the term 
“realism” lies in the ambiguity surrounding the word “real.” The “real” can be understood as 
that which may be perceived with the senses, as opposed to that which is false or imaginary; it 
may also be regarded as something which is impossible to perceive with the senses, as 
opposed to appearance; or the word can be used to refer to the practical.  
 But, in artistic discourses, works of art are still often “legitimised” on the grounds that 
they resemble reality. Jameson (2012:476-477), points out, for example, that there are various 
subgenres within realism, each claiming to be more “realistic” than the one preceding. Hence, 
“social realism” may, for example, be distinguished from “bourgeois realism.” Potolsky 
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(2006:93) also refers to various artistic movements which each claimed to reach an 
unprecedented level of truth or realism. Nineteenth-century novelists claimed to reveal the 
truth about ordinary people for the first time, while photography was initially regarded as an 
advance over painting. 
 Thus, it was only a matter of time before realism was “dethroned” as the literary style 
supposedly closest to the actual world by other literary conventions, such as naturalism and 
modernism. Where realism presented a “social totality” by selecting representative elements, 
naturalism shows chaos and unconnected, disorganised details. It aims to directly mirror the 
humdrum of capitalist reality rather than focusing on special relationships – as realism 
proposes to do (Potolsky, 2006:105). But, although differing significantly from realism, 
naturalism also has its own agenda. The naturalism of the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century “was not simply a distillation of realism.” Realists such as Flaubert aimed to 
“sustain an attitude of detached neutrality;” while naturalists “imposed a very specific view of 
mankind onto their fictional narratives, fictional realism can be described in general terms as 
an aesthetic mode; literary naturalism was more specifically an aesthetic doctrine and 
recognisable school” (Ledger, 2010:87). Ledger (2010:87) also notes that naturalism was 
more limited and narrower than nineteenth century realism and that it was markedly 
influenced by Darwin in that it represented life as a continuous struggle and perceived humans 
as only slightly elevated from animals. Even into the second decade of the 21st century, 
naturalism is still being used in conjunction with a social realist agenda to strengthen claims of 
genuineness in “a view of society which depicted working-class or lower-class life in an 
unglamorous – and often deliberately dirty – way, while stressing the truth or authenticity of 
this experience” (Sierz, 2011:17). 
 Modernism, on the other hand, sought to uncover the truth that lay beneath “an 
accumulation of misrepresentations, platitudes and stereotypes” established by realism and 
presented itself as an operation that “could establish contact between mind and language” 
(Armstrong, 2010:117). 
 Therefore, Beaumont (2010: xv) argues that in the postmodern climate of the twentieth 
century, realism has been regarded with impatience and apathy. It has become a straw doll to 
“show up the authentic and original literary or critical action occurring elsewhere” (Bowlby, 
2010: xv). Realism is regarded as presenting a Eurocentric, heteronormative version of the 
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actual world (Cleary, 2012:161) and has therefore been rejected from a political viewpoint 
rooted in a suspicion of representation. In the twentieth century, realism was perceived as 
philosophically naïve and ideologically deceptive (Esty & Lye, 2012:271). A number of 
feminists have also expressed dissatisfaction with realist forms, claiming that these represent a 
mainly patriarchal “reality” (Aston, 1995:60).5 
 On this succession of literary styles, Potolsky (2006:93) remarks:  
 
Each technique has doubtlessly improved an ability to reproduce the world we see and 
experience. Yet this relentless artistic and technological quest for better ways of 
depicting reality is strangely fixated on traditional ideas about mimesis. [...] We might 
go so far as to suggest that it is only because Plato defined art by its more or less 
accurate reproduction of the real that linear perspective or photography or virtual 
reality can be understood to mark progress in art, rather than just a change in medium 
or style. 
 
If we accept that an authentic representation of the actual world is impossible and we no 
longer value art according to its supposed ability to accurately reproduce the world, the above 
mentioned hierarchy falls flat. One literary style is then no longer able to dethrone another on 
the grounds that it is supposedly closer to the actual world than the preceding style. For 
Hutcheon (1984:41-42), postmodernism merely revealed “that what had formerly been 
accepted as an unimpeachable canon of ‘novelistic realism’ was really just another set of 
literary conventions.” 
 Robbe-Grillet (in Bowlby, 2010: xix) contends that representation styles do not change 
in order to “dethrone” one another as accurate representations of the actual world. He cites 
three reasons for the continual alteration in styles: firstly, a style loses its power of novelty as 
soon as it becomes established. Secondly, the world is always changing and literary styles are 
influenced by this process. Lastly, new realisms may also create new ways of seeing reality, 
which in turn, warrant new styles of representation. 
 Hence, while realism may be reduced to a conservative convention, that which “has 
already been read, seen, done, experienced” (Barthes, 1974:20), it is also argued to be an 
exceptionally “elastic” one. According to Taft (2011:362) genres become exhausted when 
they are no longer “artistically useful.” So, for example, realism has, from the end of the 
nineteenth century – apparently – given way to naturalism, or lives on “in a debased, 
                                                            
5 See also Kerr (2004). 
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trivializing form.” Taft (2011:379), however, points out that realism can exist peacefully 
alongside modernism and naturalism and cites George Gissing’s novel, New Grub Street 
(1891) to illustrate. This novel “shows us that literary history is not a succession of one 
dominant genre after another, but a gradually evolving literary field with many genres and 
modes coexisting – peacefully and otherwise – at once.”  
 In addition, Smajić (2009:4) demonstrates how nineteenth century realist works, such 
as those of Dickens, Eliot, James and Charlotte Brontë, encompass the paranormal, 
supernatural and metafictional. In Walter Scott’s Waverley (1972), first published in 1814, for 
example, Fergus and Edward realise that they are fictional characters (Smajić, 2009:7-8). 
George Eliot’s Silas Marner (1861) indicates that “the question of the reality of ghosts” is 
“inextricable from the question […] about the nature and uses of language” (Smajić, 2009:12). 
Lastly, in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) Jane’s experience of extrasensory perception is 
a motif for reading and the mind’s eye (Smajić, 2009:17).  
 Valis (2012:194-195), on the other hand, engages Barthes’ structuralist view that “the 
language of the realist novel does not refer to real things, but to the ways society 
conventionally understands these things,” and that “realist novels reproduce the status quo.” 
According to Valis (2012:194), “the best critical insights” on realism, since Barthes, are those 
which are “least ideologically reductive” and “both confirmed and undermined Barthes’ 
presuppositions” by demonstrating that the “substance behind the mirage of the realist novel” 
is a “kind of construction.” Yet, Valis (2012:195) argues that – for example – in Spanish 
studies, realism has become overfamiliar and as a result, many critics ignore its “slantedness,” 
its way of defamiliarising certain things, of making the stone stony, in Shklovsky’s terms. 
 These above mentioned scholars in consequence make it clear that, not only is realism 
a complex and encompassing style, but it is also contradictory. Alter (1975: x) summarises 
this stance as follows: 
 
…in many important novelists from Renaissance Spain to contemporary France and 
America, the realistic enterprise has been enormously complicated and qualified by the 
writer’s awareness that fictions are never real things, that literary realism is a 
tantalizing contradiction in terms. 
 
Therefore, each new literary technique merely seems more real because it breaks an accepted 
convention (Potolsky, 2006:99). Yet, the question of realism always comes back to the 
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question of how literature represents life, or the “relation between literature and life” (Valis, 
2012:194). However, even Rousseau’s supposedly authentic epistolary form of writing is no 
more real than prose. Rousseau cannot escape the contrived nature of his fiction, as Melberg 
(1995:88) wittily remarks when Rousseau’s protagonist seems to be writing letters right 
before and after the act of love: “the situation may seem slightly bizarre; one might imagine 
that the lover in his excitement before and/or after would let go of pen and paper.” Melberg 
(1995:12) also points out how Plato’s argument against mimesis is in itself mimetic, while 
Bowlby (2010: xv-xvi) remarks that not even, or maybe especially, so-called “reality 
television” portrays an uncontrived situation. 
 As a result we can conclude that there is a level of contrivance in all art forms. Realist 
media are often even purposefully distorted to grant a feel of authenticity. In film, for 
example, a shaky camera and distorted sound and lighting are supposed to add a sense of 
being random and unrehearsed  (Potolsky, 2006:98). Marcus (2010:195) also remarks that 
even film – supposedly the genre representing the actual world the most faithfully – relies on a 
trick of the eye, for its supposed realism. It is only through an optical illusion that the 
succeeding images on a film reel (or a digital video recording, for that matter) seem to move.  
 Although all art forms contain a level of contrivance, it is seldom the aim of art to fool 
the audience (Potolsky, 2006:95). Except in the case of a small number of marginal art works, 
the audience knows that it is dealing with a work of artifice and not with the actual world. 
Artistic “lies” make no claims to realism or truth (Potolsky, 2006:109) and the question of 
truthfulness is thus irrelevant to fiction (Mukařovský in Hutcheon, 1984:90). As Wellek (in 
Hutcheon, 1984:17) also pleads, art should be judged not only by its ability to represent the 
world.  
 And if one abandons this measuring stick of authenticity, realism is not a venture 
doomed to fail, or a politically incorrect, naïve and outmoded genre. It is a literary style in 
which a possible world is constructed that the members of its audience (and this audience is 
often time-bound) are able to recognise as familiar or reminiscent of the actual world in which 
they live. This style may be conservative, but also highly flexible and encompassing.  
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2.4.3. Postmodern metatext 
 
2.4.3.1. Definition 
 
If we accept that no fiction is more or less “real” than any other, however, we still 
acknowledge a basic binary opposition between that which is real, or actual and that which is 
fictional: a binary that postmodernism aims to dismantle. 
 For Potolsky (2006:153-154), the postmodern obsession with the replica (or the 
revitalisation of mimesis) stems from the fact that, while nineteenth century capitalism was 
based on the production of commodities, postmodern capitalism is based on the production of 
appearances. Potolsky (2006:153) considers that “postmodern societies are so saturated with 
images that we can no longer distinguish the original from the copy” and as a result, “mimesis 
is inextricably woven into the fabric of reality itself.” Also, according to Auslander (in 
Schmidt, 2005:77) we can no longer distinguish between lived and mediated experience, 
living in what Baudrillard (1994:1) refers to as the “hyperreal” where we deal with “models of 
a real without original or reality.” For Baudrillard (1994:2), the sign of the real has replaced 
the real, which renders any questions about imitation, duplication, or parody void.  
 Whereas Plato viewed the simulacrum negatively, as repeating only the “external 
appearance” of an icon without participating in the Idea that establishes it itself, as opposed to 
the icon which “inwardly participates in the Idea” (Durham, 1998:7), postmodern critics, such 
as Deleuze and Foucault, therefore view the simulacrum positively. According to Deleuze (in 
Durham, 1998:8): 
 
It is art which invents the lies that raise falsehood to this highest affirmative power, 
that turns the will to deceive into something which is affirmed in the power of the 
false. For the artist, appearance no longer means negation of the real in this world, but 
this kind of selection, correction, redoubling, and affirmation. Then truth perhaps takes 
on a new sense. Truth is appearance. Truth means bringing of power into effect, 
raising to the highest power. In Nietzsche, “we the artists” – “we the seekers after 
knowledge and truth” = “we the inventors of new possibilities of life.” 
  
 Yet, this condition is not surprising if one considers that mimesis is an inherent 
attribute of human nature and that art is viewed as “an exemplary instance of an inherent 
human tendency towards imitation” (Potolsky, 2006:115). Potolsky (2006:115-135) goes on to 
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cite Lacoue-Labarthe, Diderot, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Tarde, Lacan, Borch-Jacobson and 
Laplanche who all regard mimesis as fundamentally part of human life.6 For Lacoue-
Labarthe, “human existence is but a series of copies without a true original,” which is 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s views regarding identity, cited above (Potolsky, 2006:116).  
  For Hutcheon too (1984:58), the act of fiction-making is vital and natural to humans – 
as illustrated in John Fowles’ The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969) where the narrator 
realises that the reader, like the characters in the novel, constantly fictionalises his or her own 
life. Just as we function within language, the novel is not a representation of life, but a 
continuation of it: 
 
The novel is not a copy of the empirical world, nor does it stand in opposition to it. It 
is rather a continuation of that ordering, fiction-making process that is part of our 
normal coming to terms with experience. (Hutcheon, 1984:89) 
 
Fowles thus disputes the idea that the reader need not respond seriously to fiction since it is 
supposedly not “real” (Hutcheon, 1984:59). 
 Baudrillard (1994:20) furthermore points out how the actual and fictional may become 
confounded, using a simulated robbery as example. The gestures and signs for a simulated 
robbery are the same as those for a real robbery and, “in the absence of any evidence of 
simulation,” the police would treat the robbery as a real one and could even “fire real bullets” 
(Potolsky, 2006:154-155). The actual is also able to simulate the fictional, where criminals 
imitate television crime series, “which in turn obsessively fictionalise true crime stories.”  
 McHale (1987:11) thus regards schizophrenia as “the most evocative manifestation of 
[the] fragmentation of personal identity” in postmodern culture, whilst Pfeifer (2009:416) 
points out how this identity crisis is also a “favourite type of postmodern metareference laying 
bare the constructedness and lack of authenticity of characters or the conception of the self in 
general for that matter.” The prevalence of metareference in postmodern media is so great that 
Wolf (2009:10-11) speaks of a metareferential turn: “one of the most outstanding features of 
contemporary, postmodernist culture in the Western world is a hitherto unknown increase in 
meta-phenomena” in popular culture, television and animated films, advertising and computer 
games.   
                                                            
6 Potolsky (2006:159) also points out how repetition is a vital feature in biology. The human race, and all life on 
earth for that matter, can only survive if certain genes are continually repeated.  
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 Metafiction may simply be defined as “fiction about fiction – that is, fiction that 
includes within itself a commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity” (Hutcheon, 
1984:1), or, as the Concise English Oxford Dictionary (2004:896) states, “fiction in which the 
author self-consciously parodies or departs from novelistic conventions.” Similarly, metatext 
may be described as a text that investigates its own conventions.  
 Although metafiction is a very popular convention in postmodern times, it is not new. 
Cervantes’ Don Quijote (1605) is often cited as one of the seminal metafictional literary 
works. Here, Cervantes uses imitation and repetition to create one of the most influential 
literary works in the Western canon (Melberg, 1995:55). In this novel, the character of Don 
Quijote intends to bridge the gap between the fictional and the actual, by bringing literature to 
life; in naming things, he brings the “golden age” back into being (Melberg, 1995:65-72). 
Wolf (2009:71-72) also refers to Aristophanes’ comedy, The Frogs (405 BC) and 
Shakespeare’s comedies such as A Midsummer Night’s Dream (c. 1595) as examples of early 
metatextual works. Yet, Wolf (2009:72-73) also points out that it is not until the 19th and 20th 
centuries that “that we find non-comic metatexts on a major scale,” with the exception of 
painting, where non-comical metareferences proliferate from as early as the 1600s, with 
Velásquez’s Las Meninas (1656) and the paintings of Vermeer (1632-1675). 
   What distinguishes postmodern metatext from earlier forms, is that in postmodern 
times, metatext has become more explicit, intense and critically self-aware (Hutcheon, 
1984:18). Furthermore, postmodern meta-narratives often address broader ontological and 
epistemological issues (Pfeifer, 2009:410). Therefore, it is important to map out the field of 
postmodern metatext in a more detailed manner and also to include a more specific definition 
of this term. 
 Metareference across Media: Theory and Case Studies (2009), edited by Wolf, is the 
product of an extensive research project on the topic. In his introduction to this volume, Wolf 
(2009:15) states that a variety of different terms all refer to the concept of metareference. 
These terms include self-consciousness, self-reference, auto-referentiality, self-reflexivity, 
reflexivity, metanarrativity, metatextuality, metafiction, metanovel, introverted novel, 
metadrama, metatheatre, and metapoetry. Wolf (2009:15-17) nonetheless prefers the term 
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“metareference” because the word “reference” denotes any relation of signs to other signs or 
the “extralingual world,” and this term consequently includes transmedial examples.7  
 Wolf (2009:18) therefore distinguishes between “heteroreference” and “self-
reference,” where “heteroreference” refers to extralingual references and “self-reference” to 
reflexive references. He does, however, concede that this distinction is problematic in the 
context of poststructuralism where the concept of “heteroreference” seems naïve, “in 
particular, the notion that there is meaning outside of language.” But, he insists, despite 
poststructuralist ideas about language, we still expect signs “to inform us about the world 
rather than about sign systems.” Wolf (2009:18) continues: “regardless of contemporary 
sceptical stances in the fields of linguistics and the philosophy of language and also in spite of 
the fact that, of course, the media are themselves part of our world, it is therefore justified to 
maintain the basic difference of self- vs. heteroreference.”  
 Wolf (2009:19) explains self-referentiality as usually non-accidental, signs pointing or 
referring in various ways to “(aspects of) themselves or to other signs and sign configurations 
within one and the same semiotic system or ‘type’ of which they are part or ‘token’ rather than 
to (an element of) reality outside the sign (system).” Hence self-reference is a reference that 
reflects on itself or its system of communication. Yet, Wolf (2009:24) also contends that signs 
are never entirely self- or heteroreferential, but rather a hybrid of these two forms of reference. 
It is, however, the predominance of the one or the other that suggests an opposition: “who has 
ever read a metafictional novel which did not also tell some sort of heteroreferential story?” 
We can thus declare that the distinction between self- and heteroreference is not a binary, but 
a continuum.  
 In light of this distinction between different forms of reference, Wolf (2009:31), 
therefore comes up with the following definition for “metareference” (italics in the original): 
 
It is a special, transmedial form of usually non-accidental self-reference produced by 
signs or sign configurations which are (felt to be) located on a logically higher level, a 
‘meta-level’, within an artefact or performance; this self-reference, which can extend 
from this artefact to the entire system of the media, forms or implies a statement about 
an object-level, namely on (aspects of) the medium/system referred to. Where 
metareference is properly understood, an at least minimal corresponding ‘meta-
awareness’ is elicited in the recipient, who thus becomes conscious of both the medial 
                                                            
7 In this study, “metareference” will be used interchangeably with “metafiction,” “metatext,” “metadrama,” and 
“metatheatre” – where appropriate. 
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(or ‘fictional’ in the sense of artificial and, sometimes in addition, ‘invented’) status of 
the work under discussion and the fact that media-related phenomena are at issue, 
rather than (hetero-) references to the world outside the media.  
 
Metareference is consequently a phenomenon which comments on, not only the artefact or 
performance in which it occurs, but also on all other media. Transmedial metareference, for 
example, is a dialogue “between different media such as, for example, narrating text and 
photography” (Seeber, 2009:438). Seeber (2009:438-439) views this as a form of implicit 
metareference “since it assumes and triggers awareness of what the different media are and 
what their cooperation can possibly achieve.” Nevertheless, Hauthal (2009:570) points out 
that intermedial references do not necessarily reflect on both the medium they refer to and the 
medium in which they occur. 
 Metareference also disrupts the illusion that the artefact or performance in question 
presents a self-contained reality, by drawing attention to its fictional and medial status. 
Hutcheon (1984: xii), however, describes this illusion-breaking as a metafictional paradox. 
While reading reflexive literature, the reader is distanced from the fictional world, but is 
simultaneously mindful of their own role as reader – since the reader (or spectator) is always a 
mediating presence (Hutcheon, 1984:141). 
 
2.4.3.2. Conditions of metareference 
 
Limoges (2009:397-401) distinguishes five conditions relevant to the degree of illusion- 
breaking in self-reflexive devices. The first is perceptibility. Sometimes, a perceptive 
spectator might notice self-reflection where it was not intended, and vice versa (Limoges, 
2009:397-398). Hutcheon (1984:7) makes use of the terms “overt” and “covert” to distinguish 
between explicit examples of self-reflection and implicit self-reflection, which is not always 
perceptible. It is important to remember that although a shrewd spectator may discern 
unintended metareference, metareferential illusion-breaking always remains fictional 
(Hutcheon, 1984:46-47). As Wolf (2009:31) states in his definition, metareference must be 
non-accidental.  
 In other words, an astute spectator could, for example, pick up covert metareference in 
film about a man struggling through a divorce, whose son is incidentally a photographer. The 
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main theme of the film would be divorce, although the profession followed by a supporting 
character could point to intermedial self-reference. If this astute spectator, however, also 
notices that the camera crew is accidentally reflected in a mirror in the divorced man’s new 
home, and is therefore reminded that he or she is watching a film, it is not metareference, for 
the illusion is therefore actually – not fictionally – broken. 
 The second condition relevant to the degree of illusion-breaking is the context of 
reception. Certain contexts stabilise or destabilise aesthetic illusion. In academic discourse 
there are, for example, no more “innocent” readings (Limoges, 2009:398-399), and therefore 
the aesthetic illusion of a work being researched or taught at a university would already be 
destabilised. Thirdly, certain genres require a higher level of immersion in a fictional world – 
such as thrillers or suspense dramas. Genres, such as comedy or the musical, require lower 
levels of immersion, and therefore often utilise metareferential techniques in a playful manner 
(Limoges, 2009:399-400).  
 Limoges’ (2009:400-401) fourth condition is the modality of occurrence. When a self-
reflexive device is used only at the end of a novel, film or play, the illusion is broken to a 
greater degree, because the reader or spectator must now re-interpret everything he or she has 
seen so far. If such a device is employed at the beginning of the novel, film, or play, it 
becomes part of the spectator’s “horizon of expectations” and therefore does not disrupt the 
illusion to such a great extent.  
 Lastly, motivation is also a condition relevant to the degree of illusion-breaking. 
Sometimes metareferential devices may be absorbed into the diegesis of a literary work, 
resulting in minimal illusion-breaking. The device of looking directly into the camera is, for 
example, a familiar metareferential device in film, the most well-known example probably 
being Woody Allen’s Annie Hall (1977). This device can, conversely, be used to strengthen 
the aesthetic illusion as in Ricky Gervais’ television series The Office (2001-2003). The style 
of this series is reminiscent of a documentary: scenes filmed with a hand-held or sometimes 
shaky camera are interjected by interviews with the characters to strengthen the (fictitious) 
idea that actual events are portrayed in the series. 
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2.4.3.3. Forms of metareference 
 
Clearly, metareference can take different forms and have different functions in different 
media. Wolf (2009:37-38) distinguishes the following forms: intracompositional versus 
extracompositional; explicit versus implicit; fictio versus fictum; and critical versus non-
critical. Intracompositional metareferences refer directly to the works in which they occur. A 
novelist may, for example, comment on his or her style or ability to give a convincing picture 
of actuality such as Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveller (1981:3) which begins 
with the following sentence: “You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on 
a winter’s night a traveler.” Extracompositional metareference, on the other hand, includes 
“parodies of pre-existing works, but also meta-remarks that are not, or do not seem to be, 
immediately applicable to the work in which they occur” (Wolf, 2009:39), such as references 
to the character, Briony Tallis’, profession as a novelist, in Ian McEwan’s novel Atonement 
(2001).  
 While explicit metareference denotes metareference, implicit metareference often 
contains deviations from usual conventions, which, as a result, point to their contrivance. For 
example, Amanda Palmer’s song for the Dresden Dolls, Coin-operated boy (2003), is 
explicitly metareferential, since the lyrics to the bridge read: “this bridge was written / to 
make you feel smittener,” while a sentence-long chapter in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1760-
1767) is implicitly metareferential since it is unconventional, and therefore interrogates the 
convention of dividing novels into chapters (Wolf, 2009:40).  
 Fictio-metareference, on the other hand, is centred on mediality while fictum-
metareference is concerned with the truth-value of the work under discussion. Tennessee 
Williams’ The Glass Menagerie (1948:3) is therefore a form of fictio-metareference, since the 
character Tom explains the use of certain devices to the audience: “I am the narrator of the 
play, and also a character in it.” Ian McEwan, on the other hand, writes his novel, Sweet Tooth 
(2012), as the autobiographical novel of the character Thomas Haley. The novel is set in the 
1970s and ends with the recommendation that the tale it tells should not be published for at 
least 30 years, suggesting that the novel the reader holds in his or her hands is indeed the 
novel that Haley writes. Wolf (2009:41) states that “in all cases, metareference by definition 
implies a statement on, and elicits the idea of, mediality and the ontological artefact status of 
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the work in question.” Fictum-metareference need not always focus on fictionality in the sense 
of invention, but can also suggest truthfulness: “in this form, the common meaning of the term 
‘fictionality’ frequently comes to bear, namely a certain relation of the work to reality.” 
Hutcheon (1984:117) also remarks in this regard that  
 
…there is a two-way pull of contradictory impulses in regarding the language of 
fiction – for both writer and reader there is the impulse to communicate and so to treat 
language as a means (to order as well as to meaning), and there is also the impulse to 
make an artifact [sic] out of the linguistic materials and so to treat the medium as an 
end.   
 
Therefore, a work of fiction might either use language to create a seemingly pristine 
microcosm, or utilise itself to point out the inability of creating such a microcosm through 
language.  
 The last form, critical versus non-critical metareference, entails whether or not the text 
is critical of itself. It may be used to suggest that the story one reads is authentic (as in the 
example of Sweet Tooth above) or it might explain certain aesthetic conventions (as in The 
Glass Menagerie) (Wolf, 2009:43). In both these cases the metareference is thus non-critical. 
Eco (1983a:19), on the other hand, describes his own difficulty in narration, in finding an 
authentic voice in which to narrate his The Name of the Rose (1983b). He confesses to needing 
a “mask” with which to narrate. Therefore, he encased his narrative inside three other 
narratives: “I am saying what Vallet said that Mabillon said that Adso said…” (Eco, 
1983a:20). Without this mask, Eco’s narration would seem insincere, since “every story tells a 
story that has already been told.” By conceding that his story is not original, through the mask 
of four narratives, Eco is paradoxically able to narrate “authentically,” and this metareference 
is therefore critical. 
 
2.4.3.4. Functions of metareference 
  
Wolf (2009:65-70) furthermore distinguishes various functions of metareference which he 
categorises under work-centred, author-centred, recipient-centred and context functions. 
“Work-centred functions” foreground the frame of the fictional work (in the case of theatre, 
the fourth wall), since the classification of the work as ‘art’ “can generally confer value on the 
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work on question (or disparage other works)” (Wolf, 2009:65-66). This function includes self-
praise and claims of authenticity, interpreting the work as interesting or amusing, points of 
criticism at other works, self-criticism and foregrounding certain aspects of the work’s 
production, structure and reception (Wolf, 2009:66).  
 “Author-centred functions” on the other hand include a revelation of the author as 
intellectual or capable of amusing devices, or may be a means of experimenting with a 
medium. They may also educate recipients or comment on the products and personalities of 
the author’s colleagues (Wolf, 2009:66-67).  
 Furthermore, “recipient-centred functions” include the undermining of immersion and 
destruction of the aesthetic illusion; however, as mentioned above:  “the basic distancing 
effect of metareference can at least in part be overruled, in particular in non-critical forms, and 
sometimes leads to the stabilization of aesthetic illusion” (Wolf, 2009:67). These may 
therefore also function to provide entertainment and amusement, satisfy ludic desires and 
gratify intellectual stimulus.  
 The “context function” makes a contribution to the tendency of semiospheres to 
become self-reflexive, which is an indication of a crisis in representation, a contribution to 
increased media-literacy and the further development of arts and media by reflecting on them. 
It also contributes to the theoretical discussion of fundamental cultural and epistemological 
issues, such as differentiating reality from fiction, “an issue of particular topicality in our 
‘hypermediated culture’ and the current ‘precession of simulacra’ as discussed by Jean 
Baudrillard” (Wolf, 2009:70). Hutcheon (1984: xi-xii) also views this as an important function 
of metafiction, since “it can teach us much about both the ontological status of fiction (all 
fiction) and also the complex nature of reading (all reading).” 
 Metareference is consequently also able to explore verbal language and question how 
to acquire and represent knowledge. Lastly, metareference may acknowledge the impact of 
media on ourselves and our culture. Although realist fiction and metafiction seem to be in 
direct opposition with regard to the illusion created in literature, this opposition is problematic 
within the postmodern context. While a realist text generally does not refer to the fact that it is 
a text but metatexts do, these two terms may, rather, be regarded as two opposing ends on a 
continuum (Figure.1). The extent to which a text is self-reflexive increases from left to right 
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on this continuum, and yet it should be kept in mind that neither side is any more or less 
mimetic than the other. 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1: The continuum of realist texts and metatexts. 
 
2.5. Theatre: the authenticity of corporeality 
 
2.5.1. The truth paradox in theatre 
 
These concerns about the breaking of the artistic illusion are of even greater importance in 
theatre, because of its corporeality. Theatre implies a situation where actors (or actual people) 
pretend to be characters (or fictional people) in front of a present audience. This implies two 
features which complicate its mimesis: its use of ostension as well as its double ontological 
status, or duplexity.  
 
2.5.1.1. Ostension 
 
Theatre communicates through ostension: in other words it directly demonstrates, rather than 
describes, its fictional world (Oxford Reference, 2014). Kurman (1975-1976:294-295) 
therefore regards it as the most mimetic of genres. Theatre communicates polyphonically and 
simultaneously on various levels, so that the way an audience perceives theatre resembles the 
way that its members perceive the actual world, in “the succession of things,” as described by 
Calvino’s (1981:61) character. In Bigsby’s (1980:196) words, theatre “can present the 
experiential equivalence of events by juxtaposing disconnected but simultaneous texts.” 
Bogatyrev (1976:42) refers to this as the plurisignation of theatre. Unlike fiction, which 
communicates linearly, theatre communicates simultaneously on the levels of mime, gesture, 
costume, scenery and dialogue.  
Realist text: 
Aesthetic illusion firmly in place, 
very little recognition of text as text. 
Metatext: 
Aesthetic illusion purposely 
shattered, overt self-reflexivity. 
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 This plurisignation is further increased by the different meanings actors convey to the 
audience, fictionally to the characters on stage, and also by each audience member’s unique 
interpretation of the play. In the words of Edward Albee (in Bigsby, 1980:196), “no two 
audiences see the same piece, no two members of an audience allow themselves the same 
opportunities; they are always in different places.”  
 As in life, meaning in theatre is therefore exceptionally unstable. According to Bigsby 
(1980:196), theatre incorporates the contingent more easily than the novel and is rather 
notorious for this contingency, as is evident from the premise of Mel Brooks’ 1968 film, The 
Producers (remade in 2005 by Susan Stroman). In this film, two theatre producers purposely 
try to produce an unsuccessful Broadway musical, in a scheme to con their investors out of 
their money. They choose to produce the politically incorrect musical, “Springtime for Hitler,” 
which was sure to offend audiences and ensure a financial flop. However, due to unforeseen 
circumstances, the flamboyant director has to step in on opening night and portray the lead 
role of Hitler. His excessively camp acting sends the musical up. The audience interprets it as 
an unflattering parody of Hitler and, to the producers’ consternation, the show becomes very 
popular.  
 The film illustrates that, just as language does not describe an objective world, but 
takes part in its creation, theatre does not reflect life, but as Hornby (1986:17) states, operates 
within it, adding to the complexity with which it communicates. McGrath (1981:5) explains 
that when one wants to investigate how theatre communicates, one should take into account 
not only the various levels Bogatyrev (1976:42) mentions, but also the nature of the audience, 
the social, geographic and physical nature of the venue, the price and availability of tickets 
and factors such as how the show was publicised and the distance to the nearest pub. In the 
plot of The Producers, the recasting of the lead actor radically modifies the anticipated 
reception of the play within the film.  
 This is often the case in theatre, as Carlson (1989:86) describes: 
 
Every actor or director can recall instances when an audience created a meaning for a 
line or action not at all intended by the producers – and audiences have been known to 
wrest interpretive control entirely and openly from expected patterns, treating a 
presumedly serious work, for example, as stimulus to laughter.  
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And yet, although theatre is perceived in the same way that the actual world is, it is also 
carefully controlled and rehearsed, unlike the actual world. Theatre has “no first time, no 
origin, but only recurrence and reproduction” (Blau in Carlson, 2004:149-150). Hence it does 
not consist of a final product, but of a series of repetitions which may occur on various levels. 
Arthur Miller’s The Crucible (1953) is, for example, set in 1692. Its performance implies a 
recreation of that time period and milieu in costume, décor and props. This drama has 
undergone several revivals where each revival is a recreation, not only of the fictional time 
period, but also of the text. Furthermore, each performance in the run of a specific production 
of the text is a recreation of that first production. Although highly unstable, theatre is thus to a 
certain extent also unspontaneous and therefore “unreal” or very obviously representational.  
 In consequence there are two forces simultaneously at work in the way meaning is 
conveyed in theatre. Using centripetal force, theatre makers assert a level of control over the 
production to ensure a valid interpretation by its audience. Yet, the fact that theatre is 
performed live, wrests this control from them in a centrifugal manner. 
 As a result this conflict in interpretive control explains the ambiguity regarding realism 
or naturalism in theatre. Theatre’s plurisignation, which allows it materially to resemble 
actuality, makes it a suitable genre for realism. As Wake (2013:106) notes, theatre does not 
merely use realist narration (diegesis), but also realist imitation (mimesis).8 According to 
Begley (2012:338), “drama bears a distinct and intimate relation to material reality.” Props 
and décor may accordingly be used to create a mise en scene which is verisimilar to the actual 
word. Yet, this is easily able to be used to “flesh out and naturalize” a perspective, which is 
ideologically inclined.  
 According to Barthes (1972:261), theatre’s polyphony merely makes it appear real. 
Reinert (2010:214) describes this conflict between contingency and control in the theatre of 
Ibsen as follows: 
 
What may appear as an arbitrary collage of things and words is a device for 
authenticating as pristine reality the author’s artful design. Smalltalk turns out to mean 
something, and stage props signify beyond their looks. But the talk still sounds small 
and the doors and chairs and hats and shawls look like their real life counterparts. They 
are illusions of the actual.  
                                                            
8 Here the word “mimesis” should be taken to refer to that which can be visually observed by the audience, or 
shown, rather than verbally recounted, or told.  
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Therefore, despite – or possibly because of – the instability of meaning in theatre; that which 
is presented to the audience is carefully manipulated, although this contrivance may easily be 
hidden due to theatre’s material reality, which in turn leads to its double ontological status.   
 
2.5.1.2. The duplexity of theatre  
 
According to Eversmann (2004:141) theatre is simultaneously produced and received, and 
therefore encompasses what Calderwood (1971:12) refers to as a duplexity. This feature of 
theatre entails that it contains, in Goffman’s (1974:10) sense, different “worlds” or “frames.” 
The actual frame includes actors, décor and props, while the fictional contains characters in 
their environment. Every object or person on stage therefore possesses a double ontological 
status by both presenting and representing. An actor presents him or herself in their 
occupation by appearing on stage, but also represents a fictional character. While the audience 
usually forms part of the actual frame, its members can sometimes be included in the fictional 
frame, depending on how firmly the aesthetic illusion (or fourth wall) is kept in place. 
 For Elam (2002:50), the duplexity of theatre is easily evident in the architecture of the 
performance space (Figure. 2). The stage is a space distinguished by certain markers which 
separate the actual from the fictional. These markers might include a raised platform and 
curtains, or even just an adequate distance demarcating the “audience area” (which usually 
implies the actual frame) and the “acting area” (implying the fictional frame). Filmer 
(2008:160), however, points out that the backstage area of a theatre also suggests the 
distinction between these frames, albeit in a more nuanced manner. Between the green room, 
dressing rooms and the stage, there are the wings: “the space offstage on either side of the 
acting area” (Law, 2011:548). Filmer (2008:160-161) describes a performer’s experience of 
this space as follows: 
 
A performer’s journey through the wings involves a transition from one state of being 
to another, moving from a relatively certain space of everyday activity into a relatively 
uncertain space in which every action is framed as meaningful. Richard Schechner has 
characterized this move from offstage to onstage as a ‘leap:’ “The warm-up takes place 
on the ordinary-life side, preparing the performer for the leap, giving the performer the 
courage to jump into the performance.”  
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Schechner (in Filmer, 2008:160-161) makes a pronounced distinction between the actual 
frame and the fictional frame from the actor’s point of view. Theatre’s duplexity therefore 
applies to both spectator and performer. The wings serve as a liminal space for the actor in 
which he or she is caught between their everyday lives and the altered state of acting which 
includes heightened concentration, engagement and action.9  
Although audiences are always aware of the duplexity of theatre, the ontological 
demarcation between the actual and fictional is not always clear. Klimek (2009:177) points 
out that because drama is performed live, it particularly invites “metalepsis-like confusions 
between reality and fiction.” Actors sometimes make mistakes which they are obliged to hide 
from the audience by integrating these into the play through improvisation. Therefore, 
spectators can never be sure if what they see was intended by the performers or not. They may 
even mistake actual events for fictional ones and either realise their mistake later, or not 
realise it at all. Klimek (2009:177) cites the bizarre example of a performance at Moscow’s 
Bolshoi Theatre in October 2002. Chechen rebels took the cast and audience hostage and 
several of the audience members took the “masked, armed men that ran onto the stage for 
actors in the military play they were watching.”  
Interestingly, Billington (1996:313) mentions the opposite situation occurring in 
London in 1996. Members of a theatre company consisting of London-based Kurdish actors 
were rehearsing Harold Pinter’s Mountain Language in a community centre in north London. 
When local residents noticed the actors in their military costumes, carrying prop weapons, 
they mistook them for Turkish terrorists about to attack the Kurdish community centre. The 
residents contacted the police; the actors were taken into custody and interrogated before the 
police realised their mistake.  
The fact that even authorities such as the police confuse the actual and the fictional, 
when taken out of context, illustrates how readily the distinction between the two can be 
blurred, despite the fact that the audience is aware of the duplexity of theatre. It also points to 
the fact that although the actual could aid the fictional in performance, it may also contradict 
it. 
                                                            
9 Without discussing theories of acting in superfluous detail, it would be relevant to mention that most actors find 
a balance between two extremes of complete identification with a character and complete distance from it, 
regardless of his or her approach (whether following Brecht or Stanislavski). According to Hernandi (1976:126), 
“the kind of balance he strikes will be appropriate to his individual talent and the prevailing literary and theatrical 
tradition of his day.” Thus, not even the stage necessarily represents a purely fictional space.  
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Figure. 2: The architecture of the performance space showing a separation between areas 
representing the actual and fictional worlds. 
 
2.5.1.3. The actual frame running with or against the fictional 
 
Theatre, therefore, represents a fictional world which resembles the actual world in its 
corporeality, while its (theatre’s) corporeality may also at times contradict this fictional world. 
States (1985:377-378) observes that some things retain a “high degree of self-givenness” even 
in a fictional context on stage. These include clocks, fire, animals and children. Their 
uncontrollable dynamism lies in the fact that there are things which cannot be imitated. 
Although stage technology has progressed to the point where clocks could be manipulated to 
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rooms 
Green room 
Stage Wings 
(liminal space) 
Auditorium 
Actual world 
Actual world 
Fictional world 
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follow fictional time instead of actual time, a living animal or child can still only be 
realistically represented by themselves.10 
 Just as fictional nudity can only be realistically represented by actual nudity, certain 
actions such as kissing or eating have to be performed in actuality. In a 2012 Afrikaans 
version of Keren Tahor and Fresco Theatre Company’s play, “Jutro” (unpublished), the 
Jewish character, Mina, is seen eating pork sausage as she tries to survive during World War 
II. When another character, Janusz, points out to her that she is eating pork, the script instructs 
the actress to pause or stop chewing and then to slowly swallow as this realisation dawns on 
her. In this production, director Gérard Rudolf wanted to emphasise the moral crisis that the 
character experienced in this action and to dramatise how her survival instinct in the end 
trumps any moral qualms. She therefore did not only pause, but spat the sausage out in her 
hand and, after an excruciating deliberation, ate it with some disgust. Of course, there is no 
way of imitating this action without having the actress spit chewed salami out into her hand 
and then eat it – an action which could surely provoke a feeling of nausea, not only in the 
actress, but also in the audience. Both actress and character thus experience feelings of 
disgust, albeit due to squeamishness or moral qualms. Hence this is a situation where a 
fictional act elicits a real physical response, due to the corporeality of the representation.  
 Karen Finley’s play “The Theory of Total Blame” (1989, unpublished) elicits a similar 
response. This play, a wry parody on the traditional homecoming narrative, shows a mother, 
Irene, preparing a meal for her family. This ritual, however, becomes a source of disgust as 
Irene mixes random items she “grabs from the refrigerator” into unappetising messes. She 
uses her hands to prepare these mixtures, and her body – as well as the stage area – becomes 
increasingly soiled (Hart, 1996:114). Finley makes use of the “mechanisms of disgust” that 
this arouses in her audience to subvert ideas about the female body as a “sexually evocative 
signifier” (Geis, 1996:168).11 
                                                            
10 Sometimes, of course, children can be represented by dolls as a deliberate non-realist device, as in Charles 
Mee’s  Orestes 2.0 (1992). For a child character to blend in with a realist play, he or she would have to be 
represented by an actual child. In the South African production of Athol Fugard’s latest play, The Shadow of the 
Hummingbird (2014), for example, the 24 year old Marviantoz Baker portrayed a 10 year old boy. Baker’s 
character was incongruous with the realist style of the play and a child actor might have been more convincing 
(see Fick, 2014). 
11 See also Brown (1992) for a discussion on how Hanoch Levin uses the mechanisms of disgust to blur the 
boundary between the actual and the fictional in his political plays. 
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 Theatre thus provides the means for an audience – and actors – to experience actual 
reactions that coincide with the fictional world. There is, however, yet another level on which 
actors experience a performance physically. Stage fright refers to the feelings of anxiety or 
nervousness typically experienced by performers, right before and/or during a show. These 
often manifest themselves in an increased heart rate, shaky and sweaty hands, blushing, 
nausea, a dry mouth or tingling feeling in the limbs. According to Aaron (1986: ix), stage 
fright is not a mere inconvenient side effect or occupational hazard of performance but 
integrally part of it. Performers have linked shows lacking in energy and tension to an absence 
of stage fright; therefore, they often increase the uncertainty and danger in the theatre through 
playing tricks on each other in order to test their degree of control and reassess their own 
creativity (Filmer, 2008:164). 
 Yet, this very real and bodily experience also demonstrates how theatre is very 
definitely removed from the actual world. While actual feelings of disgust often coincide with 
the fictional world, stage fright sets the actor apart from his or her character, since the 
character presumably does not experience these physical symptoms in any given play. Hence, 
for example, Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf (1962) opens with a drunken 
couple, George and Martha, returning home after a party. Doubtlessly, these characters are not 
experiencing a dry mouth, sweaty palms or increased heart rate and tingling in their limbs, 
while the actors who portray them very possibly do.  
 Therefore, although theatre’s corporeality involves a confusion and blending of the 
real and the actual, the notion that events on stage are more “real” because they resemble the 
actual world through ostension is false. According to Hamilton (1982:41), the ontological 
status of a signifier does not necessarily alter the ontological status of the performance. A 
fictional room represented by brick and plaster is – after all – no more actual than one 
represented by plywood and paint. Being necessarily fictional, real objects and people as a 
result behave as images on stage (Rozik, 1999:202). Theatre therefore simultaneously sustains 
and destroys the illusion of authenticity.  
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2.5.2. Experiments in eliminating the actual and fictional in theatre 
 
Nonetheless, we may ask: is the presence of both actual and fictional frames necessary in 
theatre? In the twentieth century various theatre practitioners and theorists experimented with 
the aesthetic distance between the fictional and the actual. As Büdel (1961:281) observes, 
there has been a tendency either to “overdistance” or “underdistance” the aesthetic of theatre. 
To Sartre (1976:143), the meaning of theatre is the following: “its essential value is the 
representation of something which does not exist.” Therefore, he regards the aesthetic distance 
between the actual and the fictional as theatre’s greatest strength, and favours overdistance: 
 
While there can be no doubt that this is one of the principles of theater, I think we 
should never underestimate this distance; whether we are author, actor, or producer, 
we should not try to reduce it, but should exploit it and show it as it actually is, even 
manipulate it. (Sartre, 1976:12) 
 
For this reason, Sartre (1976:145-146) insists that theatre destroys itself in happenings and 
docudrama which aim to merge the actual and fictional worlds. According to Sartre (in Ben 
Chaim, 1984:19), the distance between the actual and the fictional permits vulnerability in the 
audience, and its members can thus be reached in ways which would be impossible if their 
usual defences were up. Sartre (in Ben Chaim, 1984:16) asserts that increased distance leads 
to increased imaginative involvement: the aesthetic object only appears when the audience 
member is completely absorbed in the fictional world and loses his or her “awareness of self” 
(Sartre, 1976:9). However he does contradict himself when he claims that involvement in 
either of these frames is mutually exclusive. His theory thus becomes vague, as the 
circumstances under which an audience member become involved in the fictional world are 
unclear (Ben Chaim, 1984:20). Interestingly, Sartre’s views of the fictional frame as harmless 
contrast with Genet’s who views the entanglement of art and life (such as in theatre) as “a 
dangerous game […] which affords no safe haven” (Sheaffer-Jones, 2007:50).  
 Brecht’s well-known theory of verfremdung also favours overdistance, but – unlike 
Sartre who wishes to pull his audience into the fictional world – Brecht wants to avoid 
emotional identification with the character, and thus keeps his audience in the actual frame 
(Ben Chaim, 1984:28). Brecht (1968:91) insists that the actor should not merge with the 
subject he or she is portraying: “the object of this ‘effect’ is to allow the spectator to criticize 
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constructively from a social point of view.” Brecht (1968:86) explains that an actor should act 
with the detachment of an eyewitness of a car accident, who demonstrates what he or she saw. 
The actors and audience should therefore remain in the actual frame, and Brecht (1968:85) 
uses projections on the cyclorama as well as time breaks between scenes to block emotions 
and give the audience time to make judgements. Later in his career, Brecht nevertheless did 
decide to use the emotion that his plays inevitably evoked (Ben Chaim, 1984:34).  
 Whereas Sartre and Brecht insist on the distinction between the actual and the fictional 
frames, Grotowski and Artaud attempt to diminish this distance through underdistance. For 
Grotowski, “the core of theatre is the communion between actor and spectator” (Kumiega, 
1982:193). Therefore, Grotowski (in Ben Chaim, 1984:39-40) tries to do away with the 
supposed psychological protection of the theatre for both actors and the audience. He 
enquires, “to what extent can theatrical activity successfully eliminate the manipulative 
elements in the director/actor/audience relationship and still remain theatre?” (Kumiega, 
1982:196). He believes that an actor should reveal his or her inner self to the audience and 
tries to shock the audience members in order to reveal their outer masks of artificiality. 
Although Grotowski succeeded in eliminating the distance between the actual and the fictional 
frames, this search for sincerity took him beyond the realm of art and into that of ritual (Ben 
Chaim, 1984:39-40): 
 
We noted that when we eliminate certain blocks and obstacles what remains is what is 
most elementary and most simple – what exists between human beings when they have 
a certain confidence between each other, and when they look for an understanding that 
goes beyond the understanding of words… Precisely at that point one does not perform 
any more… One day we found it necessary to eliminate the notion of theatre (an actor 
in front of a spectator) and what remained was a notion of meeting – not a daily 
meeting and not a meeting that took place by chance… (Grotowski in Kumiega, 
1982:200) 
 
 Artaud also wanted to thrust theatre into real life (Ben Chaim, 1984:40). He insists that 
the spectator should not only observe the theatrical spectacle, but should also experience it 
aurally and sensually and – like Sartre – that theatre should consequently exploit that which 
makes it different from other genres (Ben Chaim, 1984:41). Artaud thus aimed for theatre to 
break through language and touch life (Andrucki, 1990:294). He (1968:57) envisioned a 
language of theatre which should ultimately break 
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…away from the intellectual subjugation of the language, by conveying the sense of  a 
new and deeper intellectuality which hides itself beneath the gestures and signs, raised 
to the dignity of particular exorcisms. 
 
Artaud (1968:55) also emphasised that theatre was subjugated to the text and wanted “to 
recover the notion of a kind of unique language half-way between gesture and thought.” 
Derrida, however accused Artaud of prejudice against the written word in his attempts to free 
theatre from the text (Meisner & Mounsef, 2011). In addition, Ben Chaim (1984:40) points 
out that although Artaud’s theories are of value, his application of them never succeeded in 
practice. Roberts (2007:37) describes Artaud’s impossible attempt to merge the actual and 
fictional as follows: 
 
The theatre of cruelty, more exactly, the idea of a theatre without representation, 
signifies the impossible attempt to banish God from the scene by destroying this 
structure of reduplication and repetition. Artaud’s paradoxical dream of an originary 
representation of pure self-identical presence cannot escape the closed circle of 
representation. 
 
Nonetheless, theatre practitioners still continue to test and contest the distinction between the 
actual and the fictional in theatre. Like Grotowski, some feminist theatre practitioners wish to 
free theatre from the supposedly patriarchal hierarchy of director/actor/audience by staging the 
“real” stories of “real” women. When discussing the prevalence of autobiographical mono-
drama on American stages, Greenfield (2006:168) explains America’s preference for so-called 
“real” stories also as an obsession with the actual as opposed to the fictional, as discussed in 
Chapter One. According to Sierz (2008:102) this phenomenon also prevails in Britain: 
 
Today, given the anxieties created by the digital age’s affront to old and established 
views of reality, and to the ongoing global uncertainties unleashed by the War on 
Terror, the British public’s desire for reality is more intense than ever – and this is 
manifested not only in a seemingly insatiable appetite for reality TV, but also in a need 
to be assured that the best theatre is somehow “real,” explanation enough perhaps for 
the current vogue for verbatim drama. 
 
 However, in an essay entitled “True stories: Spalding Gray and the authenticity of 
performance,” Sayre (1999) describes how Gray’s performance highlights exactly the 
impossibility of, firstly, completely eliminating the fictional frame in theatre and, secondly, 
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presenting an authentic self in an autobiographical performance. He describes two 
autobiographical performance pieces by Gray, Swimming to Cambodia (1985) and Monster in 
a box (1992). In these performances, which Sayre (1999:255) refers to as “the real thing,” 
Gray recounts events in his own life such as acting in the film, The Killing Fields (1984) and 
his mother’s suicide. Nevertheless, Sayre (1999:259) also explains the difficulty in locating 
the “real” Spalding Gray in these performances: 
 
So there is, in the Spalding Gray we see in performance, something of the “real” 
Spalding Gray, or at any rate, the Spalding Gray that Spalding Gray thinks he is, but 
also present before us are the “character” he wishes to project, the Spalding Gray his 
director, Elizabeth LeCompte, sees, and the Spalding Gray she makes use of to create 
the play. We have, on the one hand, lost the “original” Gray in a proliferation of 
performing persona. 
 
No matter how close Gray’s performances are to his actual life, his “original” self is lost in 
performance.  
 Max Frisch has also experimented with autobiographical theatre in his Biography: a 
play (1969). According to Jurgensen (2007:104) this play is set in a theatre: “it is important to 
bear in mind that throughout the play the location remains the stage, or, as Frisch so succinctly 
puts it, ‘a place completely identical with itself.’” Still, this play to a large extent expresses the 
impossibility of representing authentic life, since the world cannot be reproduced: “however 
theatre projects itself, it is art” (Frisch in Jurgensen, 2007:106). 
 Schmidt (2013:16) also describes a performance named “Entitled” (2011) by the UK 
theatre company, Quarantine. In this performance, the production manager comes onstage and 
narrates the process of rigging as if in anticipation of a performance that never arrives. The 
production manager and crew thus perform exactly the same actions they normally would, 
with two exceptions: the production manager is narrating the process and there is an audience 
present. Because of this explicit theatrical frame, Schmidt (2013:17) argues that these actions 
are in fact not really labour – as they would be without the theatrical frame – but mimesis: 
“the theatre […] may be a place where we can give up our desire for the real because it will 
never deliver it.”  
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 In addition, postdramatic theatre12 fails to do away with the fictional frame in theatre. 
Wake (2013:110) describes how Ros Horin’s testimonial theatre piece, Through the Wire 
(2004, unpublished) blurs the lines between the fictional and the actual. This work recounts 
the experiences of asylum seekers in Australia, devised in collaboration with actual asylum 
seekers. Horin confuses the actual and the fictional by using such rhetorical devices as 
presenting dialogue as “less structured, more scattered” to seem less rehearsed and more 
“authentic.” She also uses paratextual devices, such as having actors related to the actual 
asylum seekers or the asylum seekers themselves, play the characters. Lastly, she also uses 
realist casting techniques, such as avoiding any role doubling and having a strong iconic 
similarity between the actor and character (Wake, 2013:111). Yet, through the repetition of 
performance, even these autobiographical accounts become scripted (Wake, 2013:109). The 
idea of “documentary theatre” is in consequence an oxymoron, since theatre is inherently 
resistant to non-fiction, due to its repetitive nature. Schmidt (2005:65) argues that 
“postmodern drama unveils the deceptive character of presence” and that “unmediated action” 
is only ever able to be an illusion. 
 For reasons such as these, Auslander (1995:181) describes the postdramatic as a knee-
jerk suspicion of the text which caused a false polarity between devised (as actual) and text 
based (as fictional) performance. Meisner and Mounsef (2011:89) assert that a devised form 
does not necessarily ensure innovation or authenticity while a text based form does not 
necessarily ensure conservatism, as is often claimed (see also Jones, 2011). According to 
Hornby (1986:13), although people call a text “realistic” when it reminds them of the actual 
world, no fictional world is more or less “real” than any other, since – as we have concluded 
above – all fiction exists on the same ontological level or, as Schonmann (2002:145) puts it, 
“when the distance has disappeared, there is no art.”  
 For Bigsby (1980:188), “the fictive quality of drama is in a sense inescapable.” He 
compares theatre’s fictivity to a crustacean’s skeleton that is always worn on the outside. In 
theatre, any imaginative processes are externalised and mediated by actors, the director and 
the mise en scène: 
 
                                                            
12 Postdramatic theatre may refer either to drama which deconstructs traditional, text based drama, or drama 
which avoids being text based (Meisner & Mounsef, 2011:90-91). 
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With movies, the screen vanishes as soon as the image appears and so, to a degree, 
does the audience since with no possibility of feedback it has no role to play. With 
theatre the stage remains clearly in evidence and the audience recognises its own role 
in the events. The film maker can choose to foreground technique […]. But with 
theatre that foregrounding is inescapable. The only option is to emphasise it or work to 
diminish it. 
 
And, as was maintained above, even if the aesthetic distance in theatre can be diminished, it 
cannot be eliminated, and the fact that drama is thus “honest” about its fictionality makes 
theatre more truthful than real life, which generally hides its artifice (Homan, 1989:13; Balme, 
2008:90-91). According to Reinert (2010:218), expressionism, epic and the absurd theatre 
have changed the way we approach theatre. Since these movements, “the Aristotelian theatre 
has fallen into disuse.” Post-Aristotelian theatre conforms to the ethical concept that theatre 
should “be honest enough to own up to its own nature and flaunt, rather than conceal, its 
status” as either a “simulation of the actual” or “deliberate refusal to seem lifelike at all,” 
resulting in the present prevalence of metatheatre. 
 
2.5.3. Metatheatre 
 
2.5.3.1. Definition 
 
It is interesting to note that, even if theatre practitioners take theatre’s fictionality as a given, 
the dialectic between the actual and the fictional, or the duplexity of theatre, remains an 
important theme in theatre. Perception (Hornby, 1986:121) and reflexivity (Boireau, 1997: xii) 
are always major features there. Hornby (1986:31) and Schmidt (2005:31) insist that theatre is 
always concerned with its own form and is therefore always metatheatrical, even if merely to 
a very small degree. 
 Lionel Abel’s book Metatheatre: a new view of dramatic form (1963) remains seminal 
in any study of metatheatre, although it is outdated. Abel (1963:59) defines “metatheatre” as 
follows: 
 
Only certain plays tell us at once that the happenings and character in them are of the 
playwright’s invention, and that insofar as they were discovered – where there is 
invention there also has to be discovery – they were found by the playwright’s 
imagination rather than by his observation of the world. Such plays have truth in them, 
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not because they convince us  of real occurrences or existing persons, but because they 
show the reality of the dramatic imagination, instanced by the playwright’s and also by 
that of his characters. Of such plays it may indeed be said: “The play’s the thing.” 
 
Abel clearly identifies the main characteristic of metatheatre as self-reflexivity and also links 
its acknowledgement in this regard to truthfulness in the sense that metatheatre is written with 
“full disclosure” about its own ontological status. Abel (1963:77) continues, suggesting that 
metatheatre might replace tragedy as preferred dramatic genre. Tragedy has lost its 
prominence in this regard since it depends on the audience’s acceptance of some “implacable 
values as true,” a stance that has become naïve in a Western imagination which regards “all 
implacable values as false.” The full disclosing metadrama, about life “seen as already 
theatricalized”, is consequently, according to Abel (1963:60), a suitable substitute for tragedy 
whose characters are unaware “of their own theatricality.”  
 For Abel (1963:79) metatheatre relies on the fundamental concept that illusion 
becomes inseparable from reality; he distinguishes two assumptions of metatheatre: firstly, 
metatheatre suggests that the world is a stage, and secondly, that life is a dream. There is 
therefore also a fantastical element to metatheatre: 
 
For in this kind of play fantasy is essential, it is what one finds at the heart of reality. 
In fact, one could say that the metaplay is to ordinary fantasy as tragedy is to 
melodrama. As in tragedy the misfortunes of the hero must be necessary and not 
accidental, so in the metaplay life must be a dream and the world must be a stage. 
(Abel, 1963:79) 
 
Adler (1980-1981:355) adds to Abel’s two assumptions of metatheatre a third: that the 
“audience is consciously forced into a recognition of themselves as audience.” Even so, these 
assumptions do not help us to further define the significance of the prevalence of metatheatre 
in postmodern drama. Because he treats metatheatre as a genre on its own, rather than as an 
element that may be found in drama across genres, his criteria are rather vague. Jernigan 
(2004:310) also finds this definition problematic and points out how Abel merely describes 
certain features of metatheatre, such as the sense that the world is a projection of human 
consciousness and the unwillingness of the imagination to regard any view of the world as 
ultimate, without any claims that metatheatre is simply “theater that takes theater as its 
subject.” Jernigan therefore considers Worthen’s (1995:1189) definition more satisfactory, 
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which regards ‘metatheatre’ as “a term used to describe plays that self-consciously comment 
on the process of theater, and so treat the relationship between theater and life.” 
 Jernigan (2004:293) furthermore regards Abel’s approach to metatheatre inappropriate 
for use in literary studies and quotes Quigley (1985:268), whose attitude is more useful, 
despite the fact that he is “apprehensive of the term metatheatre”: 
 
What is important is not to bracket these features [commonly thought of as 
metatheatrical] in a specific genre, nor to consign them to an independent tradition, but 
to establish the functions they serve in different plays in different periods, and to see in 
the modern period whether any change in their function can account for [the great 
outpouring] of works exhibiting such features in that period. This is not then a matter 
of isolating them for idiosyncratic attention, but of scrutinizing their interaction with 
other traditional and novel features of drama in the modern period. 
 
It is therefore important to distinguish the postmodern use of metatheatrical techniques from 
their earlier uses. Abel (1963) traces the incidence of metadrama from Elizabethan times. As 
was the case with all art forms except for painting, as mentioned above, only in postmodern 
times has metatheatre prevailed, not only in comedy, but also in drama, with the exception of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1600).  
 Landfester (2007:129) links the distinction between Elizabethan and postmodern 
metatheatre to the disappearance of the character of the “Fool.” The Fool’s privilege was 
traditionally to reveal not only the truth, but also to show how truth is dependent on fiction: 
“The Fool makes it clear that there is no speaking the truth without using theatrical forms to 
express it, while on the other hand the form’s self-conscious theatricality paradoxically serves 
to underscore that what is spoken is, in fact, the truth.” This function becomes problematic in 
postmodern times where any claims to “truth” are regarded with scepticism: 
 
While the Shakespearean metadrama had exhibited ‘truth’ as the knowledge that man’s 
existence on earth was nothing but that of a puppet, the emancipation of man in the 
name of reason required a strict separation between playing and reality in order to 
establish firm ground of authenticity on which man could rely for his sense of self; that 
included plays being unquestionably and consistently fictitious. (Landfester, 2007:135) 
 
The issue which, as a result, distinguishes the postmodern from the Elizabethan metatheatrical 
devices, such as the play within the play, is that, in postmodern plays, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish the represented actual from the fictional – or the inner play from the outer play 
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(Hornby, 1986:47). Postmodern theatre therefore calls itself, as well as the actual world, into 
question (Hornby, 1986:46). Consequently we can deduce from the above that, as is the case 
with all metareference, metatheatre performs specific functions in postmodern drama.  
 
2.5.3.2. The function of metatheatre in postmodern drama 
 
Although these functions are difficult to demarcate since metatheatre can literally fulfil any 
function in a drama, from asking if a transcendental reality exists to merely being comic 
(Klimek, 2009:177), we can distinguish two important functions. Firstly, postmodern 
metatheatre aims to question our perception of the world, and secondly it reflects on itself.  
 The first function has already been considered at length above, but the second warrants 
further discussion. The self-reflexivity of metatheatre is sometimes very obvious, especially in 
the case of the play within a play, where “the framing of the inner play exposes the existence 
of the author from within and, in so doing, gestures towards the actual author (of the outer 
play) at work” (Beus, 2007:19). However, as was pointed out by Jernigan and Adler above,  
the self-reflexivity of metatheatre is important, not only with regard to how theatre and 
performance function, but also with respect to the role of the audience. According to Sheaffer-
Jones (2007:47), metatheatre “highlights above all the acts of watching and acting.” Levy 
(2007:165) shows how the metatheatre of Hanoch Levin, for example, indicts the Israeli 
community’s enthusiastic yet superficial engagement with theatre: 
 
(self-)conscious theatricality must be regarded as a tool for enhancing deeper 
engagement of audiences with the stage, its theatrical events and their addressees. It 
necessarily involves thinking, feeling and (sometimes) acting – in theatre as well as in 
life. Metatheatricality also involves an ethical approach to histrionics, rather than the 
more habitual non-committal, sentimental, mostly commercial theatre most Westerners 
see. It invites free and egalitarian participation by an audience and, sometimes, it may 
even suggest that the playwright does not want to solely amuse us. 
 
But, apart from critiquing its audience and affirming itself, it is important to remember that 
metatheatre can also critique itself (Roberts, 2007:38). Edward Albee, in his metatheatre, 
indicts his characters’ “mimicking of the activity of the artist as he mimicks [sic] that of life.” 
Like Stoppard, Albee is also concerned with language and the use thereof and his plays 
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become “a parody of the writer’s conviction that language is indeed a net which can 
successfully trap experience and hence reality” (Bigsby, 1980:194).  
 When used to fulfil these two functions, metatheatre thus pulls the audience member 
into the theatrical event, urging him or her to take part and so too, as an actual person, become 
part of the fictional event. This fictional performance then also becomes part of the audience 
member’s actual world; thereby, to an extent, crossing the divide between these ontological 
levels.  
 
2.5.3.3. Metatheatrical strategies 
 
Metatheatre can use various strategies or forms to fulfil these functions. Almost any 
convention, deviation from a convention, or intertextual reference may be metadramatic. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I shall focus on the conventions of the mise en abyme, the aesthetic 
of in-yer-face theatre, and some of the metadramatic implications of genre.  
 Wolf (2009:56) defines the mise en abyme as “the ‘mirroring’ of parts or the totality 
of” the frame. In other words, it is a story within a story, a play within a play or a painting 
within a painting. Although the mise en abyme may be a heteroreferential coincidence and 
need not be metareferential, Wolf (2009:56) asserts that it tends to be metareferential in 
performative media, possibly because performance implies spectators watching spectators. 
According to Dällenbach (1989:164), the mise en abyme is solely able to be a reduplication, 
or mirroring of an aspect or part of the text; it can be a repeated duplication ad infinitum, 
leading to an abyss of duplications, or aporistique, where a fragment of the text includes the 
text in which it is included itself. 
 Fischer and Greiner (2007: xi) define the play within the play as  
 
…a theatrical device or convention, or kind of sub-genre within dramatic literature and 
theatrical practice. Dramaturgically speaking it describes a strategy for constructing 
play texts that contain, within the perimeter of their fictional reality, a second or 
internal theatrical performance, in which actors appear as actors who play an 
additional role. 
 
The play within the play is therefore “an important means by which the interaction between 
art and life is re-examined” (Sheaffer-Jones, 2007:48) since it proposes to show, within a 
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fictional frame, a second fictional frame (twice removed from the actual spectator) and a 
supposedly actual frame. Reality thus “becomes a series of infinitely receding boxes within 
boxes” (Bigsby, 1980:188).  
 According to Büdel (1961:281), the play within a play not only exposes the inner 
workings of theatre, but also involves the audience by regarding them on the same level as the 
performers in the external play, thereby fulfilling metatheatre’s two functions as discussed 
above. The significance of juxtaposing the fictional and supposedly actual on stage is clear in 
Genet’s The Maids (1947) where he suggests that it is impossible to distinguish between the 
world outside the theatre and the world within (Curtis, 1974:34) or between play and reality. 
Sheaffer-Jones (2007:50-51) identifies death and make-believe as inextricable in The Maids: 
 
…to a certain extent, what is already questioned [in The Maids] is the difference 
between role-play and life; that living might somehow be free of acting. Claire says: 
‘What remains for us  is to continue this life, take up the game again,’ to which 
Solange replies: ‘The game is dangerous.’ In the changing of places, roles become 
confused. When Claire drinks the poisoned tea as Madame, who does not drink it, is 
she really still acting as Madame? To what extent she is pretending is uncertain. Claire 
and Solange also interject their ‘real’ identities. Yet it is as if they were somehow 
suspended between themselves and the roles which they assume, like the tightrope 
walker chasing his image. 
 
Genet thereby illustrates that, not only is it impossible for us to distinguish between the 
fictional and the actual and not only are we trapped within the fictional, unable to engage with 
the actual, but also that through play-acting, the fictional becomes the actual: fictional acts 
(such as drinking poisoned tea as someone else) have actual consequences (being poisoned).  
 A play within a play is, nevertheless often also playfully critical of itself. Esslin 
(1987:75) remarks how complex the separation between the internal and external plays can 
become: 
 
The special attraction, for the audience, of all these variants of actors acting actors lies 
in the opportunity it presents for the display of various levels of “theatricality” and 
“naturalness,” side by side, to be compared and savoured. Are the “real” characters 
acted with sufficient realism to be convincing? Do the “fictional” characters give an 
insight into the nature of theatricality and the art of acting as an enhancement of the 
“natural”? And how does the author’s imagined world get coarsened by being enacted 
by professionals who can turn everything into convention and routine? 
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When a playwright embarks on self-critique in a play within a play, the interior play is 
consequently often a parody of either that which the playwright would have done in other 
circumstances, or of current theatrical conventions. Hence, in Chekhov’s The seagull (1896), 
Treplyov’s play and the fictional audience’s reaction to it comments on the theatre-going 
public of Chekhov’s time. Stoppard’s The real Inspector Hound (1968), on the other hand, 
mocks the mystery play or thriller of its era, most notably Christie’s The mousetrap (Carlson, 
1993:431). Sometimes dramatists insert intertexts into a play to function as mise en abymes. 
In cases such as these, it is important to scrutinise the difference in the style of the interior and 
exterior plays, and – as Esslin (1987) notes above – evaluate whether or not the exterior play 
avoids the pitfalls which the interior does not.  
 The juxtaposing of different ontological levels on stage, albeit fictional in itself, 
accordingly provides the playwright with the means to demonstrate to his audience how they 
engage with theatre; however, it also presents the possibility of metalepsis, since the boundary 
between the actual and fictional “seems to become permeable” (Klimek, 2009:178).  
 Metalepsis is, a paradoxical leap “across the ‘sacred’ frontier between two ‘worlds’ 
within a text: the level of representation […] and the level of what is represented” (Klimek, 
2009:169). In keeping with a “realistic” aesthetic, fictitious characters are generally not 
supposed to know about their own ontological status (Klimek, 2009:173), but metalepsis 
consequently often breaks this rule, as in Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author 
(1996) and Stoppard’s The Real Inspector Hound.  
 Unlike the mise en abyme, a phenomenon spanning millennia, in-yer-face theatre is an 
aesthetic found mainly in British theatre in the 1990s. Its main role players were Sarah Kane, 
Mark Ravenhill, and Anthony Neilson. In his book, In-yer-face theatre: British drama today, 
Sierz (2000:4) defines it as follows: “The widest definition of in-yer-face theatre is any drama 
that takes the audience by the scruff of the neck and shakes it until it gets the message. It is a 
theatre of sensation: it jolts both actors and spectators out of conventional responses, touching 
nerves and provoking alarm.” According to Law (2011:254), in-yer-face theatre is 
“deliberately aggressive, confrontational, and provocative.” Law (2011:254) continues: 
“These works share a preoccupation with extreme mental and physical states and a desire to 
make the audience experience such things viscerally, rather than in a more intellectual or 
analytical way.” In-yer-face plays thus show shocking scenes of violence, explicit sex and 
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crude language, presenting sexual relationships with unprecedented frankness (Sierz, 
2000:205).  
 Although Sierz (2002:22) interprets in-yer-face theatre as expressing modernist and 
avant-garde concerns, claiming that it is not a postmodern aesthetic, I believe that it articulates 
certain postmodern ideas very eloquently. Urban (2004:355) regards in-yer-face as rooted in 
Artaud’s theories of the theatre of cruelty, as well as in Heidegger and Nietzsche’s respective 
ideas about nihilism, defining it as follows: “where one expects to find something – a god, a 
higher power, a unity, a reason – one instead finds an absence” (Urban, 2004:365). According 
to Urban (2004), there is in this way a direct link between the absence of essence that Derrida 
(1978) refers to (and also roots in the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger) and in-yer-face 
theatre.  
 In Britain, at the end of the twentieth century, in-yer-face theatre reacted to the 
prevailing realist and naturalist forms in theatre where the members of the audience function 
as unaffected bystanders (Kane in Sierz, 2000:115) as well as to the political stalemate caused 
by postmodern detachment rooted in nihilism (Tomlin, 2004:503). Tomlin (2004:499) 
perceives British theatre in the 1990s as preoccupied with “problems surrounding the 
postmodern crisis of identity.” In the 1990s, there was an increasing difficulty in 
distinguishing between the real and the simulated: “Identity politics was no longer concerned 
with the disjunction between society’s simulated representation – or media distortions – and 
the reality of those identities (mis)represented” (Tomlin, 2004:500), but, rather, with the 
absence of a counterpoint to these representations. 
 Urban (2004:355) however discerns within the detachment associated with this 
postmodern condition a tension between what he terms “cool” and “cruel.” He regards the 
unifying factor in in-yer-face theatre as cruelty rather than violence (Urban, 2004:361). Unlike 
the deadlock of “cool” detachment, cruelty shocks the audience and provides the possibility of 
change: 
 
 Using the shock of consciousness that cruelty sets in play, the culture of cruel 
 Britannia takes up an ethical struggle and, far from ‘giving up’ on political 
 engagement or demonstrating reactionary tendencies […], the art that aligns itself with 
 this cruel undercurrent is invested in social concerns, in issues of life and death.  
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While functioning within the detachment of postmodernism (and specifically the “cool 
Britannia” of the 1990s), in-yer-face paradoxically also challenges its political stalemate 
through cruelty. Nevertheless, in-yer-face theatre takes up this “ethical struggle” without any 
moral framework or ideological certainty.  
 According to Sierz (2000:19), such theatre may therefore be identified by its explicit 
depictions of sex, rape, drug use and vomiting; its breaking of taboos by showing deeply 
private acts publicly; and by being experiential: the audience feels as if its members 
themselves have lived through the play. This, in turn, questions social norms: 
 
 Questioning moral norms, it affronts the ruling ideas of what can or should be shown 
 onstage; it also taps into more primitive feelings, smashing taboos, mentioning the 
 forbidden, creating discomfort. Crucially, it tells us more about who we really are. 
 Unlike the type of theatre that allows us to sit back and contemplate what we see in 
 detachment, the best in-yer-face theatre takes us on an emotional journey, getting 
 under our skin. In other words, it is experiential, not speculative. (Sierz, 2000:4) 
 
The in-yer-face aesthetic is therefore exclusive to theatre because live performance heightens 
the audience’s awareness (Sierz, 2000:7). In theatre, the audience experiences feelings of 
embarrassment on a much deeper level than if its members were in the privacy of their own 
homes. Although in-yer-face professes to shun intellectuality, the fact that it is exclusive to 
theatre implies a metatheatrical concern. According to Tomlin (2004:499), in-yer-face 
consequently also questions the efficacy of theatre as an art form in a reality where nothing 
exists outside of representation. The very fact that an aesthetic, which proposes to be 
experiential rather than cerebral, therefore turns out to voice metatheatrical concerns, exposes 
another paradox in its aims.  
 In-yer-face was initially developed to make theatre more “real” and thereby to 
diminish the distance between the actual and fictional. But, as Hornby (1986:112) suggests, 
violence and nudity on stage often result in metatheatrical effects. When an audience is 
confronted with the corporeality of the actors’ bodies in front of them, its members are often 
reminded of the fact that, apart from the characters portrayed in the drama, they are also 
seeing an actor.  
 Through its visceralness, in-yer-face theatre thus emphasises its own fictionality and 
prompts the audience to consider certain aspects of it intellectually. Sierz (2000:4) therefore 
argues, in addition, that it challenges specific binaries, such as human versus animal, clean 
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versus dirty, healthy versus unhealthy, normal versus abnormal, good versus evil, true versus 
untrue, real versus unreal, right versus wrong, just versus unjust and art versus life. Through 
its form, in-yer-face theatre therefore metatheatrically dismantles the binaries between 
intellectual and visceral, as well as detached and committed, theatre.  
 Hutcheon (1984:71) also observes that form or structure often serve as covert 
metatextual devices. She singles out four models: the detective plot, fantasy, games and the 
erotic, which exemplify this. As Carlson (1993:432) also confirms, the detective plot is so 
conventional and familiar that it readily lends itself to the investigation of postmodern 
hermeneutic concerns. The reader therefore becomes the detective who needs to decipher the 
fiction “committed” by the writer or “criminal.” The model of fantasy presents the author with 
the freedom to introduce properties of metafiction (Hutcheon, 1984:77) while the game model 
is usually a microcosm for a larger context and, in consequence, functions as a mise en abyme 
(Hutcheon, 1984:84). In the erotic model, the act of reading is compared to an act of 
possession or control while the mutual involvement of both parties suggests a mutual 
participation between author and reader (Hutcheon, 1984:85).   
 It is clear that any theatrical device is able to become a metatheatrical device. 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that any device which aims to test and investigate 
the boundary between the fictional and actual frames is only effective as long as it breaks a 
taboo (Hornby, 1986:20). Literal images have a life-cycle in which innovation becomes 
convention, which becomes cliché and self-parody: “today’s truth is tomorrow’s received 
idea; today’s realism is tomorrow’s melodrama” (States, 1985:83). 
 For example, Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (1879) caused much controversy when it was 
first produced, not only due to Nora’s scandalous behaviour in abandoning her family, but 
also because of the intimacy depicted in the discourse between Torvald and Nora. This 
naturalistic play seemed much closer to the actual world than the, by then, overfamiliar realist 
conventions. In Clare Stopford’s 1988 production of this play, she felt that A Doll’s House 
was still relevant, except for the lack of physical intimacy between the characters. Act Two, 
which Ibsen sets at the dining room table, Stopford set in the couple’s bedroom after they had 
sex (Stopford & Krueger, 2006:238). Stopford included intimate details about her direction of 
this scene, in order to break through fictional convention – much as Ibsen did over a hundred 
years ago. She describes the scene as follows: 
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If Nora and Torvald open the last act having just made love and I have her getting out 
of bed to pack up and leave, then, logically she will have seminal fluid about to flow 
down her inner thigh. What would she do about this? She would wash, or wipe herself 
down. […] By including the  gesture, I’m honouring a knowledge that the audience 
and I share. So although one might be breaking the audience’s comfort zones with 
such an intimate gesture, you’re building a kind of trust by stimulating in them real 
connections with their sense memories. 
 
The voyeurism that Ibsen’s play initially intended is in this manner reinvigorated, since it had 
passed through States’ life-cycle of literary images. Furthermore, Stopford’s approach to this 
scene will also only invigorate Ibsen’s voyeurism as long as it breaks a taboo. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
If we accept, in agreement with scholars such as Nietzsche, Bakhtin, Derrida, and Eco, that 
language is inextricable from existence and not an external, intellectual tool, we can conclude 
that meaning is shifting and unstable. Hence language can never present us with an exact copy 
of lived experience. 
 This, however, does not mean that language “fails,” but merely that it operates within 
life and as a result cannot present an objective mirror to it. The same can be said for mimesis – 
the basis of all art forms, which is, in fact, so ingrained in human existence that it sometimes 
becomes impossible to distinguish the original experience from the copy. Due to the close 
relationship between language and mimesis, I shall, like Wolf (2009), use mediation as an 
umbrella term throughout this thesis to refer to both language and art.  
 All forms of mediation are inseparable from human existence, and consequently no 
one form may claim to be ontologically more authentic than any other. They all function on 
the same level of fictitiousness. Although there is an interesting relationship between the 
fictional and the actual in theatre, due to its live audience which, in turn, becomes part of the 
work of art, it is not ontologically any more or less authentic than other art forms, despite its 
plurisignation.  
 I therefore do not regard certain theatrical forms, such as realism and metatheatre, as 
opposed to each other, but as two ends of a continuum, within which the three plays analysed 
in this study, easily fit. Each of these plays, concerned to a significant extent with the idea of 
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art and theatre and its (in)ability to reproduce the actual world, functions within a realist style 
(even in the narrow sense of the term which implies that everything that happens in the 
fictional world may be rationally explained). And yet, all three texts, to varying extents, also 
fulfil certain metatheatrical functions. These plays ask questions about the possibility of 
authenticity, especially concerning the characters’ mediated perceptions of each other. These 
functions involve the audience; for this reason the works also comment on themselves as 
theatre.  
 I shall now proceed to analyse Pinter’s Betrayal, Stoppard’s The Real Thing, and 
Marber’s Closer in view of the preceding theoretical discussion, with emphasis on mediation 
(both through language and art), mimicry, and metatheatre. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
HAROLD PINTER’S KALEIDOSCOPE OF BETRAYALS 
 
 The successful lie creates an unnerving freedom. It shows us that it is possible for no one to know what 
 we are doing. The poor lie – the wish to be found out – reveals our fear about what we can do with 
 words. Lying, in other words, is not so much a way of keeping our options open, but of finding out what 
 they are. Fear of infidelity is fear of language. – Adam Phillips, Monogamy (1996)  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Harold Pinter’s Betrayal poses compelling epistemological questions by presenting the 
audience with the type of lies to which Phillips (1996) refers in the epigraph above – lies 
which are successful at first, but become uncovered; revealing not only a series of betrayals, 
but also the complicated ways in which language is used. 
 In this chapter I aim to analyse Betrayal in the light of the ideas about language, 
mimesis, and theatre, discussed in the previous chapter. After a contextualisation of Pinter’s 
oeuvre, I investigate his use of language and the way the characters use it to negotiate a 
community with each other or exclude one another from such a community. I also examine 
the use of recycling and mimicry in the play, both in the characters’ dialogue and as used by 
Pinter in a broader sense. Lastly, I analyse the use of metatheatre in the play, according to 
Wolf’s (2009) guidelines in this regard. 
 This discussion will consequently illuminate the questions concerning authenticity, 
communication, and implications for the audience and theatre as an art form, posed in Chapter 
One of this thesis. 
 
3.2. Pinter’s influences and influence 
 
Harold Pinter is possibly the most important playwright of his time in the English language. 
Even so, it is difficult to place him within the dramatic canon. Initially, he was associated with 
the “Angry Young Men” of the 1950s and compared to the Absurdist playwrights, Samuel 
Beckett and Eugene Ionesco (Knowles, 2009:74). Although he was also labelled as a kitchen 
sink dramatist, Pinter’s plays are not realist. But, like Chekhov, he writes for the proscenium 
arch (Knowles, 2009:78), which makes it difficult to categorise his oeuvre, as well as pinpoint 
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his cultural influences. Scolnicov (2012:174) contrasts Pinter with Tom Stoppard, “whose 
work is openly intertextual and intermedial.” But, in an interview with Thompson (2005:45), 
Pinter states that no writer writes in a vacuum and that playwrights absorb and digest other 
writing which influences their own work, as his plays are likely to be influenced by Samuel 
Beckett. According to Scolnicov (2012:174-175), modernist writers such as William Butler 
Yeats, T.S. Eliot and James Joyce have also shaped Pinter’s drama.  
 According to Smith (2005:12-19), there are three important factors arising from 
Pinter’s childhood and early years that should be kept in mind when interpreting his plays. 
Firstly, he is Jewish. The claustrophobic domestic relations in most of his plays as well as a 
tension between working class parents and offspring with artistic and intellectual aspirations 
stem from this fact. Pinter was in his early teens during the Second World War; this 
experience left him and his generation convinced of the precariousness of life, the centrality of 
life to art and culture, the importance of sexuality and friendships, as well as the corruptibility 
of states, politicians and officials (Smith, 2005:12).  
 Secondly, Pinter’s “outsiderness,” as Smith (2005:17) terms it, also influences his 
work. Despite Pinter’s origins on the periphery of institutional education, he is often criticised 
for his intellectualism. According to Smith (2005:10), this is due to the myopic view of his 
work held by these critics. Much of Pinter’s intellectual grounding took place outside 
institutional education; he therefore always remained an intellectual outsider to an extent. He 
enrolled at RADA in 1948, but found it intolerable and dropped out, although he did serve as 
Associate Director of the National Theatre from 1972 to 1983. Thus, although he is not an 
intellectual snob, Pinter is also not an anti-intellectual. He, for example, views the 
phenomenon of “pop,” or , as he refers to it in an interview with Gross (2005:75), “the quick 
buck, the quick poem, the quick song, the quick whatever you like” as superficial, fleeting and 
driven by panic.  
 What Smith (2005:19) refers to as “a looming sense of doom” is the third important 
factor shaping Pinter’s drama. Events such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki resulted in paranoia, 
suspicion and a fear of external forces that may never be known. According to Hobson (in 
Smith, 2005:19), Pinter was living “on the verge of disaster” during his youth. For Pinter and 
his peers, there consequently did not appear to be an alternative, politically or philosophically, 
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to capitalist society, although the failings of this society had been pointed out by their 
predecessors (Smith, 2005:21).  
 In turn, Pinter’s influence on English drama cannot be overemphasised. David Mamet, 
Sarah Kane, Mark Ravenhill, Caryl Churchill and Martin Crimp are all indebted in a general 
sense to Pinter, while Jez Butterworth, Patrick Marber, Joe Penhall and David Eldridge were 
all influenced by Pinter’s comedy of characters lost in language and improvised confusions. 
Pinter’s modernism, in the tradition of Beckett and Kafka, inspired the plays of Mark 
Ravenhill and Martin Crimp, whereas the political plays of Sarah Kane and Caryl Churchill 
carry traces of Pinter’s menacing political plays (Waters, 2009:300-302).  
Unfortunately, Pinter is also, according to Dromgoole (2000:225), “the aircraft carrier 
from which many planes take off on shorter, less majestic trips.” Spencer (2000), for example, 
describes Martin Crimp’s The Country (2000) as an unsuccessful pastiche of Pinter: “That 
debt is particularly burdensome in The Country, and at times the piece seems less like an 
original play than an immensely skilful parody of dear old Harold.”13  
 
3.3. Pinter and postmodern drama 
 
Just as Pinter’s place in the canon does not neatly fit any category, critics also vastly differ on 
the level of postmodern innovation in his work. Pinter’s work is definitely traditional in the 
sense that it is firmly text based. In an interview with Bensky (2005:66), Pinter describes 
himself as a “traditional playwright,” who makes use of curtains and curtain lines. There is 
also no improvisation in his plays: “I don’t at all believe in the anarchic theatre of so-called 
‘creative’ actors – the actors can do that in someone else’s plays” (Pinter in Bensky, 2005:55).  
 In an interview with Thompson (2005:46-47), Pinter furthermore explains that he 
always thinks of the proscenium arch when he writes, although he finds that different theatre 
forms, like theatre in the round, all have an equal number of liberating qualities and 
limitations. Smith (2005:31) argues that, although contemporary, Pinter’s plays are rooted in 
character, emotion and plot and therefore not avant-garde. Almansi and Henderson (1983:15) 
describe Pinter’s plays as follows: 
                                                            
13 Other less successful Pinter-inspired plays include Simon Bent’s The Associate (2002) and Mark Ravenhill’s 
The Cut (2006). See De Jongh (2002) and Shaw (2008).  
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His plays are conceived for an orthodox proscenium stage; they are conventionally 
based on speech and dialogue with only a marginal inference of physical action; they 
are written fully and intensely, their author seeming to abhor improvisation, 
‘happenings,’ or any kind of aleatory technique (in this sense Pinter is definitely not a 
post-modernist playwright). 
 
Scolnicov (2012:5-6), however, differs from Almansi and Henderson (1983) and describes 
Pinter’s categorization as traditional, adding to “the deceptive appearance of the plays’ surface 
realism,” while she unequivocally regards him as an avant-garde playwright. Scolnicov 
(2012:7), instead, agrees with Esslin (1992:41) who describes Pinter’s work as 
hypernaturalistic, although Scolnicov (2012:7) prefers the term “hyperrealism:” 
 
At first look, Pinter’s plays appear to be realistic: the characters belong to well-
defined, contemporary English social groups and classes, who talk in the proper 
registers and idiolects, and the prescribed scenery is of familiar English rooms. This 
semblance of realism may lead the actor, director, spectator, and reader to search for 
motivation and causation. But the search is futile and bound to end in frustration, since 
the text fails to supply reasons for the actions or behaviour. Accustomed to analysing 
well-made plays, the reader feels let down and may conclude that the plays are not 
well made and are written in a puzzling style. 
 
The avant-garde elements of Pinter’s plays are thus subtle, yet very evident upon closer 
inspection. As mentioned in Chapter Two, realism is elastic enough to encompass dissidence. 
Despite Pinter’s resistance towards improvisation and his preference for the proscenium, the 
postmodern and poststructuralist concerns about language and art investigated in this study are 
present in Pinter’s major themes and techniques. Pinter therefore represents an example of the 
type of play Meisner and Mounsef (2011:89) describe when they argue that a text based form 
need not necessarily imply conservative or traditional theatre: “radical performance does not 
always translate into radical politics.” 
Even Almansi and Henderson (1983:78), who do not regard Pinter as a postmodernist, 
concede that he began to investigate the idea that a “fixed, objective reality” does not exist. 
Pinter (in Esslin, 1992:32) himself has also stated that “there are no hard distinctions between 
what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false.” This idea, 
consequently, forms the basis of Pinter’s notorious silence with regard to the history of his 
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characters.14 For Scolnicov (2012:1), it is probably impossible to find a rational explanation 
for every word and action in Pinter’s plays. The audience never finds out who exactly the 
characters are, and his plays therefore seem opaque since they depart from established ideas of 
realism in the theatre. Esslin (1992:31) argues that this is exactly the way in which Pinter’s 
plays resemble reality: “we do not know, with any semblance of certainty what motivates our 
own wives, parents, our own children – why then should we be furnished with a complete 
dossier about the motivations of any character we casually encounter on stage?” Therefore, 
Esslin (1992:41) also sees Pinter’s plays as highly ambivalent, even multivalent and not 
traditional, although the plays resemble reality; “for reality itself is equally multivalent.” 
 The non-verifiability of the past and the ways in which we reconstruct the past through 
memory therefore constitute an important theme in Pinter’s oeuvre. In this regard he 
(2005:21-22) remarks: 
  
 I’ve never started a play with any kind of abstract idea or theory. Apart from any 
 other consideration, we are faced with the immense difficulty, if not the 
 impossibility of verifying the past. I don’t mean merely years ago, but yesterday,  this 
 morning. What took place, what was the nature of what took place, what happened? 
 
The inaccessibility of the world for Pinter’s characters influences how they communicate. 
Esslin (1992:227) argues that his biggest contribution to modern drama is exposing how stage 
dialogue overestimated the way in which human beings actually use language. Pinter has often 
been grouped with the Absurd dramatists on the premise that his plays illustrate the failure of 
communication. However, he (2008) does not agree with this interpretation of his work: 
 
We have heard many times that tired, grimy phrase ‘failure of communication’… and 
this phrase has been fixed to my work quite consistently. I believe the contrary. I think 
we communicate only too well, in our silence, in what is unsaid, and that what takes 
place is a continual evasion, desperate rearguard [sic] attempts to keep ourselves to 
                                                            
14 Shaw (2008:57) cites the anecdote of Pinter’s reaction when an audience member wrote the following to him 
after seeing The Birthday Party:  
 Dear Sir, I would be obliged if you would kindly explain to me the meaning of your play, The Birthday 
 Party. These are the points I do not understand: 1. Who are the two men? 2. Where did Stanley come 
 from? 3. Are they all supposed to be normal? You will appreciate that without the answers to these 
 questions I cannot fully understand your play.  
To this, Pinter replied: 
 Dear Madam, I would be obliged if you could kindly explain to me the meaning of your letter. These are 
 the points which I do not understand: 1. Who are you? 2. Where do you come from? 3. Are you 
 supposed to be normal? You will appreciate that without the answers to these questions I cannot fully 
 understand your letter. 
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ourselves. Communication is too alarming. To enter into someone’s life is too 
frightening. To disclose to others the poverty within us is too fearsome a possibility. 
 
Hence Pinter does not investigate the fact that our attempts at communication are 
unsuccessful, but rather the fact that we communicate in unexpected ways. For Almansi and 
Henderson (1983:15), humans are alone in Pinter’s world and communication is difficult and 
dangerous. Social connections – supposed to break the isolation of the human condition – are 
untrustworthy and treacherous. 
 Pinter’s plays are furthermore known for an atmosphere of menace, their commitment 
to political causes, and his idiosyncratic rhythm and pauses, usually described by the adjective 
“Pinteresque” (Law, 2011:390). This rhythm obviously also impacts on the way that Pinter is 
performed. According to Scolnicov (2012:8), it is very difficult for a Method Actor to act in a 
Pinter play, since “Pinter demands a different approach:  a hyperrealistic fidelity to external 
appearances together with an opaqueness that deliberately refuses to suggest motives or inner 
workings of the mind.” For Scolnicov (2012), an actor should thus not try to find a motivation 
for every word or action he or she speaks or performs. The actor should merely achieve a 
guise required by the text.  
 Peter Hall (2005:137), collaborator and first director of many of Pinter’s plays, 
disagrees, affirming that “people who think that all you’ve got to do in Pinter is to say it, hold 
the pause, and then say the next line, are wrong.” Hall (2005:137-138) describes his rehearsal 
method which involves a process of “veiling.” According to Hall, Pinter’s characters veil their 
emotions and motivations with discrepant words and actions. In rehearsal, his actors are then 
required to determine the emotion or motivation which they are veiling:  
 
 actors can’t play veiling until they know what they’re veiling, so we play mockery, we 
 play hatred, we play animosity, we play the extreme black-and-white terms of a 
 character. That stage of rehearsal is very crude, but it’s a very important stage, because 
 unless the actor understands what game he is playing, what his actual underlying 
 motivations are, the ambiguity of the text will mean nothing. (Hall, 2005:137) 
 
Although actors are sometimes concerned that an audience might overlook their veiled 
motivations, Hall (2005:137) is confident that an audience will grasp the full nuance of such a 
performance.  
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 The other aspect of Pinter, regarding production, which Hall (2005:138) emphasises is 
that the script should not be altered in performance. Actors and directors often change the 
words in their scripts until they are comfortable delivering these. According to Hall 
(2005:138) each pause and silence in Pinter’s writing is there for a specific reason and the 
director and actors’ “job is to find out why.”  
 
3.4. Betrayal within Pinter’s oeuvre 
 
By the time Pinter wrote Betrayal in the late 1970s, he was already established as a major 
figure in British theatre, and the above mentioned qualities of his work and its production had 
already been accepted by audiences. The plays that he wrote in the 1970s also marked a 
definite shift in milieu, from working class East London to the more affluent centre, or west. 
Class and social tension do, however, remain as themes throughout, while the emphasis on 
time and memory is increased (Smith, 2005:32). The plays of the 1970s examine English 
cultural life and identity viewed through a sense of loss and the uncertainty of the past (Smith, 
2005:34).  
 It is against this backdrop that Smith (2005:35) describes Betrayal as a “study in 
English disillusionment and equivocation.” The seemingly simple tale of adultery therefore 
proves on closer inspection to ask the question “how can we trust what we know?” If the 
events in the play were to be chronologically considered, Betrayal would begin in 1968 with a 
flirtation at a party between Jerry, the best friend of the host, Robert, and Emma, the hostess. 
This flirtation develops into an affair which takes place in a rented flat in Kilburn. The 
audience sees a scene set in this flat, at the height of the affair in 1971, in which Emma reveals 
to Jerry that she is pregnant by her husband, Robert. Emma and Robert subsequently visit 
Venice in 1973 where Robert finds out about the affair and confronts Emma. Back in London, 
Emma and Jerry have another rendezvous in their flat but Emma does not tell Jerry that 
Robert knows about the affair. Robert and Jerry lunch together at an Italian restaurant shortly 
after this, where Robert also does not tell Jerry that he knows about the affair, although he 
seems visibly tense about it. A year later, Jerry drops in at Robert and Emma’s house for a 
drink where all three parties keep up the pretence of a happily married couple and their 
platonic friend who is visiting. In 1975, the affair is dissolved. This happens in Emma and 
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Jerry’s rented flat; the reasons given for the dissolution are the demands of the characters’ 
respective jobs. Two years later, in 1977, Jerry and Emma meet at a bar for a drink. Emma 
reveals that her marriage to Robert is over, and that she had told him about the affair between 
her and Jerry the previous night. The last event of the play is a confrontation between Robert 
and Jerry where Jerry finds out that Robert had known about the affair since 1973.  
 This rather banal plotline is, however, related to the audience in a mostly reversed 
chronological order. The play starts with Emma and Jerry’s drink at the pub, moves forward to 
Jerry and Robert’s confrontation after which it shifts backward to the dissolution of the affair, 
the social gathering at Robert and Emma’s house where all three characters pretend that the 
affair does not exist, then further back to the scene in Venice where Robert finds out about the 
affair. From here the play shifts forward again to Jerry and Emma’s reunion in their flat and 
Robert and Jerry’s lunch at the Italian restaurant, after which it proceeds backward again to 
the height of the affair – and ends with a scene in Robert and Emma’s bedroom where Jerry 
makes his first advances on Emma.  
 For Scolnicov (2012:105), the reverse chronology of the play is its most innovative 
aspect, turning the banality of the subject matter into a novelty. Since the outcome of the 
events is already known, suspense is replaced with an unpacking of what caused these events: 
“every new scene turns out to be unexpected because, although we know the outcome, we 
don’t know the steps that lead up to it.” In this regard, Burkman (1982:506) refers to Betrayal 
as an “autopsy,” because of its reversed structure.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter One, Betrayal met with a very hostile reception 
when it opened in 1978 and was criticised in the main for being banal, insubstantial and 
uninteresting. According to Elsom (1981:249), Pinter did not “at any point try to conceal the 
basis of the story, which, as several papers pointed out gleefully, could have had an 
autobiographical connection. There was nothing perplexing about what happened, no veils of 
cunning ambiguity.” It is on the grounds of this superficial interpretation of the play that 
Kretzmer (in Elsom, 1981:251) called it a “woman’s magazine romance,” while for 
Hirschhorn (in Elsom, 1981:251) it was “a very insubstantial so-what piece of work.” Young 
(in Elsom, 1981:252) felt that “Mr. Pinter has made his characters such uninteresting people” 
and also asks “well, so what?” of the play. Ironically, Bock (1981:182) states that “the 
dialogue tells us facts and is without depth,” while Wardle (in Elsom, 1981:253) asserts that 
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Pinter’s “obsession with the irretrievable past and the fallibility of subjective memory finds no 
expression in this play.” He adds that “the dialogue throughout is of studied banality, broken 
occasionally by a short-lived explosion of lust or anger,” but concedes that “it would be false 
to say that there is nothing ambiguous in the play” (Wardle in Elsom, 1981:254). 
 
Scene 
number 
Place in 
chronology 
of the play 
Year Scene synopsis 
Scene 9 A. 1968 The flirtation between Emma and Jerry at a party at Robert 
and Emma’s house. The start of the affair. 
Scene 8 B. 1971 The height of the affair, set in Jerry and Emma’s flat. Emma 
reveals that she is pregnant by her husband. 
Scene 5 C. 1973 Robert and Emma on vacation in Venice. In their hotel room, 
Robert confronts Emma about the affair.  
Scene 6 D. 1973 Jerry and Emma meet after Emma has returned from Venice. 
She does not tell him that Robert has found out about the 
affair. 
Scene 7 E. 1973 Robert and Jerry have lunch at an Italian restaurant. Robert 
does not tell Jerry that he knows about the affair. 
Scene 4 F. 1974 Jerry drops in at Robert and Emma’s house for a drink. All 
three characters pretend that the affair does not exist. 
Scene 3 G. 1975 The dissolution of the affair. A discussion about the demands 
of the characters’ respective jobs.  
Scene 1 H. 1977 Jerry and Emma meet two years after the affair has ended. 
Emma reveals that she has told Robert about the affair. 
Scene 2 I. 1977 Jerry confronts Robert about the fact that he now knows 
about the affair and finds out that he has known for years. 
Figure 3: The sequence of the scenes in Betrayal and their place in the chronology of the play. 
 Despite this wave of negative criticism of Betrayal, Nightingale (in Elsom, 1981:254-
255), praised the play, in particular its “anti-clockwise” chronology: “it substitutes the 
question ‘how?’ for the cruder ‘what next?’ in the minds of the audience. And in my view it 
deepens and darkens our perception of the play, infecting the most innocent encounters with 
irony, dread and a sense of doom.” Of the critics cited above, only Nightingale, and Wardle to 
an extent, thus grasped the nuances in Pinter’s text and picked up on the deeper levels hidden 
beneath the smooth surface of banality.   
 In his seminal The life and work of Harold Pinter (1996:258-259), Billington 
speculates that he and other critics were initially hostile towards Betrayal for three reasons. 
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Firstly, against critics’ expectations, the play was not committed or political. Secondly, the 
original production did not realise the play’s full potential: according to Billington (1996:325), 
the Lyttleton Theatre, where it was first performed, was too big and the National Theatre was 
experiencing industrial problems at the time. A subsequent revival of the play in 1990, which 
was performed in a more intimate venue, had a much better reception. Lastly, the audience 
interpreted the play as a type of Mills and Boon novel, instead of seeing the self-betrayal as a 
steadily infecting virus.  
 The critics’ and audience’s expectations thus seem to be a major factor in the initial 
reception of the play. In Betrayal, Pinter did address themes and techniques that were by this 
time associated with him. Language and communication and the various ways in which people 
use it to mask and obscure, as well as the impossibility of verifying the past, were also 
investigated. The play moreover features long pauses, questions in response to questions and 
limited dialogue (Ben-Zvi, 1980:227). But, according to Ben-Zvi (1980:227), Betrayal does 
deviate from Pinter’s previous work in that there are no innuendoes, sinister ambiguities or 
impending disasters. Nonetheless, while I shall argue that there are indeed innuendoes in 
Betrayal, Ben-Zvi (1980) is correct in pointing out the absence of the impending sense of 
doom so familiar in Pinter’s previous work. Scolnicov (2012:106) aptly sums up the initial 
reaction to Betrayal, when she states that 
 
 In his previous plays, the audience was left baffled by the inscrutability of the 
 characters. In Betrayal, Pinter seems to be mocking us, by providing all the identity 
 data one might wish for; but, for all that, the mystery of the human personality remains 
 unchanged. 
 
The themes usually associated with Pinter thus appear in Betrayal in a disguised, but no less 
effective manner. I continue to explore the themes of mediation, recycling and mimicry in 
Betrayal, for the remainder of this chapter. I additionally investigate the subsequent 
implications of metatheatre in the play.  
 
3.5. Mediation as theme and dramatic strategy in Betrayal 
 
As mentioned above, mediation, for the purposes of this study, refers to any communicative 
act (be it through language or art) between two or more human beings. As I have noted, for 
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Bakhtin (in Shotter & Billig, 1998:16) the only way for one person to know another is through 
dialectic discourse, which entails observable acts of communication. A play by a dramatist 
such as Pinter, who is known for his idiosyncratic use of language on stage, invites an 
investigation of the concept of community that mediation establishes between characters, the 
use of language in the play, the way the characters use narrative to construct their pasts and 
ideas of deception and originality. 
 
3.5.1. Isolation versus community among the three characters in Betrayal 
 
As explained above, Maturana and Varela (1980:5) as well as Bakhtin (in Hitchcock, 1998:92) 
perceive human beings as quintessentially isolated, since it is impossible to fully experience 
another’s pain. This is especially applicable to Pinter’s characters in Betrayal, since, as Cahn 
(1993:4) points out, “no matter how much they talk, no matter how much they attempt to 
establish a bond through language, these characters remain trapped in loneliness.” Griffith 
(1992:99) links this phenomenon with the theory of Bakhtin in which no character’s definition 
of reality is able to be identical to that of his or her interlocutor, although the latter may have 
much in common with him or her.  
 When Robert and Jerry discuss the affair after Emma has told Jerry in Scene One that 
she has confessed to Robert, the impossibility of completely knowing another becomes 
evident: 
 
 JERRY: But you betrayed her for years, didn’t you? 
 ROBERT: Oh yes. 
 JERRY: And she never knew about it. Did she? 
 ROBERT: Didn’t she? 
   Pause 
 JERRY: I didn’t. 
 ROBERT: No, you didn’t know very much about anything, really, did you? 
   Pause 
 JERRY: No. 
 ROBERT: Yes you did. 
 JERRY: Yes I did. I lived with her. 
 ROBERT: Yes. In the afternoons. 
 JERRY: Sometimes very long ones. For seven years. 
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 ROBERT: Yes, you certainly knew all there was to know about that. About seven 
   years of afternoons. I don’t know anything about that.  (Pinter, 1978:42-
 43) 
 
This passage simultaneously illustrates and thwarts the idea of community between two 
individuals. Jerry and Emma’s clandestine affair created an insulated community which 
excludes Robert and anybody else. Yet the preceding dialogue indicates that Jerry was also 
excluded from Robert and Emma’s community in which they shared knowledge about the 
other’s affairs. 
 For Almansi and Henderson (1983:12), the lack of community between characters in 
Pinter’s plays is so pronounced that words and language do not function as conduits between 
two individuals, but rather as “barbs to protect the wired enclosure of the self.” Therefore 
communication among the characters in Betrayal occurs in indirect ways, through a discussion 
on squash, the success of the authors that they represent, and their children’s lives (Roof, 
1993:80). But these means of mediation still isolate the characters and resist community. 
 According to Esslin (1992:189), the isolation of the characters in Betrayal extends also 
to their memory and pasts: “the passage of time changes our perception of what the past was 
like and what we were like – who we were – in the past.” A character is thus not only cut off 
from other characters, but also from past versions of him- or herself. The perception of certain 
past events undergoes a transformation, according to Esslin (1992:189).  
 Betrayal accordingly sketches a situation where a sense of community is created 
between characters, but this community is subsequently betrayed, resulting in a resistance to 
community by these characters. Therefore, the title of the play refers to the idea of betrayal, 
rather than one specific betrayal, or it might possibly have been called “The Betrayal” 
(Scolnicov, 2012:107). Ben-Zvi (1980:228) seems to agree, when she points out that “the 
parameters of the topic are broad enough to subsume almost every facet of contemporary 
experience. The subject is not betrayal, but existence in society.”  
 According to Billington (1996:259), there are four main betrayals in the text, which 
include “betrayal of self, betrayal of others, betrayal of art” (Leveaux in Billington, 
1996:326): marital betrayal, the betrayal of lovers’ trust, the male friendship bond and literary 
idealism. Marital betrayal is the most obvious of the betrayals in the play, since all three on-
stage characters and most of the off-stage characters possibly commit adultery, or suggest that 
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they are doing so. Emma not only betrays Robert with Jerry, but later on also with Casey, an 
author whom Jerry represents and Robert publishes. According to Robert, he has repeatedly 
cheated on Emma, although there is no confirmation for this, other than Robert’s own 
words.15 Jerry betrays his wife, Judith, with Emma, and the possibility that Judith is having an 
affair with a colleague is mentioned. Even so, marriage is not the only community the 
characters create and then betray.  
 As Robert’s remark about Jerry’s afternoons with Emma in the excerpt quoted above 
indicates, the characters also form a community in their extramarital affairs. Ben-Zvi 
(1980:229) believes Emma betrays Jerry when she conceives a child with her husband. In an 
affair such as theirs, however, where none of the parties consider dissolving their marriages to 
marry each other, it is debatable whether or not this constitutes a break in lovers’ trust. 
Nonetheless Emma does betray Jerry when she fails to inform him that Robert has found out 
about the affair. Esslin (1992:193) describes this situation as follows: 
 
 This amounts to Robert and Emma jointly betraying Jerry by leaving him in a fool’s 
 paradise, thinking that he is betraying Robert and basking in the – as it now turns out – 
 spurious feeling of superiority that comes from knowing something important that 
 another person does not. 
 
The secret that Robert and Emma thus keep from Jerry also betrays the bond of male 
friendship between the two men. This betrayal is serious enough for Ben-Zvi (1980:231) to 
assert that the reason that Jerry is upset about Robert’s knowledge of the affair is that it taints 
their friendship. I am, however, inclined to concur with Esslin (1992:193) that it is, rather, the 
fact that he was left in a “fool’s paradise,” excluded from the community between Robert and 
Emma, who shared this secret.  
 Yet Esslin (1992:193) also believes that it is the breaking of the male bond that most 
upsets Robert when he finds out about the affair, but, based on Peter Hall’s idea of veiling in 
Pinter’s plays discussed above and the way that the characters continually establish 
communities with each other only to betray these communities, I shall argue – throughout this 
chapter – that Robert’s repeated reference to his and Jerry’s friendship when he learns of the 
                                                            
15 Although the majority of critics take it for granted that Robert did betray Emma with other women, this is not 
confirmed anywhere in the play. According to Almansi and Henderson (1983:71) a critic should guard against 
taking a character’s words as fact: “all we know is that there are characters making these statements: not that 
these statements are valid.” 
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affair is designed to re-establish his community with Jerry, in order to exclude Emma and hide 
the fact that he was also living in a “fool’s paradise.” 
 It is, however, justifiable that Esslin (1992:190) regards the community between the 
two males as Emma’s motivation to yield to Jerry’s advances. Emma seems to resist Jerry’s 
attempts at seduction up to the point where Robert enters and appears indifferent to Jerry’s 
behaviour towards Emma, which is clearly inappropriate: “Emma has yielded to Jerry because 
she resents Robert’s physical intimacy with Jerry, because she is jealous of Jerry’s 
relationship with her husband.” All three characters thus seem to be in a constant battle with 
the others to form a community, and not be left isolated. 
 These various affairs, for Esslin (1992:197), appear to take up almost all of the 
characters’ time since they are largely preoccupied by them, although he does continue: 
 
 at the same time, these sexual relationships are shown, by Pinter, to be superficial in 
 the extreme; far from being passionate involvements, elemental and irresistible, they 
 seem casual and trivial, hardly more involving than the occasional drunken binge, a 
 form of amusement that will pass the time and alleviate the boredom of an affluent and 
 meaningless existence.   
 
Esslin (1992:197) concludes that this behaviour betrays the characters’ lack of literary loyalty 
and demonstrates how literary middlemen and gallery managers are not committed to what 
they do. However, I perceive this as a rather harsh interpretation of the characters and their 
motivations which negates a few aspects of Pinter’s play referred to above. Firstly, Pinter 
shows us only some scenes in the characters’ lives, all of which concern their affairs. Emma 
did, after all, mention her hours at the gallery as one of the reasons she and Jerry could not 
meet more often. Secondly, to interpret the characters’ relationships as “casual and trivial” 
denies Peter Hall’s technique of veiling. Robert’s tirade at the publishing industry in Scene 
Seven is indeed a thinly veiled mask for his frustration over Jerry and Emma’s affair. Even 
Jerry seems sceptical about it, and interjects first with “What are you talking about?” (115) 
and later with “You must be pissed” (116).  
 The marital betrayal in the text is, as a result, shown to influence, as well as mirror, 
other aspects of the characters’ lives. Although the characters are all successful in their jobs, 
Robert and Jerry both betrayed their own literary idealism. They were both once poetry editors 
at Oxford and Cambridge but have now become an agent and a publisher, literary middlemen 
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to best-selling authors. According to Ben-Zvi (1980:232), the career of Casey, the author 
whom Jerry represents and Robert publishes, clearly connotes an increase in commercialism 
and decrease in artistic merit: from poet to promising but commercially unsuccessful novelist, 
to producing marketable writing and lastly considering a film contract with Hollywood. As 
Billington (1996:159) describes this: “behind the play’s action lies an aching awareness of the 
way the high ideals of youth are betrayed by the compromises of daily life.” The characters 
are in other words betraying their younger selves, or breaking up the community with earlier 
versions of themselves, as suggested above. This situation is also universal to an extent, as 
Billington (1996:259) avers elsewhere: “they are not only parasitic middlemen, but, by 
extension, symbols of all those who betray their youthful commitments for the sake of bland, 
middle-aged affluence.” 
 Pinter therefore, through the marital infidelity, progressively comments on various 
forms of betrayal, “until his original triangle has disappeared, leaving a void in the center of 
ever widening circles of human interaction. Hence he produces a dramatic equivalent to the 
Yeatsian absence of center and the subsequent loss of fixity in a constantly changing world” 
(Ben-Zvi, 1980:228).16 As the play raises existential issues about human interaction, the 
temporary establishment of community and the role that language plays in the mediation 
between individuals, it consequently also underscores Nietzsche’s notion of the loss of an 
essential truth. 
 
3.3.2. Pinter’s veiled language 
 
Throughout Pinter’s entire oeuvre, language remains a fundamental element (Almansi, 
1981:79). Pinter is exceptionally particular about the use of language: Smith (2005:38), for 
example, agrees with Peter Hall that not a word should be altered in a Pinter text. Pinter 
himself has also admitted in an interview with Thompson (2005:46) to being obsessed with 
words and language. One of his oldest friends, Mick Goldstein (2005:115), describes Pinter’s 
attitude towards language as follows: 
 
                                                            
16 This of course refers to Yeats’ well known poem “The Second Coming” and specifically to the lines: “Things 
fall apart; the centre cannot hold; / Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,” (1993:123). 
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 I am still aware of how careful Harold is about language, and how a clumsy 
 expression, which can distort what it is one wants to say, can turn him right off. In 
 some ways the style of language – the words you choose – were as important as the 
 meaning of what you wanted to say. 
 
Yet, in Pinter’s plays, characters rarely say what they mean, conforming to the 
poststructuralist theory discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, especially Derrida’s 
(1998a:71-72) notion that language can obscure as well as reveal meaning. According to 
Almansi (1981:80), Pinter resists reflecting the inner world of the heart or mind 
perpendicularly through language. The audience instead perceives a skewed, distorted version 
of what a character thinks or feels. Elsewhere, Almansi (1981:89) describes the 
communication of Pinter’s characters as “a perverse, deviant language to conceal or ignore the 
truth.”  
 According to Billington (1996:391) Pinter’s technique is an “undertow of brutality and 
savagery,” covered with a decorous surface. This is evident even in “his overtly middle-class 
plays such as Old Times, No Man’s Land and Betrayal.” According to Billington (1996:322-
323), Pinter believes that there is a reality behind our perception, but that we are too afraid to 
access it and therefore camouflage it with language. Even if the characters in this play have 
access to the content plane of what they want to say, they purposely distort this in the 
expression plane. For this reason Billington’s views about Pinter’s language are especially 
relevant to the veiling technique in performance, repeatedly referred to above, and are evident 
most clearly in Scene Five, when Robert confronts Emma about the affair, during their 
holiday in Venice.  
 Robert raises the subject by telling Emma that he had gone into American Express the 
day before and that there was a letter for Emma, which he did not take, since he disapproves 
of the unprofessional manner in which the clerk assumed that it would be appropriate to hand 
Robert Emma’s mail on the grounds that they are married. Rather than confront her directly, 
he lapses into a rather lengthy monologue on the subject of the privacy of opening one’s own 
mail. After this, Robert continues to delay the confrontation, while Emma confesses to their 
affair: 
 
 EMMA: Pretty inefficient bunch. 
 ROBERT: Only in a laughing Mediterranean way. 
   Pause 
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 EMMA: It was from Jerry. 
 ROBERT: Yes, I recognised the handwriting. 
   Pause 
   How is he? 
 EMMA: Okay. 
 ROBERT: Good. And Judith? 
 EMMA: Fine. 
   Pause 
 ROBERT: What about the kids? 
 EMMA: I don’t think he mentioned them. 
 ROBERT: They’re probably all right, then. If they were ill or something he’d have 
   probably mentioned it. 
   Pause 
 (80-81) 
 
The conversation continues in this vein, with Robert lapsing into monologues about his and 
Emma’s first visit to Torcello and his and Jerry’s days as poetry editors at Oxford and 
Cambridge. He does notice at one point that Emma is trembling and asks her if she is cold. 
She answers negatively, and when Robert asks her if she can remember when he introduced 
her to Jerry, she says that she cannot recall this: 
 
 ROBERT: You can’t? 
 EMMA: No. 
 ROBERT: How odd. 
   Pause 
   He was best man at our wedding, was he? 
 EMMA: You know he was. 
 ROBERT: Ah yes. Well, that’s probably when I introduced him to you. 
   Pause 
   Was there any message for me, in his letter? 
   Pause 
   I mean in the line of business, to do with the world of publishing. Has 
   he discovered any new and original talent? He’s quite talented at  
   uncovering talent, old Jerry. 
 EMMA: No message. 
 ROBERT: No message. Not even his love? 
   Silence 
 EMMA: We’re lovers. 
 ROBERT: Ah. Yes. I thought it might be something like that, something along 
   those lines. (83-84) 
 
Robert’s dialogue might seem casual and indifferent at first glance but, according to 
Billington (1996:261), “what gives Scene Five a dramatic tension is Pinter’s ability to convey 
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both Emma’s guilt and Robert’s pain through circuitous banter.” In this scene the actors would 
thus be required to play against the line’s surface, since “what is said is in direct opposition to 
what is felt” (Billington, 1996:262). Two reviewers have confirmed this with respect to two 
different productions of the play. In The Observer, Kellaway (1998) mentions how Imogen 
Stubbs (as Emma) in a revival at the National Theatre in 1998 pretends to read and visibly 
trembles as Anthony Calf (as Robert) patiently moves through his monologues. In The 
Guardian, Billington (2003) also describes how, in a 2003 revival at the Theatre Royal, Bath, 
Janie Dee (as Emma), played the moment that the affair is uncovered: “There’s a heart-
stopping moment in the pivotal Venetian scene when Dee stares fixedly at a novel, knowing 
that Robert has discovered her secret.”  
 The discrepancy between the dialogue and its undercurrents is momentarily interrupted 
by Robert who is noticeably caught off guard when Emma tells him how long the affair has 
been going on: 
 
 ROBERT: How long? 
 EMMA: Some time. 
 ROBERT: Yes, but how long exactly? 
 EMMA: Five years. 
 ROBERT: Five years? 
   Pause 
   Ned is one year old. 
   Pause 
   Did you hear what I said? 
 EMMA: Yes. He’s your son. Jerry was in America. For two months. 
   Silence (85-86) 
 
After this silence, Robert recollects himself and continues the conversation in its masked way.  
 Robert’s cool way of masking his emotions, which Cahn (1993:122) has described as a 
parody of male stoicism, continues when he and Emma return to London and, presumably, 
decide not to end their marriage. In Scene Four, when Jerry drops by Robert and Emma’s 
house for a drink, Robert again acts in a cruelly cool manner towards Emma. (The members of 
the audience, however, only realise the significance of this scene after they have seen the 
confrontation in Scene Five.) In Scene Four, Robert and Emma conceal from Jerry the fact 
that Robert knows about the affair, while in Jerry’s mind, he and Emma are concealing their 
relationship. By this time, the audience is aware that Robert possesses this knowledge, 
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because Robert informed Jerry in Scene Two that he had known ever since “a long time ago” 
(39). The characters talk about Casey and, after Robert explains what Casey’s last two novels 
were about, Emma and Jerry discuss the latest one. This does not continue for long, before 
Robert sneeringly interrupts: 
 
 JERRY: (to EMMA) Why didn’t you like it? 
 EMMA: I’ve told you actually. 
 JERRY: I think it’s the best thing he’s written. 
 EMMA: It may be the best thing he’s written but it’s still bloody dishonest. 
 JERRY: Dishonest? In what way dishonest? 
 EMMA: I’ve told you actually. 
 JERRY: Have you? 
 ROBERT: Yes, she has. Once when we were all having dinner, I remember, you, 
   me Emma and Judith, where was it, Emma gave a dissertation over the 
   pudding about dishonesty in Casey with reference to his last novel. 
   ‘Drying Out.’ It was most stimulating. Judith had to leave unfortunately 
   in the middle of it for her night shift at the hospital. How is Judith, by 
   the way? (66-67) 
 
After this, Robert takes control of the situation and deliberately excludes Emma by steering 
the conversation to the game of squash. When Jerry and Robert make a tentative plan to play a 
match in the near future and cannot decide who should take whom to lunch afterwards, Emma 
interjects, trying to re-enter Jerry and Robert’s community: 
 
 EMMA: Can I watch? 
   Pause 
 ROBERT: What? 
 EMMA: Why can’t I watch and then take you both to lunch? 
 ROBERT: Well, to be brutally honest, we wouldn’t actually want a woman  
   around, would we, Jerry? I mean a game of squash isn’t simply a game 
   of squash, it’s rather more than that. You see, first there’s the game. 
   And then there’s the shower. And then there’s the pint. And then there’s 
   lunch. After all, you’ve been at it. You’ve had your battle. What you 
   want is your pint and your lunch. You really don’t want a woman  
   buying you lunch. You don’t actually want a woman within a mile of 
   the place, any of the places, really. You don’t want her in the squash 
   court, you don’t want her in the shower, or the pub, or the restaurant. 
   You see, at lunch you want to talk about squash, or cricket, or books, or 
   even women, with your friend, and be able to warm to your theme  
   without fear of improper interruption. That’s what it’s all about. What 
   do you think, Jerry? 
 JERRY: I haven’t played squash for years. 
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   Pause (69-70) 
 
Like Scene Five, this exchange is conducted on multiple levels simultaneously. According to 
Scolnicov (2012:110), “all three play the traditional game of friendly chat while, at the same 
time, engaging in the game of hiding their complicity in, and their knowledge of, the betrayal 
(or rather, betrayals).”  Or, as Wells (1983:23) put it, this is “a triangle of difficulty in which 
all know what is going on but must keep the information below the surface and feign 
ignorance if the smooth social structure is to be maintained.”  
 Scolnicov (2012:113), though, reads this behaviour as that of characters who manage 
their infidelities with ease in a postmodern world where religious and moral laws regarding 
adultery have been abolished: “theirs is a desire that is firmly under control, and it is perfectly 
played out, with enough financial resources to help it along.” Diamond (1985:202) concurs in 
asserting that the only thing that Robert mourns “is that Jerry’s love affair with Emma put an 
end to their squash game.” 
 Nevertheless, I concur with Burkman (1982:507) who finds Robert’s aloofness 
unconvincing. The above excerpt, on the contrary, reveals anguish, veiled with cruel self-
control. Using Pinter’s (2008) own words out of context, Robert’s behaviour can be described 
as follows: 
 
 The speech we hear is an indication of that which we don’t hear. It is a necessary 
 smoke screen which keeps the other in its place. When true silence falls we are still left 
 with echo but are nearer to nakedness. One way of looking at speech is to say that it is 
 a constant stratagem to cover nakedness. 
 
Robert’s abusive (and misogynist) monologue, supposedly aimed at convincing Emma to stay 
away from his and Jerry’s squash game, is instead a smoke screen to cover his vulnerability in 
the face of Jerry and Emma’s obvious rapport. As Wells (1983:23) aptly remarks, “these 
modern, ultra-sophisticated characters fear disruption of the surface of things more than 
anything else.” 
 According to Cahn (1993:5) it furthermore becomes a power game to gain “supremacy 
over other people,” for it is only “when characters are secure in their authority” and able to 
control others that they are comfortable. In an interview with Aragay (2005:94), Pinter reveals 
that he believes men to be more brutal than women, reflected in the cruelty with which Robert 
launches his attack on Emma. Robert deploys the one attribute of Emma’s that marks her 
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involvement with Jerry and distinguishes her in the trio – her gender and sexuality – against 
her. Robert attempts to forcibly strengthen the male bond between him and Jerry while edging 
Emma out of the trio by objectifying and insulting her, as Scolnicov (2012:110) also remarks: 
these male rituals “are clearly meant to exclude women from what is perceived as exclusive 
male terrain.” Despite Scolnicov’s (2012:113) assertion that the characters have their 
infidelity under control, she concedes here that Robert’s monologue about squash “discloses a 
defensive attitude, an attempt to distance women so as to get rid of their sexually threatening 
presence” (Scolnicov, 2012:110). While Diamond (1985:202) sees the planned squash game 
as central to Robert’s motivation in this scene, it is, rather, a tool used to establish an 
exclusive community with Jerry. Ben-Zvi (1980:231) regards these forms of etiquette and 
convention as “handmaidens to the deception that passes for human communication.” 
 For Almansi and Henderson (1983:31), this “gentle trial of strength” and “battle of 
wits” replaces cruder competitions, such as a boxing match for Robert to retaliate against 
Jerry’s affair with his wife. Diamond (1985:204) also interprets the game of squash as 
functioning “as a Restoration masquerade in which emotions can be vented in a publicly 
acceptable way.” Squash is, in other words, a civilised version of more primitive displays of 
masculinity.  
 Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that this remains a battle of words. Robert and 
Jerry never get round to playing squash, the reason most likely being that Robert’s squash 
games with other men cease when he realises that they are having affairs with his wife. This is 
most clearly suggested in Scene Two when Jerry first finds out that Robert has known about 
the affair for four years: 
 
 JERRY: But we’ve seen each other… a great deal… over the last four years. 
   We’ve had lunch. 
 ROBERT: Never played squash though. (39) 
 
Later in Scene Two, Robert again alludes to the fact that he does not play squash with men 
Emma conducts affairs with: “I bumped into old Casey the other day. I believe he’s having an 
affair with my wife. We haven’t played squash for years, Casey and me. We used to have a 
damn good game” (43). In Prentice’s (1994:238) words, “squash becomes a measure of the 
bond Robert extends to close friends or withdraws from his wife’s lovers.” Therefore, 
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Robert’s insincere invitation to Jerry to play squash is a game in itself. He does not intend to 
follow it through, but uses his tainted bond with Jerry to exclude Emma. 
 However, it is not only Robert who upholds this smooth surface. As Almansi and 
Henderson (1983:23) point out, Robert’s veiled dialogue can only take place if his 
interlocutors comply (and of course also construct their own masks). It is as much Robert, as 
Emma and Jerry, who prefer to hear only the surface language: “as long as we refuse to pay 
attention to the voices of other people, avoid any sympathy for them, distort what we hear, 
everything is fine. The real enemy is understanding: the appreciation of how horrible 
we/you/they are.”  
 Consequently Pinter’s characters essentially communicate through deceit. Almansi 
(1981:79) describes Pinter’s “idiom” as “essentially human because it is an idiom of lies.” 
Pinter thus does not create false dramatic worlds in which characters are truthful: “in twenty 
years of playwriting he has never stooped to use the degraded and ultimately treacherous 
language of honesty, sincerity or innocence, which has contaminated the British theatre for so 
long” (Almansi & Henderson, 1983:13).  
 For this reason Pinter’s lying characters may clearly be distinguished from the 
traditional liars in Western theatre who are introduced as if they were “merchants, seamen or 
carpenters.” Every one of Pinter’s characters lies, therefore; “the genuine liar no longer exists” 
(Almansi, 1981:83). Hence the characters all collaborate in creating the false surface of their 
existence – even if they are themselves penalised by it. Wells (1983:30) therefore interprets 
Robert’s monologue about squash as follows: 
 
 The subject of honesty is repeated throughout the scene. On the surface, all of the 
 characters are honest with each other, but previous scenes have already exposed the 
 ironic use of the word, for they are all hiding something from the others. Betrayal 
 demonstrates that the menace of autonomy prevents these characters from being really 
 honest with each other, for they fear that honesty would mean the end of their fragile 
 but essential social structures. 
 
 Although complicit in mediation, the characters’ ambiguous attempts at it leave them 
in a “struggle for meaning in a fragmented, unfathomable world” (Cahn, 1993:2), as far as 
their interlocutors are concerned. According to Peter Hall (2005:151), Pinter is obsessed with 
“trying to pin down reality, trying to pin down memory, trying to pin down truth.” This 
struggle consequently becomes a central theme in Betrayal – as Almansi and Henderson 
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(1983:72) suggest. The characters’ uncertainty at how to interpret the other’s words is clear in 
statements and questions such as “you didn’t know for certain, did you? You didn’t know!” 
(40), “what do you mean by that?” (53) and “What the hell are you talking about?” (77). Kroll 
(1978) aptly describes this situation as follows: “behind its smooth pastel surface is a haunting 
vision of a man as a creature trapped in an orbit of betrayal that sends him circling around the 
ideal without ever reaching it.” 
 Especially in the triangle of marital betrayals portrayed in the play, where there are 
three central relationships which betray one another: the marriages of Robert and Emma, Jerry 
and Judith as well as Jerry and Emma’s affair, the characters cannot have certainty about any 
of their relationships. Wells (1983:26) quotes Barthes’ notion of the uncertainty of signs in 
this regard: “the amorous subject has no system of sure signs at his disposal.” The characters 
can neither be sure of the signs that they interpret, nor of the signs that they unconsciously 
give. When reminiscing about their affair in Scene One, Emma says to Jerry: “I wonder. I 
wonder if everyone knew, all the time” (23). Jerry is, however, sure that nobody did know. In 
Scene Eight, when the affair is at its height, Emma asks Jerry if Judith would ever find out 
about the affair, he is positive that she would not: 
 
 EMMA: But what about clues? Isn’t she interested… to follow clues? 
 JERRY: What clues? 
 EMMA: Well, there must be some… available to her… to pick up. 
 JERRY: There are none… available to her. (126) 
 
And although Jerry feels certain that they have fooled their larger community, he does panic 
in Scene Six when he has misplaced Emma’s letter and thinks that Judith might have found it. 
He is also incredulous that he did not notice Robert’s supposed affairs, as he says to Emma, in 
Scene One: 
 
 We were such close friends, weren’t we? Robert and me, even though I haven’t seen 
 him for a few months, but through all those years, all the drinks, all the lunches… we 
 had together, I never even gleaned… I never suspected… that there was anyone 
 else…. in his life but you. Never. For example, when you’re with a fellow in a pub, or 
 a restaurant, for example, from time to time he pops out for a piss, you see, who 
 doesn’t, but what I mean is, if he’s making a crafty telephone call, you can sort of 
 sense it, you see, you can sense the pip pip pips. Well, I never did that with Robert. He 
 never made any pip pip telephone calls in any pub I was ever with him in. The funny 
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 thing is that it was me who made the pip pip calls – to you, when I left him boozing at 
 the bar. (26)  
  
Jerry is, as a result, shown to be largely excluded from the mediation between the characters. 
He initially seems confident of his and Emma’s ability to conceal their relationship as well as 
his own ability to see through others’ masked affairs. This certainty, though, is shattered in the 
very first scene of the play. Although it is debatable whether or not Robert actually did 
conduct his own affairs, Jerry was ignorant of the fact that Robert did actually expose his and 
Emma’s affair. Pinter thereby portrays a character who often misses in the game of mediation.  
 
3.5.3. The narrative in memory 
 
Since there is no way to recount the actual without fictionalising it, the surfaces through which 
the characters communicate in these games of mediation with other characters as well as past 
versions of themselves often become fictionalised – whether consciously or unconsciously. 
According to Rayner (1988:488), “narrative form gives the illusion of the closure of 
experience in the consonance of cause and effect that experience does not have.” Hence it is 
easier for the characters to make sense of their existence by fictionalising their experience. 
 For Pinter (2005:22), our first consideration, as human beings, is that “we are faced 
with the immense difficulty, if not the impossibility of verifying the past.” It therefore 
happens that Pinter’s characters create, or rather, narrate, their own versions of the past, in 
which, as he illustrates in The Collection (1961), an “event has no independent existence 
outside the different versions of its story.” For the characters, as well as the audience, it is 
impossible to access an event in the past: “the past event cannot be touched in any sense; it 
can only be ‘objectified’ in the sense that a particular description of it is accepted – 
temporarily – as ‘the truth’” (Scolnicov, 2012:90). 
 Pinter therefore is already pointing out “the futility of trying to pin down the past event 
by relying on subjective reports of it” (Scolnicov, 2012:90). In addition, as Scolnicov 
(2012:90) argues, the storied event becomes as important, and real, experientially and morally, 
as the actual event.  
 In Betrayal an instance of the manner in which characters fictionalise their own 
experience is that of Jerry and Emma’s memory of Jerry throwing Charlotte into the air. This 
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memory is recounted twice in Scene One, and again in Scene Six. In both scenes it aims to 
convince the characters how close Emma and Jerry’s families were at one time, despite the 
fact that these characters were having an affair. The first time the audience hears the memory 
recalled occurs when Emma and Jerry enquire about each other’s children in Scene One and 
talk about Emma’s daughter, Charlotte: 
 
 EMMA: Do you remember that time… oh god it was… when you picked her up 
   and threw her up and caught her? 
 JERRY: She was very light. 
 EMMA: She remembers that, you know. 
 JERRY: Really? 
 EMMA: Mmnn. Being thrown up. 
 JERRY: What a memory. 
   Pause 
   She doesn’t know about us, does she? 
 EMMA: Of course not. She just remembers you, as an old friend. 
 JERRY: That’s right. 
   Pause 
   Yes, everyone was there that day, standing around, your husband, my 
   wife, all the kids, I remember. 
 EMMA: What day? 
 JERRY: When I threw her up. It was in your kitchen. 
 EMMA: It was in your kitchen. (19-20) 
 
This first recollection serves mainly to indicate how Charlotte also shares this significant 
memory with Jerry and Emma, although it must have had a different significance for her. The 
second time it is brought up, Jerry wishes to emphasise how close he and Robert were, and 
how unsettling he finds the fact that Robert knows about his affair with Emma: “But he’s my 
oldest friend… I mean, I picked his own daughter up in my own arms and threw her up and 
caught her, in my kitchen. He watched me do it” (29). Jerry now accepts Emma’s version of 
the memory, where the event happened in his kitchen, rather than hers. 
 The audience again hears of this memory in Scene Six, which – for the characters – is 
in fact the earlier recollection. Jerry is anxious about being caught out by Judith in his affair 
with Emma; after a pause, he continues: 
 
 JERRY: Listen. Do you remember, when was it, a few years ago, we were all in 
   your kitchen, must have been Christmas or something, do you  
   remember, all the kids were running about and suddenly I picked  
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   Charlotte up and lifted her high up, high up, and then down and up. Do 
   you remember how she laughed? 
 EMMA: Everyone laughed. 
 JERRY: She was so light. And there was your husband and my wife and all the 
   kids, all standing and laughing in your kitchen. I can’t get rid of it. 
 EMMA: It was your kitchen, actually. (100-101) 
 
The memory again serves to express how close the families are, and thus how complicated the 
affair – but this time the emphasis falls on Jerry’s feelings of guilt. Again, there is uncertainty 
about where it happened: in Emma’s kitchen or Jerry’s, which indicates that there is no way of 
determining what exactly happened. The memory itself becomes a vague marker to illustrate 
the complicated entanglement of these two families in the present. 
 We again notice the way characters fictionalise events in the last scene of Betrayal, 
where Jerry first tries to seduce Emma. Being drunk, Jerry becomes rather poetic in his 
description of his memories. He reminisces about how he was best man at Robert and Emma’s 
wedding and how his attraction to her was evident even then: 
 
 JERRY: I was best man at your wedding. I saw you in white. I watched you 
   glide by in white. 
 EMMA: I wasn’t in white. 
 JERRY: You know what should have happened? 
 EMMA: What? 
 JERRY: I should have had you, in your white, before the wedding. I should have 
   blackened you, in your white wedding dress, blackened you in your 
   bridal dress, before ushering you into your wedding, as your best man. 
 (135) 
 
Burkman (1982:511) interprets the fact that Jerry recalls Emma’s wedding dress as white, 
when it was not this colour, as a sign that he does not primarily desire Emma, since he 
“doesn’t even recall the color of her dress properly.” In the light of Pinter’s characters’ 
tendency to fictionalise their life experiences, I think it more plausible that Jerry is replacing 
actual events with more poetic versions of those events. Jerry is taking poetic licence in 
recalling Emma’s wedding to portray her as the virginal bride, which fits his fantasy. Again, 
the memory itself is a vague marker for the more important, present goal of seduction. 
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3.5.4. The unoriginality of language 
 
In Betrayal, characters do not only fictionalise their own past, but also sometimes borrow 
fictions from elsewhere if they are struggling to bring something into expression. Griffith 
(1992:98) associates this tendency with Bakhtin’s concepts about the lack of originality in 
language: 
 
 Just as there is no such thing as “fresh air,” since, if we think about it, every gulp of it 
 is likely to have been in several pairs of lungs before our own, so there is for Bakhtin 
 no such thing as “fresh speech,” since all the words in it are likely to have been used 
 already, and to carry with them traces of their previous usages. 
 
The unoriginality of language is most clearly evident in Betrayal’s Scene Nine, when Jerry is 
unable to express himself satisfactorily. Prentice (1994:246) describes the scene as one in 
which emotion overwhelms expression. He tells Emma: “You’re lovely. I’m crazy about you. 
All these words I’m using, don’t you see, they’ve never been said before” (135). This line, 
which very obviously contradicts itself, actually points to the fact that while no utterance is 
original, each is also unique – since one context can never be identical to another (Bakhtin in 
Holquist, 1990:68).  
 Later, Jerry says to Emma “Nothing has ever happened. Nothing. This is the only thing 
that has ever happened” (136-137). That which Jerry so vaguely refers to as “this,” is powerful 
enough to obliterate for him the history clinging to the words he uses. Therefore, a repetitive 
use of language is necessary for the characters to communicate.  
 Interestingly, it is not only Pinter’s characters who borrow words to express 
themselves. Pinter himself also incorporates various texts intertextually to express certain 
things. According to Burton (2005:213), Scene Nine corresponds to how Cupid marries 
Psyche in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, in the sense that Emma is kept in the dark. The moment 
of bliss can only happen in the obfuscation of the dark, just as Psyche was not allowed to see 
that Cupid is a god. 
 The way in which the affair is discovered by Robert also corresponds to Dante’s 
Inferno, according to Fehsenfeld (1993:127). In Betrayal, Spinks’ book, the subject of which 
is possibly betrayal, leads to the confrontation about the infidelity. In Inferno, it is also “the 
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book of betrayal by Guinevere and Lancelot” that is not only central to the passion between 
the lovers but also the source of the discovery of their deception. 
 It is, furthermore, not a coincidence that Robert chooses to read Yeats on Torcello. 
According to Roche (2009:206), Yeats is the poet of sexual betrayal: “In the sexually more 
explicit poems Yeats wrote in the second half of his career, the encounter of a man and a 
woman in the act of love is likely to be troubled by the presence of a third: either a lover from 
a past life or the projection of an idealised counter-self to the beloved.” In Betrayal, the cast of 
three and their various groupings throughout the nine scenes also evoke the idea that 
“wherever two people are gathered in a room, there is always a third, unseen presence” 
(Billington, 1996:355).  
 Lastly, for Prentice (1994:234), Emma’s name is also reminiscent of Emma Bovary, 
foreshadowing certain ideas about the adulterous woman which the play either confirms or 
rejects. Clearly, as Bakhtin asserts above, as does Blau (in Carlson, 2004:149-150), no literary 
image can be pure and original. It already carries with it the baggage of past uses which can be 
put to use anew, such as Pinter has done with Betrayal. 
 
3.6. Recycling and mimicry 
 
The fashion in which the characters recycle utterances and create surfaces through which to 
communicate permeates their entire existence to the point that it brings the authenticity of that 
existence into question. An element of mimesis thus permeates the characters’ lives in that 
their words and actions are often not original, but mimicked. Ben-Zvi (1980:233) contrasts the 
three characters’ duplicitous lives with that of Spinks, the author of the book that Emma reads 
in Venice. Jerry describes Spinks as follows: “He’s a very thin bloke. About fifty. Wears dark 
glasses day and night. He lives alone, in a furnished room… He’s unfussed” (97). For Ben-Zvi 
(1980:233),  
 
 it is Spinks who appears least able to betray or be betrayed because he has cut all 
 possibility of human contact. The only way, Pinter implies, that one can live without 
 duplicity, is to live in a perpetual blackness without life. Spinks is heralded as the 
 writer of the future, the artist who produces the new novel – untouched by human 
 contact.  
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Spinks thus represents to Ben-Zvi a modicum of authenticity in his isolation. This image of 
the lonesome artist who renounces the world is, however, also a pretentious stereotype and 
therefore just as much, if not more, mimetic than the lives of Robert, Emma and Jerry.  
 In a manner similar to Spinks, Emma tends to create an image of what she thinks her 
life ought to be, and thereafter attempts to emulate that image in her daily life. This becomes 
evident in her attitude to the flat she and Jerry rent for the purposes of their affair. The 
audience first comes to know of the flat when Emma and Jerry refer to it in Act One. Emma 
describes how she had driven through Kilburn a few days before and passed “the house” (21). 
She stopped and went to look for her and Jerry’s fake surname on the bell – which, of course, 
had been replaced by the new occupants. Later, in Scene One the audience also learns that 
Jerry could not really afford the flat at the time, but rented it anyway and that Emma bought 
curtains for it. Three scenes are subsequently set in this flat: Scene Three which shows the 
affair being dissolved, Scene Six, when Emma and Jerry see each other for the first time since 
Emma and Robert went to Venice (where Robert discovers the affair), and Scene Eight, which 
reveals the peak of the affair.  
 Through these three scenes, Emma’s intention to make the flat a home is evident. 
When she and Jerry are terminating the affair, she remarks that they “haven’t spent many 
nights… in this flat” (53). She also recognises how her efforts in this regard fell short: “I mean 
the crockery and the curtains and the bedspread and everything. And the tablecloth I brought 
from Venice. (Laughs.) It’s ridiculous” (54). When she refers to the flat as a home, Jerry 
replies: 
 
 JERRY: It’s not a home. 
   Pause 
   I know… I know what you wanted… but it could never… actually be a 
   home. You have a home. I have a home. With curtains, etcetera. And 
   children. Two children in two homes. There are no children here, so it’s 
   not the same kind of home. 
 EMMA: It was never intended to be the same kind of home. Was it? 
   Pause 
   You didn’t ever see it as a home, in any sense, did you? 
 JERRY: No, I saw it as a flat… you know. 
 EMMA: For fucking. 
 JERRY: No, for loving. 
 EMMA: Well, there’s not much of that left, is there? 
   Silence (55) 
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When they decide to give the flat up, Emma says: “I don’t want anything. Nowhere I can put 
it, you see. I have a home, with tablecloths and all the rest of it” (57). Emma clearly 
recognises that although she had tried to mimic a conventional marriage with Jerry in the flat, 
this was impossible, since they both already possessed families. The scene ends with Emma 
returning her key to the flat to Jerry and him handing her back the key ring after he had taken 
the key off it, the key and ring being a less romantic version of a wedding ring.  
 The next time the audience sees the flat, Emma is still optimistic about the possibility 
of turning the flat into a home. She remarks that it “needs hoovering” (94), and while Jerry 
compares the flat to Spinks’ “furnished room” (97), Emma continues to “play house”: 
 
 EMMA: Furnished rooms suit him? 
 JERRY: Yes. 
 EMMA: They suit me too. And you? Do you still like it? Our home? 
 JERRY: It’s marvellous not to have a telephone. 
 EMMA: And marvellous to have me? 
 JERRY: You’re all right. 
 EMMA: I cook and slave for you. 
 JERRY: You do. 
 EMMA: I bought something in Venice – for the house. 
   She opens the parcel, takes out a tablecloth. Puts it on the table. (98) 
 
In Scene Eight, the audience sees the flat for the last time. The scene opens with a display of 
domesticity which borders on parody. Jerry arrives to find Emma cooking a stew in an apron, 
fulfilling a gender role starkly contrasting with what one would expect from two sophisticated, 
career-driven adulterers. By this time it is clear that the flat, as well as Jerry and Emma’s 
relationship, complete with the fake surname of “Green,” contain an element of make-believe 
or mimicry. Throughout these three scenes, the affair as a result seems to be an inauthentic 
relationship imitating a conventional marriage and contrasted with the characters’ “real” 
marriages and homes. It would be easy to interpret Emma and Jerry’s affair as a counterfeit, 
much like the painting in the Italian restaurant where Robert and Jerry lunch after Robert has 
found out about the affair. Ben-Zvi (1980:233) describes the painting that was used in the first 
production of Betrayal at the National Theatre as “crass, artificial, ugly,” and compares it to 
the relation of Spinks and Casey’s writing to that of the Modernist authors Robert and Jerry 
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admire: “poor imitations of some desired goal.”  But the mere existence of the affair again 
calls the integrity of their marriages into question.  
 According to Sakellaridou (1988:184), the two relationships poison each other – and it 
is exactly because the characters have a sense of honesty that their “dishonest” relationships 
become tainted “with feelings of guilt or mortification.” Ben-Zvi (1980:236) points out that 
the cracks in the characters’ marriages are indeed very evident: 
 
 Throughout the play, Pinter has made clear that the actual homes in which Jerry and 
 Emma live are not homes: Judith is absent, the children mere spectres. Both Emma and 
 Jerry have voids in their lives which each hopes the affair between them will fill. But 
 Pinter, in these exchanges, shows the impossibility. 
 
Neither of Emma’s relationships, in other words, seems to be genuine. For Scolnicov 
(2012:109), the affair and marriage mimic each other since Emma “cooks and slaves” for her 
lover while she goes on a romantic vacation to Venice with her husband. In consequence, 
unlike the Italian restaurant where Jerry and Robert lunch in Scene Seven, which is a mimicry 
of Italy, complete with a painting of Venice against the wall, neither the affair nor the 
marriage can be compared as a fake to an original.  
 
3.7. Metatheatrical implications in Betrayal 
 
As is often the case with theatre, in Betrayal, the concerns about meaning and language 
illustrated by the play have significance not only within the fictional world of the characters, 
but also in the actual world of the audience. According to Burkman and Kundert-Gibbs (1993: 
xvii), Pinter’s writing  
 
 focuses with terrible honesty on personal and societal problems, forcing a primal, 
 living, or immediate response as much as an aesthetic one. He confronts the audience 
 with problems outside the bounds of art, breaking the so-called normal boundaries of 
 film and stage in an attempt to find a reality so immediate that one cannot separate 
 oneself from it. 
 
Hence, the concerns of the characters in the fictional world become the concerns of the 
audience in the actual one. In neither the fictional world represented on stage, nor the 
audience’s actual perception of it, are either the present or the past able to be verified. 
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 In Betrayal, this becomes evident, chiefly through the reverse chronology of the play. 
Roof (1993:82) explains how the epistemological concerns in the fictional world permeate the 
actual world in Betrayal as well as certain plays by Marguerite Duras: 
 
Foregrounding the characters’ consciousness of the untrustworthiness of language, the 
investigative method, even of the news media, the plays situate the substance of the 
drama not in a reenactment [sic] of the crime, nor even finally in any murder 
investigation,  but rather, as in Betrayal, in the indirect examination of who knows 
what when and how. Focusing on the slippages, approximations, gaps, and 
misunderstandings by  which knowing is conveyed and the works’ consciousness of the 
uneasy relation between fact and medium brings into question any reliance upon 
original fact or text. 
 
Roof (1993:80) proceeds to argue that because the audience already knows the “‘central’ fact” 
of betrayal, the apparent power granted by the dramatic irony as a result of the structure of the 
play is shown to be a red herring. Betrayal suggests “that the process – the desire, the looking 
– is more important than finding facts.” Therefore, it exposes the “lure” of knowledge as 
merely a “lure” (Roof, 1993:79).  
 Roche (2009:207), on the other hand, links the reverse chronology to the intertextual 
author, Yeats, and his concept of “Dreaming Back.” The latter is a process in which a person, 
upon death, repeatedly relives the moments in his or her life that moved him or her most. 
Although nothing new can be added to these events, they are experienced in a light, the 
brightness of which is determined by the “intensity of the passion” which accompanied the 
events. Diamond (1985:198) agrees that the characters relive their past in Betrayal. Yet, there 
is no indication in the play that the scenes following Scene One are flashbacks, rather than the 
characters’ lives shown with a rearranged chronology. I am of the same mind as Rayner 
(1988:484) who regards the past, not as rendered through the memory of one of the characters 
in Betrayal, but as taking place in front of the audience.  
 Thus, although the reverse chronology might remind the audience of the concept of 
“Dreaming Back,” this does not imply that the play shows the memory of one of the 
characters. Rather, the reversed timeline emphasises the fact that the author had tampered with 
the chronology of events. For Esslin (1992:198), the device of having the year displayed 
above each scene is distinctly Brechtian; Billington (1996:275) also remarks that the 
“conspicuous artifice” of the narrative that moves backwards strongly reminds one of the 
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author’s presence. It therefore pushes the audience out of the fictional world into the actual in 
order to examine the play, as a sleuth might.  
 Pinter shows the audience just enough for it to know that the characters are sometimes 
lying. Emma’s lie that she and Robert did not go to Torcello because the speedboats were on 
strike, when Robert had indeed gone alone, is, for instance, obvious. This indicates to the 
audience how an entire world of deception can be constructed in words, just to be shattered – 
again by words.  This points not only to the precariousness of perception, but additionally, to 
how the entire play is indeed a world constructed through language. The reverse chronology is 
therefore a metatheatrical event (albeit an implicit, covert one), used to prompt the audience to 
consider the broader epistemological questions that the play asks.   
 This notion is underscored by the mise en abymes in the text. Within a play about the 
topic of betrayal, we find a character reading a novel which is possibly about the topic of 
betrayal when Emma reads Spinks’ novel in Scene Five. Although this mise en abyme is not a 
play within a play, but a transmedial metareference, it does reflect on both the medium which 
it refers to (the novel) as well as the medium in which it occurs (the theatre), as suggested 
above by Hauthal (2009). It is consequently ironic when Robert remarks that there is “not 
much more to say on that subject, really, is there?” (78). Billington (1996:261) remarks that 
the idea of a Borgesian hall of mirrors is intensified when Emma says that she does not know 
the topic of the novel, since she has not finished reading it, while the audience has not finished 
watching the play about betrayal.  
 Casey’s novels also form mise en abymes since they seem to be painstakingly 
autobiographical in the way that they attempt to fully disclose the circumstances of how the 
novel comes about, much like the performances of Spalding Gray, discussed above. The 
audience learns about Casey’s novels when the characters discuss his whereabouts in Scene 
Four: 
 
 JERRY: He’s left Susannah. He’s living alone round the corner. 
 EMMA: Oh. 
 ROBERT: Writing a novel about a man who leaves his wife and three children and 
   goes to live on the other side of London to write a novel about a man 
   who leaves his wife and three children –  
 EMMA: I hope it’s better than the last one. 
97 
 
 ROBERT: The last one? Ah, the last one. Wasn’t that the one about the man who 
   lived in a big house in Hampstead with his wife and three children and 
   is writing a novel about – ? (66) 
 
Accordingly Casey’s novels indeed lead to a poststructuralist hall of mirrors since they 
represent a narrative within an identical narrative within an identical narrative. Yet, Emma 
considers this device insincere, due to the fact that she considers the fictionalising of one’s life 
or living out one’s own fiction “bloody dishonest,” according to Rayner (1988:488). Such a 
hall of mirrors emphasises the fact that reflecting surfaces merely continue to reflect each 
other and bring one no closer to any original substance, but remain a surface. Any assertion to 
the contrary would thus be insincere.  
 The irony of fictionalising one’s own life is not lost if one considers that Betrayal is 
based on autobiographical events. According to Billington (1996:257), Pinter drew from his 
affair with journalist and television presenter, Joan Bakewell, for this play. This has also been 
corroborated by Lady Antonia Fraser (2010:81), Pinter’s second wife.17 Bakewell (in 
Billington, 1996:264-265) has confirmed that Pinter did indeed throw her own daughter in the 
air while they were having an affair. The incident with the poste restante in Venice did also 
happen to her, although, instead of a tablecloth, she brought an hourglass back from Venice. 
Bakewell (in Billington, 1996:265) describes her reaction to this as follows: 
 
 But it’s like a diary and so I was upset when I first read it. Harold kept saying, ‘It’s a 
 play – it’s a play.’ I was upset, however, because it was called Betrayal. It’s such a 
 judgemental word. But we go on betraying, don’t we? Here I am telling you about it. 
 The irony is that the process never ends. 
 
The boundary between fiction and reality in consequence breaks down, on yet a different 
level. The play reaches through the fictional world into the actual, suggesting that betrayal is 
also not limited to the fictional, but permeates the actual world.   
 Pinter therefore succeeds in using “banal” subject matter to cast light on profound 
epistemological issues. In Betrayal, the audience’s seemingly privileged position is shown to 
be relative, despite the reverse chronology. The members of the audience may know the 
characters’ future, but they do not know their past. The play exposes the audience’s desire for 
knowledge (Roof, 1993:80) and how piecing the events of the past together brings its 
                                                            
17 According to Fraser (2010:81), “the play began with the image of Harold finding out from Michael Bakewell 
that he, Michael, had long known of Harold’s affair with his wife Joan – from Joan herself.” 
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members no closer to the truth (Roof, 1993:82). Metatheatrical implications ensue, since the 
experience of the characters mirrors the quest of the viewer to read through the surfaces of the 
play. 
 The characters also hold very definite opinions about literary texts – evident in their 
attitudes to their professions and Robert and Jerry’s betrayal of their literary idealism. Yeats 
and Ford Madox Ford are, for example, contrasted with the commercially successful Casey 
whose “art does seem to be falling away” (44), although it still sells well. This raises the point 
that despite the fact that in Betrayal, various texts seem to be deceitful, certain texts are 
represented as of higher value. The characters therefore make a distinction between “good” art 
and commercial art, corresponding to Eco’s (1999:20) assertion that certain interpretations are 
more valid than others. It is then left to the audience to establish if it finds Betrayal to be of 
higher value or not.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
Betrayal consequently demonstrates how, if there exists such a thing as an authentic core or 
essence, it is never accessed by the characters or shown to the audience. Every bond, or 
community, formed between the characters is betrayed in this play as the characters even 
betray younger versions of themselves.  
 As Esslin (1992:227) suggests, Pinter’s greatest contribution to theatre is the manner in 
which he points out that people do not communicate through a code, but that language is used 
in a much more complex manner. His innovation lies in the way that he uses a traditional form 
to convey avant-garde ideas, and therefore it does not fit neatly into any dramatic category.  
 The manner in which the characters in Betrayal remain isolated, conforms to 
postmodern ideas about language, although Pinter (2008) maintains that his plays do not show 
the “failure of communication.” Nevertheless, Betrayal does portray characters for us who 
communicate, using language as a kaleidoscope: reflecting unoriginal fictions to create an 
image which may be smashed at any second. The characters create worlds using words and 
undo these same worlds, again through words.  
 Language becomes a weapon with which the characters obscure things and exclude 
each other. They reveal themselves to each other (as well as the audience) through veiled 
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speech: by saying one thing, while it is clear that they are meaning something else. Pinter 
conveys this veiled language to the audience by relying on the plurisignation of theatre – the 
actors are called upon to portray veiled language through veiled acting. The characters (and 
again, the audience too) as a result have only clues at their disposal with which to interpret 
what they experience: the “pip pip pips” (26), as Jerry refers to them. The idea of language as 
a screen or surface is reinforced by recycling and mimicry, both by the author in constructing 
the play as well as by the characters within the fictional world.  
 If the actual can be pitted against the fictional in terms of what the characters mean 
versus what they say, Pinter never indulges himself or his audience by showing the former 
directly. The actual thus remains an enigma: just as Jerry’s memory of throwing Charlotte in 
the air is only recounted and never shown on stage. Pinter furthermore undermines any binary 
between the original and an imitation in the characters’ relationships by making neither the 
affair nor the marriages more sincere – the relationships all mimic each other. 
 These concerns subsequently ripple out to the audience, through metatheatrical 
devices. As Hutcheon (1984:7) suggests, the audience is simultaneously pushed out of the 
fictional world of the play and pulled back into it by these devices. By displaying the year in 
which a scene takes place above the stage and showing the events in an altered chronology, 
the audience is made aware of the author’s hand in what is seen on stage. Its members are 
thereby invited to view the play in a detached manner. Yet, through the modality of the self-
reference, in that it happens at the beginning of the play, the audience early on accepts the 
obvious fictionality of the play. The metareference in the play is furthermore mainly 
extracompositional and implicit, so that it can be accepted within the fictional world of the 
play. 
 The audience is thereafter drawn back into the fictional world of the play, sharing in 
the characters’ frustration in uncovering the “truth” of what is presented before them. If the 
characters are betrayed by and betray each other as well as their artistic ideals, what does this 
imply for the audience viewing a work of art? In this manner, the metareference in this play 
fulfils a recipient-centred function by having the audience members consider their own role as 
an audience. 
 Hence Betrayal uses fictio-metareference in mimicking the manner by which the 
characters communicate by using language as surfaces to cover up undercurrents of meaning: 
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like the characters’ speech and Casey’s novels, theatre (and this play) also function as a 
surface. The fact that none of the characters can – or are willing to – move beyond these 
surfaces, does not imply that their language (or the medium of theatre, for that matter) is 
somehow more or less authentic than any other language or medium. It merely emphasises 
that theatre functions, as all languages do, within the actual world. 
 By now, the way Pinter’s characters speak through innuendoes and use language as a 
smoke screen has been copied and parodied numerous times, as happens with any established 
literary icon’s work. Indeed, Betrayal has become a seminal text within the realm of drama, 
with adultery as its theme and a very probable inspiration for the next play to be analysed in 
this thesis, Tom Stoppard’s The Real Thing.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
TOM STOPPARD’S PERPLEXING  
HALL OF MIRRORS IN THE REAL THING 
 
 What would we do without the idea of the Real Thing, the ‘real’ relationship? We would have to 
 compare everything with everything else. Monogamy saves us from – and, alas, saves us for – the 
 madness of comparisons. It domesticates the infinite. – Adam Phillips, Monogamy (1996)  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As is evident from the preceding chapter, Pinter involves his audience through transmedial 
metareferences which are mostly covert, extracompositional and implicit. In other words, the 
audience might not necessarily perceive these metareferences. Stoppard, on the other hand, 
uses metatheatrical devices in an overt manner. Mise en abymes proliferate in The Real Thing, 
to the point that the characters and audience are indeed caught in “the madness of 
comparisons,” as Phillips (1996) suggests in the epigraph above.  
After a brief contextualisation of Stoppard’s place in the dramatic canon and The Real 
Thing within his oeuvre, I proceed to investigate how his play embodies the concepts of 
authenticity, language and mimesis discussed in Chapter Two, firstly by analysing the debates 
in the play about these subjects. Secondly, I consider the way mimicry infiltrates the lives of 
these characters within the fictional world; both in the formation of their identities and in the 
various mise en abymes included in the play. Lastly, I reflect on how the playwright includes 
the actual world in this play, through various metatheatrical devices.  
 
4.2. Stoppard’s place in the dramatic canon 
 
Up until Harold Pinter’s death in 2008, Tom Stoppard had been considered one of the greatest 
living British playwrights together with him. According to Rusinko (1986:7), Pinter led a first 
wave of new dramatists in the latter half of the twentieth century, while Stoppard led a second 
wave in the 1970s. Various scholars have compared the two playwrights and found that the 
differences between them are numerous, despite the fact that neither went to university, both 
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are passionate about cricket (Rusinko, 1986:7-8), and both use revolutionary stage language 
(Harty, 1987:130). 
 When one compares the typography of the published texts of Betrayal and The Real 
Thing, for example, the playwrights’ contrasting approaches to language become clear. The 
words in Pinter’s text are widely spaced and the turns of speech generally short, while 
Stoppard’s text is densely printed with longer sentences that seem wordy. According to 
Gussow (1984:2-3), “Stoppard and Pinter are stylistic opposites. Stoppard’s plays are 
expansive, verbose and filled with digressions. Pinter’s are mysterious, parsimonious with 
words and filled with pauses.” For Rusinko (1986:9), Pinter is the master of the unspoken 
word, and Stoppard the master of the spoken one. Even in their distinct approaches to the 
production of their plays, Pinter remains more reticent, whereas Stoppard is more 
forthcoming, as Jeremy Irons (in Delaney, 1994:5), who played Robert in the film version of 
Betrayal and Henry in the New York premiere of The Real Thing, notes: “Tom is just great. 
He’s not like Pinter, who believes that you don’t have to explain because the work is it, it’s all 
in the writing. Tom explains.” 
 In addition, Stoppard has also been compared to George Bernard Shaw because of the 
witty debate in his plays, the fact that his theatre is a theatre of ideas, and his “ambushing” of 
the audience (Crawford, 1993:108). Like most innovative British playwrights of his time, 
Stoppard is also influenced by Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot and possibly John 
Osborne’s Look back in anger (Delaney, 2001:1).  
Nadel (2004:21) distinguishes three themes in Stoppard’s life which consistently 
permeate his work. Firstly, the theme of displacement stems from Stoppard’s history as a child 
refugee. According to Nadel (2004:21), “his status as refugee until his arrival in England in 
1946 clearly shaped his early outlook while paradoxically driving him to secure his new 
identity by becoming more English than the English in his habits and subject matter.”18 The 
second and third themes which Nadel (2004:22) discerns: that of a distrust of history and a 
double identity, stem from Stoppard’s notion that the past is invented.  
 In his later work, Stoppard extends his concern with memory and uncertainty, focusing 
specifically on the consequences of “ethical conflict and intellectual doubt” (Kelly, 2001:10). 
                                                            
18 It should be noted, however, that unlike Conrad or Nabokov, Stoppard’s first language was English, since the 
time he was a small child (Nadel, 2004:21). 
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His oeuvre is marked by a preoccupation with the past, a conservatism “with a small c” 
(Kelly. 2001:151), an emotional distance – or coldness – an emphasis on structure, flair for 
words, a playful self-consciousness and intertextuality. 
 According to Nadel (2004:19), Stoppard discovered that “one can invent but not 
reproduce the past” when he tried to recreate a photograph of his parents, taken decades 
before. Stoppard is thus well aware that mimicry inherently shows repetition to be impossible. 
Therefore, Stoppard treats biography as “a fiction more to be mistrusted than believed” in his 
plays, most notably, Indian Ink and Arcadia (Nadel, 2004:20). 
 And yet, Stoppard has a desire to protect – or conserve – the past and resists impulsive 
change. While this has caused him to be regarded as a conservative playwright, Stoppard (in 
Gussow, 1995:96), contends that what he prefers and does not prefer, cannot be divided into 
“things that the Conservative Party or the Labour Party does.” He thus aligns himself with a 
“wider moral and cultural definition of ‘conservatism’” than the specifics of any political 
party (Bull, 2001:138). Nevertheless, his supposed lack of commitment to a cause is one of 
the main critiques against him (Billington, 1987:145). Brustein (1984:28), for example, 
describes Stoppard as “tone deaf before the dissonant inflections of Western political protest,” 
although he acknowledges the latter’s involvement in the politics of Eastern Europe. 
Sammells (1988: ix) considers Stoppard’s conservatism as the root of the decline in his art, 
which he describes as moving from an aesthetics of engagement to a politics of 
disengagement, or “militant conservatism.” However, there are critics such as Chung 
(2005:689), who read Stoppard’s plays against the grain and regard him as revolutionary and 
subversive, despite his reputation as politically conservative.  
 Apart from his conservatism, the other major critique of Stoppard is that his plays are 
perceived as cold or unemotional (Billington, 1987:145) or “far too cerebral, too emotionally 
barren: all head and no heart” (Zeifman, 2001:185). According to Müller (2000:119), from his 
debut Stoppard has consistently “included theoretical views, statements and remarks in his 
plays”. A problem solving element invariably occurs in his plays, although he refuses to over 
simplify the theory incorporated in them. Stoppard does not attempt to solve mysteries such as 
the wave versus particle controversy in the theory of light or the “irrationality of romantic 
love” (Zinman, 2001:121). Yet, for Cohn (1981), Stoppard does not succeed in creating a 
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marriage between farce and ideas in his plays. The comedy serves as light relief while the 
ideas weigh the play down.  
 Müller (2000:119), on the other hand, argues that Stoppard illustrates how literature, 
philosophy and literary theory are often inextricable. For Müller (2000:121) the strength of 
Stoppard’s plays lies in his combination of a traditional dramatic form regarding character, 
dialogue and didascalia with ambivalent situations, contradictory dialogue, pastiche and 
intertextuality, logical paradoxes and parody. As a result, the theory in Stoppard’s plays serves 
various functions, such as a parody and indirect criticism of the theory in which it takes on the 
“polyphonic openness of literature” (Müller, 2000:126). 
 It follows then that Stoppard’s characters are highly intelligent and known for their 
immense vocabulary and complex sentence structure. They are rarely inarticulate or 
ungrammatical, to the point that they are necessarily “well-educated, ironical and quick-
witted,” and are “despicable” when they are not. Hence, according to Zinman (2001:120), 
there is a “quality of high Englishness” in his oeuvre. 
 Since Stoppard’s plays are known to be exceptionally theatrical, the theory not only 
finds expression through the dialogue, but is also theatrically presented. For Zinman 
(2001:121), the structure of a Stoppard play is informed by a vision and functions as 
“dramatic architecture.” Especially when his plays are concerned with the theory of play 
construction, aesthetics and style, as they often are, according to Fleming (2001:14), the 
structure proves to be crucial. In Travesties (1975), Night and Day (1978) and The Real Thing 
(1982), for example, Stoppard uses a “faux” opening scene which is subsequently doubled, 
tripled or quadrupled throughout the play. The set design also features prominently and 
mimics the structure (a point to which I shall return) as the audience needs to reassess what its 
members have seen as the play progresses (Zinman, 2001:121). 
 In this way, Stoppard’s work is, despite its traditional form, characterised by an 
uncertainty and a refusal to present a reliable voice (Bull, 2001:138). According to Boireau 
(1997:136), “Stoppard plays his favourite game of ping-pong with layers of fictionality, deftly 
juggling with postmodern practices, therefore carefully avoiding fixed meanings and rigid 
categories,” while a sense of doubling and mimicry permeates Stoppard’s life and work 
(Kelly, 2001:11). He favours the play within a play technique, following René Magritte’s 
statement that a representation of an apple on a canvas “is not an apple,” but only an image of 
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an apple. Stoppard’s plays therefore always advertise “that whatever is represented on stage 
looks like theatre and is first and foremost theatre” (Boireau, 1997:136).  
 While this makes Stoppard’s work especially interesting in light of metatheatrical 
concerns over authenticity, it has also been the cause of criticism. Homan (1989:106) 
describes Stoppard as “a playwright so aware of his audience that, for some observers, his 
seeming violation of the stage’s fourth wall amounts to a limitation: Stoppard is too playful, 
and too self-conscious of that playfulness, we are told, and as a consequence is not sufficiently 
concerned with the integrity, nor with the originality of his onstage world.”  
 In light of Hornby’s (1986), Homan’s (1989) and Balme’s (2008) positions, with 
regard to the authenticity of theatre discussed in Chapter Two, one could argue that Stoppard’s 
full disclosure about the ontological status of the worlds depicted in his plays would rather 
seem to suggest integrity, as will be pointed out in the rest of this chapter. This disclosure 
furthermore extends to his use of intertextuality. Scolnicov (2012:174) contrasts Pinter with 
Stoppard on the grounds that Stoppard’s work is more openly intertextual. 
 Stoppard often mines or recycles from the canon of Western art, presenting his 
audience with familiar images which are then made strange (Kelly, 2001:10-11). This clearly 
implies that he writes for a well-read audience whose members have known, since 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, that they should expect “texts behind the text” in a 
game of collaboration with Stoppard, recognising “major works of the western canon” (Kelly, 
2001:11). Brater (2001:205) has also noted that although it may not be politically correct to 
point this out, Stoppard’s plays are aimed at a literate and middle-class audience. Thereby, 
Stoppard involves his audience in his plays as his work not only comments on itself 
metatheatrically, but always points to something outside the play: “the interlacing of texts 
reaffirms for the audience the validity of literature within human experience” (Meyer, 
1989:106). 
 The fact that Stoppard’s oeuvre is characterised on the one hand by his conservatism 
and use of traditional forms, and on the other by his use of metatheatre and intertextuality, 
simultaneously suggests and resists positioning him as a postmodern dramatist. Fleming 
(2001:15) divides Stoppard’s critics into three groups: firstly, those who focus mainly on 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1966), Jumpers (1972) and Travesties and view 
them as studies in existentialism, absurdism and “structure for structure’s sake.” Secondly, 
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those scholars who align themselves with Western liberal democracy and employ a traditional 
approach to Stoppard’s plays; whereas, thirdly, postmodern and poststructuralist critics 
“elevate form to level of context,” deprivileging dialogue when “they argue that Stoppard’s 
plays accent the unknowability of the world, the elusiveness of true knowledge, the fallibility 
of human memory, and the relativity of almost all aspects of life.”  
 Hence there is disagreement between scholars as to whether or not Stoppard’s work 
should be approached from a postmodern perspective. Delaney (1990:1) asserts that 
Stoppard’s distinct “vision of life” permeates all his plays and is opposed to the “currents of 
thought which prevail in his own day.” Delaney (1990:1) perceives Stoppard as writing “of 
mankind as existing in a realm in which right and wrong are universal metaphysical 
absolutes.” Furthermore, Zinman (2001:121) considers Stoppard’s plays as distinctly not 
postmodern due to their concern with morality and honour. 
 Fleming (2001:14) regards Stoppard’s work as a continuation of the experimentation 
of high modernism, with aesthetic expression: “Stoppard firmly believes in the values 
associated with Western, liberal humanism.” Fleming (2001:14-15) therefore sets out to assess 
Stoppard’s work, not within current discourses in literary theory, but from the vantage point 
that Stoppard’s “artistic genius cannot be neatly explained by the sociopolitical context of the 
historical moment.” I find this approach odd, however, since much of Stoppard’s oeuvre, and 
The Real Thing in particular, is inextricably part of a larger postmodern discourse. Both 
Delaney’s (1990) and Fleming’s (2001) interpretations of Stoppard’s oeuvre furthermore rely 
on the playwright’s personal vision or values, which I consider problematic.  
 Although Stoppard is markedly uneasy “with polemical and pseudo-documentary 
playwriting,” as is suggested in The Real Thing (Bull, 2001:148), his plays still express 
various postmodern notions. Hu (1989:4) contends that Stoppard’s use of “excerpts from other 
dramatists’ works” and stylistic devices from a variety “of theatrical and literary periods” 
reflects postmodern sensibilities while Innes (2006:224) describes his main effect “of 
multiplying intellectual complexity” as distinctly postmodern.  
 Vanden Heuvel (2001:213) additionally identifies the loss of sustaining cultural 
narratives, the waywardness of language, the fragmented nature of identity and the death of 
the author as postmodern concerns in Stoppard’s work. The last concern is underscored by 
Stoppard (1999) himself when he remarks that “the theatre seems to me, on the whole, to be a 
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way of telling stories which are acted out for an audience and which mean pretty much what 
the audience thinks they mean.”  
 According to Vanden Heuvel (2001:217-218), “Stoppard has relentlessly pursued 
themes relevant to postmodernism’s obsession with textual openness and the free (wheeling) 
play of signification of meaning.” As a result, the epistemological aspects of Stoppard’s 
oeuvre in particular test the limits of postmodernism. Yet, Vanden Heuvel (2001:213) 
emphasises that “Stoppard and his plays will frustrate any attempt to impose an either/or logic 
in terms of their relationship to postmodern ideas and aesthetics.” According to Vanden 
Heuvel (2001:219), Stoppard’s morality keeps him from giving “himself completely over to” 
the ideas he writes about. Although Stoppard is keenly interested in “certain intellectual, 
aesthetic, and ideological positions associated with postmodern art and drama,” he is 
simultaneously opposed to “some of the more radical notions and claims of postmodern social 
theory and its image of the human subject” (Vanden Heuvel, 2001:213).  
  
4.3. The Real Thing within Stoppard’s oeuvre 
 
Although Stoppard consequently does not neatly fit into the category of postmodern 
playwright, I illustrate, in an analysis of The Real Thing, that a postmodern reading of the play 
will open up interesting avenues which Delaney’s (1985) restrictive emphasis on morality 
excludes.  
 According to Fleming (2001:175), “The Real Thing is Stoppard’s most realistic, most 
personal, and most accessible play.” It was also his most commercially successful to date. The 
play concerns a playwright-actress couple, Henry and Annie, and their experience of 
infidelity. The audience is introduced to the couple when Henry is still married to a different 
actress, Charlotte, who stars in one of his plays, opposite Max, Annie’s husband. By the end 
of the first act, Henry and Annie have divorced their spouses after their affair has been 
discovered, and married each other. In the second act, Annie has an affair with her co-actor in 
Ford’s ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore (1633), named Billy. Annie finally ends this affair and returns 
to Henry. Meanwhile, Annie is involved in the cause of Brodie, a political prisoner who is 
serving a sentence for setting a cenotaph on fire during an anti-missile demonstration. He 
writes a very poor play about his demonstration and subsequent incarceration, which Annie 
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persuades Henry to rewrite. The rewritten version is filmed with Annie and Billy in the lead 
roles.  
 The most interesting aspect of The Real Thing is its structure. The play functions on 
several fictional levels since Stoppard intersperses scenes from the characters’ lives with 
scenes from plays they encounter in their occupations in the theatre. Therefore, Scene One is a 
scene from a play within a play titled “House of Cards,” which is about infidelity and was 
written by Henry. Henry’s first wife, Charlotte, and Annie’s first husband, Max, play the lead 
roles in this scene, which shows a husband coolly confront his wife whom he suspects of 
adultery. The second scene shows Charlotte and Henry at their home, which presumably 
confuses the audience at first since it only gradually becomes clear that Scene One was in fact 
a play within a play and not part of the outer play. Max and Annie drop by, and the cracks in 
Henry and Charlotte’s marriage, as well as the fact that Henry and Annie are conducting an 
affair, become clear. Scene Three depicts the confrontation between Max and Annie when he 
has discovered the affair – mirroring “House of Cards” in subject matter and blocking19 – 
while Scene Four shows Henry and Annie living together. 
 Scene Five, the first of Act Two, shows Henry and Annie two years later. They are 
living in a different house and argue about what constitutes “good writing” as Annie tries to 
persuade Henry to rewrite Brodie’s play. Scene Six seems at first to be a scene from Brodie’s 
play, but turns out to be an event in the outer play with Billy, a young actor, quoting from the 
play in order to tease Annie. They also read lines from ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore and it is 
evident that the two actors are attracted to each other because Billy’s reading becomes more 
sincere.  
Scene Seven is a conversation between Henry, Charlotte and their seventeen year old 
daughter, Debbie. In this scene Henry doubts whether Annie is faithful to him while Debbie 
voices her views on infidelity. Scene Eight is a scene from ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore with Annie 
and Billy, in which the boundaries between the characters that they are acting and themselves 
blur markedly. Scene Nine offers another confrontation scene, this time between Henry and 
Annie about her affair with Billy, reminiscent of Scene One and Scene Three. She admits to 
the affair, but asks Henry to give her the opportunity to let it run its course without ending 
their marriage.  
                                                            
19 “Blocking” refers to the placement of actors on stage. 
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Brodie’s play is filmed in Scene Ten while Henry and Annie discuss the status of their 
marriage and her affair in Scene Eleven. In the last scene, Brodie’s play is broadcast on 
television; the audience finally sees Brodie himself as he watches it with Henry and Annie. In 
this scene Brodie is exposed as loutish and vulgar, and Annie reveals the real reason she 
remained involved in his cause: he had set the Cenotaph on fire in an attempt to impress her 
and she felt guilty about this. After asking Brodie to leave, Annie states that her affair is 
finally over and she and Henry are reunited – just as Max phones to tell them that he had just 
gotten engaged.20 
                                                            
20 There are various versions of this text. I have used the version reprinted with revisions in 1983, since this 
version corrected some of the difficulties experienced with the first London production of the play but remains 
relevant to most critics’ interpretations of it. 
Scene 
number 
Mise en abyme 
or outer play 
Approximate 
time lapse 
Scene synopsis Structural 
mimicry 
Act One 
Scene 1 Mise en abyme: 
“House of 
Cards.” 
-- “Max” confronts “Charlotte” 
about her perceived infidelity. 
A. 
Scene 2 Outer play. One day. Max and Annie visit Henry and 
Charlotte. It becomes evident that 
Henry and Annie are having an 
affair. 
B. 
Scene 3 Outer play. A few days. Max confronts Annie about her 
infidelity. 
A. 
Scene 4 Outer play. Fifteen days. Henry and Annie now live 
together. Henry reads for Annie 
as she learns her lines for Miss 
Julie and voices his 
dissatisfaction with his own 
inability to write romantic scenes. 
B. 
Act Two 
Scene 5 Outer play. Two years. Henry and Annie are now 
married. Annie tries to persuade 
Henry to rewrite Brodie’s play; 
they argue about what constitutes 
good writing. 
C. 
Scene 6 Outer play. A few weeks. Billy and Annie meet on a train. 
They rehearse lines from ’Tis Pity 
She’s a Whore. It is clear that 
Billy is attracted to Annie. 
D. 
Scene 7 Outer play. A few weeks. Henry is at Charlotte’s house to B. 
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Figure 4: The sequence of events in The Real Thing, indicating the placement of mise en 
abymes and structural mimicry. 
 
 The structure of this play is consequently as important as its characters (Brassell, 
1985:164). According to Thomson (1987:535), “the structure juxtaposes several love 
relationships, some more real than others, both theatrically and emotionally.” It is therefore a 
“mixture of broad naturalism and subversive artifice” (Brassell, 1985:257). Fleming 
(2001:179-180) points out how the different sets used in the London and New York 
productions emphasised different aspects of the play. Carl Tom’s set for the London premiere 
was stylised, incorporating moveable frames around certain scenes which were then removed, 
while Tony Walton’s design for the New York production was much more “naturalistic.” The 
two set designs illustrate that Stoppard’s play is elastic enough to encompass either a highly 
stylised production or a more realistic one. 
 Likewise, Billington (1987:146) acknowledges that The Real Thing “branches out 
from the subject of adultery to take on board so many other issues and to raise so many 
questions about the values by which we live.” Billington (1987:146) positions The Real Thing 
as part of a dramatic discourse about fidelity alongside other British plays about adultery such 
say goodbye to their daughter, 
Debbie, who is leaving for a road 
trip with her boyfriend. The three 
of them discuss love, sex, and 
fidelity. 
Scene 8 Mise en abyme: 
’Tis Pity She’s a 
Whore. 
A few weeks. Annie and Billy rehearse for ’Tis 
Pity She’s a Whore. 
E. 
Scene 9 Outer play. A few weeks. Henry confronts Annie about her 
infidelity. 
A. 
Scene 10 Mise en abyme: 
Brodie’s play. 
A few weeks. Annie and Billy film Brodie’s 
play. 
D. 
Scene 11 Outer play. A few weeks. Henry and Annie discuss the 
future of their marriage. 
F. 
Scene 12 Outer play. A few weeks 
or months. 
Henry, Annie, and Brodie watch a 
filmed version of Brodie’s play. 
Brodie is unmasked as a fraud, 
Henry and Annie reconcile. 
G. 
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as Betrayal and Peter Nichols’ Passion Play (1981) and regards Stoppard’s contribution as 
superior because it reaches beyond the confines of marital infidelity.   
 The title is blatantly borrowed from Henry James’ (1984) short story first published in 
1892 (Meyer, 1989:118). For Meyer (1989:118) this makes Stoppard’s title simultaneously 
“real” and stolen. James’ “The Real Thing” concerns a painter who takes pity on a couple 
who, although of noble birth, are now destitute. The painter hires them to model scenes from 
nobility but quickly becomes frustrated since they fail to represent these scenes adequately. 
The mere fact that they are noble by birth, does not mean that they can effectively represent 
nobility for the purposes of the artist. Hence the play presents the audience with the question 
of “realness” from the outset although, as Gamerman (2000) states, “realness is a highly 
loaded concept in Stoppard territory.” The Real Thing thus extends the aesthetic debates of 
Artist Descending a Staircase (1972), Travesties, Jumpers, Professional Foul (1977), and 
Every Good Boy Deserves Favour (1977) (Smith, 1987:166-167). Gussow (1995) regards the 
principal subject of The Real Thing as “theatre-love,” while for Zinman (2001:129) it deals 
with “art and politics”. Thomson (1987:535) summarises the main theme of the play as: 
 
The problem of relating subjective perceptions to objective realities [which] 
determines both the form and the content of The Real Thing – a clichéd phrase that not 
only deftly conveys the certainty of lovers but, more importantly captures the difficulty 
of expressing the feeling, the emotion of love, both in real life and in theatre. 
 
Therefore The Real Thing asks questions, not only about the authenticity of romantic 
relationships, but also about politics, theatre and art in general.  
 Still, The Real Thing received mixed reviews when it first opened. Zinman (2001:129) 
states that it was not received very well by scholars such as Brassell (1985:258) who found 
that the characters never fully move the audience, Corballis (1984:147) for whom the 
language was “slick and trendy” rather than “genuinely clever,” and Jenkins (1987:160-161) 
who objected to the implausible and inconsistently drawn female characters. 
 The London production was furthermore criticised for Stoppard’s perceived political 
views expressed in the play. Stead (in Page, 1986:72-73), for example, asks what comfort 
there would be in attacking the language of a cause such as the anti-nuclear movement if that 
cause were proved to be correct. Stewart (in Page, 1986:73) accuses Stoppard of snobbery 
because he supposedly regards everything outside the English middle class as barbarous. 
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Morley (in Page, 1986:71-72), however, wrote a glowing review for Shooting Stars in which 
he positions The Real Thing in the discourse on infidelity and also suggests an element of 
autobiography: 
 
 It’s a romantic comedy of a tragic nature, corresponding perhaps most closely to less 
 successful attempts in this same field recently made by our other two leading British 
 dramatists, Harold Pinter (in Betrayal) and Peter Nichols (in Passion Play). […] The 
 Real Thing is also love, and divorce, and jealousy, and innocence,  and anguish, and in 
 writing about all of that within the context of a marital drama about an actress and a 
 playwright Mr. Stoppard has come up with the warmest and the most touching play 
 he has ever written. In a purely artistic sense, this is also an  autobiographical play 
 since it is about a dramatist trying to write a play about indescribable love. 
 
For these reasons Morley (in Page, 1986) praises Stoppard for the warmth with which he 
handles themes of love, marriage and divorce. 
 The first New York production, on the other hand, won various prizes: the 1984 Tony 
Award for Best Play, the New York Drama Critics Circle Award, the Drama Desk Award, and 
the Outer Circle Critics’ Circle Award (Hu, 1989:203). However, Brustein (1984:28) 
described it as “just another clever exercise” in which “all of the characters (the proletarian, 
Brodie excepted) share the same wit, artifice and ornamental diction.” Brustein (1984:28-29) 
continues, criticising the way Stoppard presents his play as “the real thing” and argues that 
The Real Thing “comes no closer to reality than any of those other adultery plays recently 
exported from England – and it doesn’t even possess the mordancy of Harold Pinter’s 
Betrayal or the ingenuity of Peter Nichols’ Passion.”21  
 The critics’ views on The Real Thing are therefore clearly in conflict. While Brassell 
(1985) and Corballis (1984) consider the play cold, unmoving and too clever, Morley (in 
Page, 1986) comments on its warmth. Brustein (1984) compares it to Betrayal and Passion 
Play, as Billington (1987) does, but unlike Billington, finds it compares poorly to those plays.  
 In conversation with Pinter’s Betrayal, it takes certain themes and concerns, such as 
the role of language, recycling and mimicry in romantic relationships, further. Whereas Pinter 
suggests a recycling and mimicry in the characters’ lives and relationships, Stoppard takes this 
idea to a new stylistic level. It is very difficult to isolate a scene, character or part of dialogue 
which is not recycled and mimicked in The Real Thing.  
                                                            
21 Passion Play was performed in the United States as Passion. 
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 The dichotomy of the authentic versus the inauthentic is imposed on every aspect of 
the characters’ lives, as is evident from the very first scene, “House of Cards,” when “Max”22 
debates the virtues of the analogue versus the digital watch, where the analogue is perceived 
as somehow more authentic and “real” than the digital, which operates purely on the principle 
of appearance. This notion is continued immediately when “Max” refers to “Charlotte’s” gift 
to her mother of placemats with copies of Rembrandt paintings printed on them. He jokingly 
wonders if the “real” Rembrandts are also used as placemats elsewhere. 
 In the second scene, which represents the actual world of the characters as opposed to 
the fictional world of “House of Cards,” Charlotte enters, telling Henry and Annie that Max is 
making a dip which is supposed to be served in a hollowed-out pineapple, but since Henry and 
Charlotte do not have any pineapples in their kitchen, Max will serve the dip in an empty 
pineapple tin. This once again reinforces the dichotomy between truth and artifice where the 
pineapple is regarded as authentic while the tin – used in this manner – is a mere mimicry. 
According to Zeifman (1983:140), certain “side acts” accordingly mirror the central theme in 
the play: “real” music is opposed to pop music, the real self is opposed to masks, real 
motivation behind political commitment to opportunism and real writing to commercial, or 
just plain “bad,” writing. 
  
4.4. The characters’ debates about authenticity in art and life 
 
4.4.1. Brodie’s writing versus Henry’s 
 
Stoppard enquires in The Real Thing whether language – and literature or art – is able to 
authentically represent the actual world and, if so, which type of language or art is closer to 
actuality. Stoppard addresses these concerns primarily through the opposition between Henry, 
the established playwright and Brodie, the convict-turned-playwright. Various scholars have 
considered Brodie to be the play’s major weakness. For Rusinko (1985:21), he remains a 
straw doll, a caricature whose only purpose is to serve as a foil to Henry; neither does Pochada 
(2000:34) find Brodie convincing, while Jenkins (1987:17) and Billington (1987:155) 
                                                            
22 Throughout this thesis I will distinguish the characters Max and Charlotte from the characters they portray in 
“House of Cards” in Scene One by putting the latter in inverted commas. 
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perceive the opposition between Henry and Brodie as unbalanced, with the latter describing it 
as a “false, too easy antithesis.” According to Fleming (2001:193), Stoppard sets up a false 
binary between the apolitical, skilled craftsman versus the opinionated, primitive, ham-fisted 
playwright and argues that the play seems to be favouring the former. Likewise, Corballis 
(1984:140) asserts that Stoppard comes to a clear cut decision: that Brodie’s cause is 
undeserving.  
 On the other hand, Meyer (1989:115) points out that the distinction between Brodie as 
a “bad” writer and Henry as a “good” one is not so clear cut. The play asks if Henry can 
indeed counter Brodie’s attempts. Stoppard takes care to reveal the character of Brodie very 
gradually to the audience. The characters first discuss him as representative of a political 
cause in Scene Two, and his merits as a playwright are later hotly debated by Henry and 
Annie, before we hear and see excerpts of his autobiographical play rehearsed and filmed, 
where he is represented by the actor, Billy. The character makes his first and only appearance 
in the very last scene of the play, delaying the audience’s confrontation with the “real” Brodie. 
 As a result, Brodie is first discussed purely in political terms. When an argument 
between Henry and Charlotte in Scene Two threatens to turn the atmosphere sour, Henry 
changes the subject by asking Annie to tell them about the Justice for Brodie Committee, on 
which she serves. Annie met Private Brodie on a train, travelling to London for an anti-
missiles demonstration. As noted earlier, he subsequently set fire to a Cenotaph and was 
arrested. The Justice for Brodie Committee is attempting to free him from prison. Max seems 
to be very proud of Annie for being involved in the cause, while Charlotte remains detached; 
Henry voices his scepticism of political causes and tries to dismantle Max’s arguments by 
correcting his grammar: 
 
 MAX:  But he got hammered by an emotional backlash. 
 HENRY: No, no, you can’t –  
 MAX:  Yes, he bloody was! 
 HENRY: I mean ‘hammer’ and ‘backlash.’ You can’t do it! 
 MAX:  Oh, for Christ’s sake. This is your house, and I’m drinking your wine, 
   but if you don’t mind me saying so, Henry –  
 HENRY: My saying, Max. (34) 
 
Although Henry is purposefully obstinate in this excerpt, his scepticism about the characters’ 
involvement in Brodie’s cause proves to be correct.  
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 Henry describes people’s motivations to join political causes as follows: “One of us is 
probably kicking his father, a policeman. Another is worried that his image is getting a bit too 
right-of-centre. Another is in love with a committee member and wishes to gain her 
approbation…” (33). When questioned about whether or not he will be attending the 
committee meeting, Max cites a squash appointment as an excuse, while it also becomes 
evident that Annie only took part in the anti-missiles demonstration because she and Max own 
property close to where the missiles are stored. Annie, whose praises have been sung for her 
involvement in the Brodie case, is finally discredited in her political involvement when it is 
revealed at the end of the scene that she is using the committee meetings as an alibi to cover 
up her affair with Henry. When they plan a rendezvous for that afternoon and Henry asks 
“What about Brodie?” Annie answers “Let him rot” (35).  
 As Fleming (2001:195) points out, all the characters involved in political causes 
actually do so for ulterior motives: to mask an affair or to protect private property. The Real 
Thing thus resists championing a cause. This has earned Stoppard sharp criticism, but it also 
refuses a clear-cut answer to his question of “how can we know what is real?” regarding 
political causes. Because Stoppard does not explicitly oppose the use of missiles by the United 
Kingdom, Sammells (1988:122) interprets The Real Thing as apologising for the “political 
status quo in Britain.” I, however, disagree with Sammells (1988:141) who also argues that 
“Stoppard consigns dissent to nonsense.” Stoppard merely avoids suggesting that any specific 
cause is “the real thing”, simply on the grounds of its perceived ethical or moral validity. 
 While Henry remains cool and detached during the argument about Brodie’s cause, the 
debate becomes more heated when the latter invades Henry’s professional territory by 
attempting to write a television play. By Scene Five, Annie has asked Henry to rewrite 
Brodie’s autobiographical television play. Henry reads an excerpt out loud. This excerpt will 
be repeated, in various guises, throughout the play as Brodie’s play is eventually filmed. The 
excerpt itself is based on his first meeting with Annie on a train, which was described by her 
in Scene Two. From the first two lines that Henry reads, “‘You’re a strange boy, Billy. How 
old are you?’ ‘Twenty. But I’ve lived more than you’ll ever live,’” (48) the audience can 
gather that the play is appallingly clichéd and sentimental. 
 Henry only reads a few lines before he interrupts himself, declaring the play poor. 
While Annie argues that although the play is not “literary,” it has merits because it is based on 
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a convict’s life, Henry contends that both the form and content of the play are flawed: “He’s 
got something to say. It happens to be something extremely silly and bigoted. But leaving that 
aside, there is still the problem that he can’t write. He can burn things down, but he can’t 
write” (49). The argument becomes more intense when Annie immediately criticises Henry 
for having to invent things to write about, while Brodie has lived through the events in his 
play and is directly affected by them: 
 
 ANNIE: He’s not a writer. He’s a convict. You’re a writer. You write because 
   you’re a writer. Even when you write about something, you have to 
   think up something to write about so you can keep writing. More well 
   chosen words nicely put together. So what? Why should that be it? Who 
   says? 
 HENRY: Nobody says. It just works best. 
 ANNIE: Of course it works. You teach a lot of people what to expect from good 
   writing, and you end up with a lot of people saying you write well.  
   Then somebody who isn’t in on the game comes along, like Brodie, 
   who really has something to write about, something real, and you can’t 
   get through it. Well, he couldn’t get through yours, so where are you? 
   To you, he can’t write. To him, write is all you can do. (51) 
 
Annie, in other words, clearly distinguishes between content and form. She furthermore sees 
merit in Brodie’s content on the basis that it is autobiographical. Henry becomes frustrated 
with the argument; he fetches his cricket bat to illustrate an analogy and emphasise the 
importance of form in playwriting. He compares a play to a cricket bat which, if constructed 
well, will make a ball travel if hit by it, much as an idea will travel if “hit” with a carefully 
constructed play. If one uses just any piece of wood (or a poorly constructed play) to hit a ball 
(or idea), it will not travel and will burn one’s hands. For Bull (2001:148), this illustrates “the 
importance of craft over ideology.” 
 Henry, though, also argues that there is a fundamental difference between tangible 
objects and abstract concepts and asserts that Brodie does not know the difference, 
consequently treating abstract concepts such as “politics, justice, patriotism” (53) as tangible 
objects. According to Henry, “there’s nothing real there separate from our perception of them” 
(53). At the end of Scene Five, Henry delivers one more monologue on the role of language, 
or words, in writing: 
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 [Words] don’t deserve that kind of malarkey. They’re innocent, neutral, precise, 
 standing for this, describing that, meaning the other, so if you look after them you can 
 build bridges across incomprehension and chaos. But when they get their corners 
 knocked off, they’re no good any more, and Brodie knocks corners off without 
 knowing he’s doing it. So everything he builds is jerry-built. It’s rubbish. An 
 intelligent child could push it over. I don’t think writers are sacred, but words are. 
 They deserve respect. If you get the right ones in the right order, you can nudge the 
 world a little or make a poem which children will speak for you when you’re dead. 
 (54) 
 
Henry accordingly continues to defend his point by declaring that words are sacred and that if 
they are used carefully by a wordsmith, they can do remarkable things. If used incorrectly, 
words are meaningless. His argument is, however, undercut when Annie turns to his 
typewriter, reading the dialogue he has written for a mediocre science fiction series. 
 Annie therefore believes that Brodie’s play has merits because its content directly 
affects his life. His writing has, apparently, also improved over the two years since Annie has 
known him and he taught himself to write. He did not write his play to compete with 
established playwrights, but to be “heard.” She accuses Henry of being prejudiced against 
those who have not benefited from the same educated background as himself, and are trying to 
keep playwriting an exclusive art form. 
 For Sandall (1995:73), Henry’s cricket bat monologue means that how you express 
something is equal to what you express; thereby Brodie’s ideas are as clichéd as his language. 
However, I beg to differ. Henry criticises Brodie’s play for both its form and its content. He 
contends that no play can succeed if it is poorly written, no matter how compelling or 
important the subject matter is. As Meyer (1989:115) states, “Brodie’s revolutionary 
monosyllables deny the creative presence behind autonomous discourse.”  Nonetheless, 
Brodie’s content is also flawed since he cannot distinguish between abstract concepts and 
tangible objects. He disregards his own subjectivity; as a result his argument is weak.  
 Both Arndt (1997) and Delaney (1985) assert that Stoppard favours Henry’s point of 
view in this argument. Arndt (1997:498) maintains that Stoppard sets up these arguments in 
The Real Thing to create the appearance of blurring the lines between the “real” and the 
“ersatz,” only to affirm Henry’s stance as “the real thing” in the end. For Delaney (1985:51), 
Stoppard reveals through Henry that “the world that is there to be nudged is real; a world in 
which people need to act with justice is inherently moral; and art, by faithfully reflecting the 
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real world, can enable people to see the real world and their own actions with greater 
precision.” Smith (1987:166), though, points out that the oppositions between Stoppard’s 
characters – such as this disagreement between Henry and Annie about writing – remind one 
of Chekhov in the sense that they remain suspended. Similarly, Kelly (1991:148) aptly points 
out that since the debate between Henry and Annie ends in a deadlock: “if The Real Thing 
attempts to present a ‘sacramental view of language,’” as Delaney (1985:49) suggests, “it does 
so ironically.”  
 I concur with Kelly (1991:148) that both Annie and Henry’s points of view in this 
argument are weak. Annie’s argument falls flat, since it becomes clear just how poorly written 
Brodie’s play is. In Scene Twelve, as mentioned, the audience is given the final glimpse of 
this play when Henry, Annie and Brodie watch a televised version of it. Brodie reveals that he 
was, supposedly, freed because of overcrowding in the prison, so that his play did not serve its 
intended purpose, which was to create enough awareness for him to be freed. Moreover, 
Brodie objects to Henry’s improvements to his play. He regards these as somehow 
inauthentic: “Don’t be clever with me, Henry, like you were clever with my play. I lived it and 
put my guts into it, and you come along and wrote it clever” (81). His claim to authenticity is, 
nonetheless, immediately invalidated because, as noted above, Annie reveals, after Brodie 
crudely insults her, that he was not politically motivated when he set the Cenotaph on fire, but 
was merely trying to impress her. She felt guilty and therefore remained involved in his case, 
the political motivation of which became increasingly overblown. With Brodie unmasked as a 
fraud, his play has credibility neither of form nor content. The image of Brodie that was 
created throughout the play is thereby exposed as a phantom.  
 Henry’s argument is also deeply flawed, though. Meyer (1989:116) points out how he 
naively believes that words’ innocence can be kept intact, while “words, as most of the other 
characters in the play realize, can never be innocent and sacred, nor can they be neutral and 
precise.” Words, as indicated in Chapter Two, are not instruments with which to describe a 
fixed, external reality; as Hartman (1985: xii) states, “nothing can lift us out of language.” 
Scruton (1983:46) also points out how Max regards “Henry’s obsession with language” as “no 
more than a snobbish isolation from the ordinary conscience”; an issue Henry will become 
acutely aware of in his relationship with Annie, to be discussed below. Fleming (2001:192) 
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likewise interprets Henry as too rigid in his analogy of a play as a cricket bat, pointing out 
how his views are contradicted by his taste in music.  
 Pop records are among the various intertexts of which Stoppard makes use in The Real 
Thing. These records link some of the scenes and include Herman’s Hermits’ “I’m into 
Something Good,” Righteous Brothers’ “You’ve Lost That Lovin’ Feelin’,” Procul Harem’s 
“A Whiter Shade of Pale,” and The Monkees’ “I’m a Believer.” The last of these is given a 
prominent place within the play: it is played as the curtain falls. Interestingly, The Monkees is 
considered a rather controversial band as it was a spin-off act from a television series in which 
it was a fictional band, based on The Beatles. There are rumours that The Monkees did not 
play their own instruments and therefore were never an authentic band, but only posed as one 
(Rolling Stone, 2012). 
 The records which are heard during The Real Thing represent the music that Henry 
listens to at various points in the play, and are juxtaposed with the classical music of Bach and 
Verdi to which Annie listens. Although Martin (2000:12) claims that by the 1980s there was 
no longer a distinction between high art and low, Stoppard makes use of this distinction in 
music to elaborate Henry and Annie’s argument, discussed above. Henry is ashamed of his 
taste in music and confesses he is moved by the latter although he regards it as superficial: “It 
moves me, the way people are supposed to be moved by real music” (25).  
 In Scene Two, Henry is about to be featured on a radio programme, Desert Island 
Disks, on which he is asked to list eight records that represent turning points in his life. He 
struggles to compile this list, since there is a discrepancy between his taste in music and his 
reputation as an “intellectual” playwright. This illustrates how Henry’s public persona is very 
carefully constructed, a feature which Thomson (1987) also points out. Thomson (1987:541) 
interprets Henry as “wearing a deceptive mask” since the image he wishes to project clashes 
with his actual life. Thomson (1987) substantiates this claim by the fact that Henry wears a 
digital watch while the protagonist in his play, “House of Cards” denounces such a watch. I 
consider this unfair, however, since Henry cannot be held to his characters’ convictions. 
Thomson’s (1987) point is, nevertheless, illustrated in Henry’s panic when he cannot come up 
with eight records he can relate to his own life which are not in some way banal or superficial. 
 Annie later does her best to educate Henry in classical music, with limited success. 
Henry can only recognise Bach’s “Air on a G-String” because Procul Harum borrows it in “A 
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Whiter Shade of Pale.” He then jokes that Bach stole it from Procul Harum. His taste in 
music, as intimated, thus clearly contradicts his views on writing. Henry’s taste in music 
therefore suggests that people’s appreciation of art is not necessarily controlled by its aesthetic 
integrity or the merits of its content. 
 Furthermore, Henry’s own writing also seems to be mediocre. Charlotte criticises 
Henry’s writing precisely because she finds it to be inauthentic, or to fail in representing life 
realistically. She specifically refers to “Max’s” stoicism, which reminds one of Robert’s in 
Betrayal, when confronting his wife with her supposed infidelity. Charlotte describes the 
play’s problem as follows: 
 
 Having all the words to come back with just as you need them. That’s the difference 
 between plays and real life – thinking time, time to get your bottle back. ‘Must say, I 
 take my hat off to you, coming home with Rembrandt place mats for your mother.’ 
 You don’t really think that if Henry caught me out with a lover, he’d sit around being 
 witty about place mats? Like hell he would. He’d come apart like a pick-a-sticks. His 
 sentence structure would go to pot, closely followed by his sphincter. (22) 
 
While Brodie’s writing is consequently seen as poor because it is naively unoriginal, Henry’s 
is regarded as tedious because it is pretentiously unoriginal in its mimicry of other plays rather 
than reality.  
 Later, in Scene Four, Henry admits that he struggles to write realistic love scenes: 
 
 I don’t know how to write love. I try to write it properly, and it just comes out 
 embarrassing. It’s either childish or it’s rude. And the rude bits are absolutely juvenile. 
 I can’t use any of it. My credibility is already hanging by a thread after Desert Island 
 Disks. Anyway, I’m too prudish. Perhaps I should write it completely artificial. Blank 
 verse. Poetic imagery. Not so much of the ‘Will you still love me when my tits are 
 droopy?’ ‘Of course I will, darling, it’s your bum I’m mad for,’ and more of the ‘By 
 my troth, thy beauty makest the moon hide her radiance,’ do you think? (40) 
 
Henry proceeds to declare that “loving and being loved is unliterary. It’s happiness expressed 
in banality and lust” (40). This excerpt indicates how he also has difficulty finding the right 
words to describe emotion and as a result cannot convey his experience through words. In 
addition, it demonstrates that Henry regards highly stylised language as less authentic than 
everyday language, although banal, or “rude,” language does not suffice in communicating the 
emotion of love, either. Annie advises that lust and banality are best expressed through a sub-
text, suggesting that there are certain issues that cannot be conveyed through language, and 
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must be expressed non-verbally, such as the nuances in romantic relationships. The binary 
between “good” writing and “bad” writing, with regard to authenticity, is thereby dismantled. 
Although Brodie’s play is discredited on the grounds of both its form and content, Henry’s 
writing is apparently unconvincing. 
  
4.4.2. The authentic versus the inauthentic in romantic relationships 
 
Apart from establishing the indistinctness of the lines between authentic and inauthentic art, 
Stoppard simultaneously asks the same question of relationships: how can one know what is 
real in love? Stoppard again investigates this question primarily through the couple, Henry 
and Annie, while also voicing four different views on love: those of Henry, Annie, Charlotte 
and Debbie, Henry and Charlotte’s teenage daughter. Stoppard suggests that just as the 
distinction between genuine and fake writing becomes clouded, the lines between fiction and 
actuality also blur within the characters’ relationships. 
 Fleming (2001:185-188) describes how Henry’s views of love and sex contrast with 
those of his ex-wife, his current wife and his daughter. While Henry passionately champions 
the importance of fidelity, since “carnal knowledge” offers an exclusive, authentic view of a 
person which is not on offer to the public, Pochada (2000:34) points out how Henry’s view 
contrasts with views of authenticity in the current “confessional culture” and describes his 
point of view as “a rarefied definition of love in an age that encourages all cards on the table, 
all the time.” Debbie, on the other hand, perceives sex as a matter of mere biology. Charlotte 
does not regard commitment as binding, unless it is renewed daily, whereas Annie believes 
that infidelity cannot necessarily be laid at the door of the adulterous party.  
 Since Henry’s views on love differ from those held by the three most prominent 
women in his life, Rusinko (1985:18) interprets The Real Thing as the “emotional education” 
of Henry at the hands of Annie, Charlotte and Debbie. The play, however, does not endorse 
any one of these views. As with the arguments on the authenticity of writing, those about love 
in the play remain suspended. No one character is shown to be “correct” in his or her views. 
While Henry, for example, criticises Debbie for using a catchy slogan to summarise these 
views of her, he contradicts himself by adapting her slogan to summarise his own views. 
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 Stoppard’s reluctance to endorse any of the views in the play might be the reason why 
there has been a distinct divide between various critics’ interpretations of the relationship 
between Henry and Annie. On the one hand, there are those who consider Henry as the victim 
of the play, being patronised and punished by the women in his life. Pochada (2000:34), for 
example, views the play as mapping Henry’s swift downfall at the hand of the three anti-
intellectual women characters: “The pace is still as brisk as the wit, making the rush toward 
Henry’s undoing seem at first a cruel form of revenge on the tyranny of the exceptionally 
articulate.”  
 Delaney (1985:57-58) similarly regards Henry as being Annie’s victim. He sees Henry 
as emerging as victorious in the end, having convinced Annie of his point of view: “If the 
penultimate revelation of Brodie reaffirms all that Henry – as a playwright – has said about 
writing, the ultimate revelation of a transformation in Annie reaffirms what Henry – as a lover 
– has said about love.” Delaney (1985:64-65) further dismisses Annie’s arguments as 
“persuasive nonsense.” I find this view of Annie to be too critical. Harbin (2010:30) 
justifiably remarks that “the infidelities of Stoppard’s women characters generate more 
anxiety among critics than those of his male characters.” While Delaney (1985) condemns 
Annie for having an affair with Billy, he downplays Henry’s affair with Annie while he was 
still married to Charlotte.  
 On the other hand, there are those who understand Annie as the victim of a negligent, 
or even domineering, Henry. Like Delaney (1985), Arndt (1997) also interprets The Real 
Thing as coming to unequivocal conclusions, but unlike Delaney (1985), who denounces 
Annie, Charlotte and Debbie, Arndt (1997) demonises Henry. Arndt (1997:494), for example, 
regards the fact that Henry is a playwright as significant, since he also writes scripts for 
Charlotte and Annie. Her interpretation of the play is, however, biased and parochial.  
 In Scene Two, Annie enters while Henry is working and tries to attract his attention, 
using established theatrical conventions which tease the audience, such as flashing her robe 
open for his benefit: 
 
 ANNIE: I’m not here. Promise. 
 (She goes to the couch and carefully opens a newspaper. HENRY continues to write. 
 ANNIE glances towards him once or twice. He takes no notice. She stands up and goes 
 behind his chair, looking over his shoulder as he works. He takes no notice. She goes 
 round the desk and stands in front of him. He takes no notice. She flashes open the 
123 
 
 robe for his benefit. He takes no notice. She moves round behind him again and looks 
 over his shoulder. He turns and grabs her with great suddenness, causing her to 
 scream and laugh. The assault turns into a standing embrace.) 
 HENRY: You’re a bloody nuisance. 
 ANNIE: Sorry, sorry, sorry. I’ll be good. I’ll sit and learn my script. (38) 
 
Arndt (1997:494) interprets this excerpt as follows: 
 
 Henry’s subtle attempts to now insert his new lover into his “scripts” of masculine 
 domination permeate their dialogues. When Annie, for example, tries to get Henry’s 
 attention while he is writing, he tells her, “You’re a bloody nuisance.” Annie, giving 
 in, apologizes: “Sorry, sorry, sorry. I’ll be good. I’ll sit and learn my script” (emphasis 
 added) – an expression which refers to Strindberg’s Miss Julie but can also be read as 
 Henry’s script of feminine subordination. 
 
Arndt (1997:494) negates the teasing, playful rapport between Henry and Annie, and instead 
imposes a culprit/victim relationship on them. She criticises Jenkins (1987), Zeifman (1983) 
and Corballis’ (1984) readings of the play since they do not acknowledge Henry’s 
domineering presence, which permeates the entire play. She also disapproves of Thomson’s 
(1987) interpretation that the play is a study in the difficulty of expressing visceral emotions in 
language. According to Arndt (1997:490), these interpretations negate the “inherent 
ideological underpinnings which elevate male subjectivity into universality and concomitantly 
assign woman to the position of the Other” in The Real Thing. Arndt (1997:491) thus 
perceives the play as having a closed structure which supports Henry’s “impartial vision.” 
 Fleming (2001:188) is not as sharp in his criticism against Henry, but also considers 
Annie as neglected, because Henry has taken their relationship for granted. Billington 
(1987:150) is likewise sympathetic toward Annie, finding the disconcerting fact of her going 
through Henry’s things at the end of Scene Four as completely natural, showing that she has 
an interest in him and desires to know everything about him. And yet, it is exactly because 
Stoppard leaves the debates between the characters suspended that neither Henry nor Annie 
can be interpreted as the victim of the other. Stoppard shows the audience characters who both 
distrust each other at times, who both go through each other’s things at different times in the 
play, and are both in search of greater clarity about who the other is.  
 As a result it is also difficult to determine whether or not the relationship between 
Henry and Annie is “the real thing.” Arndt (1997:496) declares that neither of Henry’s 
marriages can be “the real thing” since adultery occurred in both. Zinman (2001:132) 
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describes the love plot of The Real Thing as unconvincing and suggests that Stoppard, like 
Henry, cannot “write love.” He does, however, concede that the play proposes that what is 
“real” in terms of love, is not necessarily what is good or what is right. In addition, Thomson 
(1987:536) views the play as dramatizing “the growth of a love that is real: not perfect, but 
fallible, painful, and thus, recognisably human.”  
 However, Stoppard never gives a definite answer to this question. It is deceptively 
easy to establish that Henry and Charlotte’s marriage was not “the real thing.” Charlotte was 
unable to discern the false perception – that Henry was unfaithful – from reality. Henry, on his 
part, was unaware of this perception of Charlotte’s. Their marriage was therefore dissolved by 
their misunderstanding of each other, as Thomson (1987:545) suggests. But as Annie remarks, 
in Scene Two, in agreement with Waskul (2009), it is much easier to tell whether something is 
inauthentic than authentic when she chides Henry for being hesitant in making their 
relationship public: “you want to give it time – […] … time to go wrong, change, spoil. Then 
you’ll know it wasn’t the real thing” (27). 
 Knowing what is real, is complicated since “a facility with words,” as Thomson 
(1987:543) remarks, “can be a means of hiding rather than revealing feelings, and […] our 
understanding of what words mean can change depending on our experience of the reality 
underlying them,” a point also illustrated in Betrayal. The fact that The Real Thing is intended 
to be performed as theatre further complicates this process since the reader’s experience of the 
text will necessarily differ from the audience’s. Just as Annie remarks that lust and banality 
are best conveyed through subtext in Miss Julie (40-41), this proves also to be the case in The 
Real Thing.  
 For Thomson (1987:537) the representations of how the characters encounter difficulty 
in expressing themselves are very realistic since they “rely on verbal shorthand and body 
language to say what specific words cannot.” Fleming (2001:184) also points out how Henry, 
for all his articulateness, never verbalises why he loves Annie; therefore “the bond between 
them must be enacted by the performers whose physical and vocal interactions play the 
subtext of lovers in love.” The genre of The Real Thing is thus vital in this regard. The 
vagueness of the title, as well as other clichéd lines such as “all right”, used throughout the 
play, intimates “the distance between deeply-felt emotion and the capacity of language” to 
express it. Subtext is thus absolutely imperative in a performance of The Real Thing 
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(Thomson, 1987:541). For Brantley (2000) this is fully justified and “the badinage feels 
natural precisely because directors and actors are so attentive to what bodies say that words 
don’t.” The fact that these characters are also actors results in further implications with regard 
to how their identities are constructed and conveyed to the audience, because they also 
sometimes portray roles in their everyday lives.  
 
4.5. Mimicry  
 
4.5.1. Mimicry in the characters’ behaviour 
 
The characters’ desire to know everything about each other begs the question of whether this 
is even possible. For Thomson (1987:547) The Real Thing suggests that “self-revelations” and 
“mutual knowledge” are never complete, although these can be present to a degree, therefore 
assenting to Nietzsche’s ideas about identity. Sometimes they are purposefully masked. 
Henry, for example, declares himself in Scene Ten as not believing in acting aloof in the face 
of adultery, only to contradict himself later: 
 
I don’t believe in behaving well. I don’t believe in debonair relationships. ‘How’s your 
 lover today, Amanda?’ ‘In the pink, Charles. How’s yours?’ I believe in mess, tears, 
 pain, self-abasement, loss of self-respect, nakedness. Not caring doesn’t seem much 
 different from not loving. (72) 
 
Yet, later in the play, he makes a definite decision not to be weak while Annie is conducting 
an affair with Billy: 
 
 Love me because I’m in pain. No good. Not in very good taste. 
 So.  
 Dignified cuckoldry is a difficult trick, but it can be done. 
 Think of it as a modern marriage. We have got beyond hypocrisy, you and I. Exclusive 
 rights isn’t love, it’s colonization. (76-77) 
 
In this last quotation, Henry is very obviously wearing a mask, as Billington (1987:154) also 
points out. When Henry pretends not to care about Annie’s affair, citing one of Debbie’s 
philosophies as justification, he is trying to align himself to an image he thinks would be more 
acceptable to Annie. Stoppard (in Delaney, 1994:5) states that he has “a feeling that almost 
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everybody today is more trying to match himself up with an external image he has of himself, 
almost as if he’d seen himself on a screen.” Henry is attempting to match himself to an image, 
which contrasts with Max’s pathetic behaviour when Annie left him. But this mask is an 
uncomfortable fit, to the point that Annie asks him to “Stop it – please stop it” (77). She 
apologises for hurting him, and declares: 
 
I’m sorry for your pain but even your pain is the pain of letting go of something, some 
idea of me which was never true, an Annie who was complete in loving you and being 
loved back. (With sad disdain) Some Annie. (78) 
 
What becomes evident is that just as in Betrayal, the characters consciously wear certain 
masks in order either to protect themselves or come across more acceptably, but they also 
perceive each other through a mask created by themselves – as Annie claims, Henry perceives 
her as an idea he created himself, illustrating Maturana and Varela’s (1980:5) as well as 
Bakhtin’s (in Hitchcock, 1998:92) ideas about the impossibility of knowing the Other.  
 Further complicating the masks that the characters wear, is the fact that in this 
metatheatrical play, Stoppard’s characters act as doubles for each other. They seem like 
versions of one another throughout the play since life imitates art, and sometimes also life – 
within the fictional contexts represented in The Real Thing. Since four of the characters in the 
play are actors, the roles that they play are masks that they willingly – or unwillingly, in the 
case of Charlotte – wear. Hence, “Charlotte” is a version of Charlotte and vice versa. 
Charlotte complains in Scene Two that people assume “House of Cards” is based on the lives 
of her and Henry. Therefore, “Max” is also a version of Henry, which reminds one of the 
manner in which some reviewers gleefully pointed out that Betrayal is autobiographical. 
However, later in the play, Charlotte has a relationship with an architect, while in Scene Seven 
she tells Henry that she had to end the relationship because he was too jealous and went 
through her things when she was not at home to prove her infidelity. Her relationship thus 
echoes “Charlotte’s” relationship with the architect, “Max,” in Scene One. 
 Max also echoes “Max,” when he is confronted with his spouse’s infidelity. Max is 
described in the didascalia as “nice, seldom assertive, conciliatory” (15), while “Max” is 
described as not having “to be physically impressive, but you wouldn’t want him for an 
enemy” (9). Although in consequence these two characters clearly differ, Max’s initial 
reaction to Annie’s adultery does echo “Max’s” in “House of Cards.” Being familiar with 
127 
 
“House of Cards”, Max is probably deliberately mimicking the character he portrays in that 
play in order to stay in control of his emotions. He does, nonetheless, become emotional soon 
after and sharply contrasts with “Max.”  
 As Henry is the playwright who created the role of “Max,” “Max” also represents a 
version of him. Scene Nine begins in the same way as Scene One and Scene Three, preparing  
the audience for another confrontation scene concerning infidelity. Like “Max,” Henry has 
also gone through Annie’s things. According to Rusinko (1985:19-20), “Henry, who describes 
himself ‘as an ironist in public though a prig in private,’ both writes about and becomes the 
suspicious husband.” Reminiscences of the characters thus cling to other characters because 
they are at times versions of each other and Henry is as a result shadowed by both “Max” and 
Max.  
Billy is also a version of Brodie – even sharing his first name – and responsible for the 
image the audience forms of Brodie, until the “real” Brodie shatters that image in the last 
scene. Billy furthermore deliberately uses his shadows of Brodie and Giovanni to flirt with 
Annie in Scene Six. Annie would then be tempted to react as Mary or Annabella.23 
This doubling also continues into the outer play in The Real Thing. Annie is described 
in the didascalia of Scene Two as “very much like the woman whom CHARLOTTE has ceased 
to be” (15) while Henry later states: “I keep marrying people who suddenly lose a wheel” 
(77), referring to both Charlotte and Annie’s infidelities. A shadow of Charlotte consequently 
clings to Annie. This is emphasised in Scene Four, which mimics Scene Two, as is again 
suggested not only in a duplication of the disposition of door and furniture, but also in the 
actions of the characters. Annie enters in Henry’s robe, which is too big for her, just as 
Charlotte did in Scene Two. As Baudrillard (1994) suggests, mimicry is thus so deeply 
ingrained in the lives of these characters that it becomes impossible to distinguish the different 
versions of these characters from each other.  
 This doubling is also evident in the way the characters mimic each other in their 
philosophies on love. In the example cited above, Henry quotes Debbie’s philosophy of love 
as a way of masking his pain. Yet, earlier, when he broke down, declaring that he does not 
believe in “debonair relationships”, he is also mimicking Max who states in Scene Two: 
                                                            
23 Interestingly, the character of Mary is based on Annie. Hence Mary is a version of Annie, which is then 
represented by Annie, confusing the mimesis, mimicry and doubling of characters even further. 
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“That’s what life’s about – messy bits of good and bad luck, and people caring and not 
necessarily having all the answers” (35). Max says these words in defence of Brodie’s cause 
which Henry has been dismissing. The shadows of both Max and Brodie consequently haunt 
Henry’s words in Scene Ten.  
 Henry tells Charlotte in Scene Seven that the reason he was never jealous in his 
marriage to her, or in his marriage to Annie, is that he believes that when a commitment has 
been made, it is final. He therefore does not feel the need to take care, in his words and actions 
towards his spouse, when a relationship has been secured in this way: “I use you because you 
love me. I love you so use me. Be indulgent, negligent, preoccupied, premenstrual… your 
credit is infinite, I’m yours, I’m committed…” (67). These words prove to be bitterly ironic 
when Annie later explains why she does not abruptly end her affair with Billy: “This is the me 
who loves you, this me who won’t tell Billy to go and rot, and I know I’m yours so I’m not 
afraid for you – I have to choose who I hurt and I choose you because I’m yours” (78). 
 
4.5.2. Mimicry in the mise en abymes and outer play 
 
A reminder of mimesis, in the form of mimicry also infiltrates the lives of the characters, since 
the mise en abymes mimic the outer play and vice versa. The situation in “House of Cards” is, 
for example, duplicated twice, in Scene Three and Scene Nine, both of which should 
correspond to Scene One, according to the didascalia: “The disposition of furniture and doors 
makes the scene immediately reminiscent of the beginning of Scene 1” (35) and “It’s like the 
beginning of Scene 1 and Scene 3” (68). For the characters, the repetition of Scene One is, of 
course, not fictional, and therefore clearly sets Scene One (“House of Cards”) apart from 
Scene Three and Scene Nine (Özdemir, 2004:433). In contrast to “Max,” Max breaks down 
completely when confronted with Annie’s infidelity. Henry is more articulate than Max in 
Scene Nine, but much less stoic and collected than “Max.”  
 Apart from these, albeit confusing, juxtapositions of events in the mise en abymes and 
the outer play and the mimicry between the mise en abymes and the outer play, Stoppard also 
represents the liminal space between the outer play and the play within a play during Annie 
and Billy’s rehearsal of ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore in Scene Eight. They are kissing and 
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embracing, two acts which have to be actually performed to be represented on stage, 
according to States (1985). The scene, however, ends as follows: 
 
 ANNIE: O, you’re wanton! 
   Tell on’t you’re best; do. 
 BILLY: Thou wilt chide me, then. 
   Kiss me: - 
   (He kisses her lightly.) 
 ANNIE: (Quietly) Billy… 
   (She returns the kiss in earnest.) (67-68) 
  
Billy and Annie’s affair thus begins as a fictional romance which becomes real. Although 
Annie discouraged Billy’s advances when she sensed that they were no longer fictional in 
Scene Six, by Scene Eight the fictional has become a convenient excuse to indulge a real 
attraction. The affair also evolves from one that is simulated and suggested into a physical 
one, albeit off stage. 
 Distinguishing the authentic from the inauthentic, as well as the play within a play 
from the outer play, as a result becomes almost impossible. Although it is possible to 
distinguish the lives of the characters from the various plays-within-plays such as “House of 
Cards,” ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore, and Brodie’s play, as Delaney (1985:47) suggests, the 
shadowing and mimicry of the characters in these plays and each other inevitably blur any 
clear cut distinction. Stoppard’s play therefore does not assume “that reality exists, that life is 
meaningful, that the universe is not random or chaotic, that the difference between the real and 
the unreal, between the genuine and the artificial is knowable and that the real thing can be 
recognised” (Delaney, 1985:47). Hence this blurring of the distinction between mise en 
abymes and the outer play also extends to the actual world of the audience through Stoppard’s 
use of metatheatrical devices. 
  
4.6. Metatheatrical implications of the various mise en abymes in The Real Thing 
 
While the juxtaposition of various plays-within-plays and the outer play in The Real Thing 
might seem bewildering, it is, like all fiction, carefully controlled by the author. The first overt 
mise en abyme encountered in the text, “House of Cards,” parodies English realism and is 
reminiscent of the confrontation scene (Scene Five) in Betrayal, which Rusinko (1986:136) 
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also points out. As Esslin (1987) suggests, various critics have also compared “House of 
Cards,” – the first inner play – to The Real Thing, or outer play. For Zeifman (1983:140), 
“House of Cards” is unmistakably Stoppard in its allusiveness and pattern, comic devices, 
witty puns, elegant jokes, and comic misunderstandings. In other words Henry is, like 
Stoppard, witty, intellectual and clever. For these reasons, Özdemir (2004:432), regards 
“House of Cards” as more realistic than The Real Thing. For Özdemir (2004), the second 
scene, although supposedly more “real” within the context of the play, seems more artificial 
than the first, since the first is “artistically superior” on grounds of its dialogue. Özdemir 
(2004:433) therefore agrees with Zeifman (1983) when he claims that “House of Cards” 
contains the Stoppardian humour and word games the audience has come to expect from the 
dramatist. Through this juxtaposition of the mise en abyme and the outer play, the audience is 
led into a “Jamesian paradox,” by preferring the false to the real.  
Some critics, however, interpret “House of Cards” as unrealistic and very obviously 
artificial. For Hu (1989:205), as for Charlotte, “Max’s” reaction to his wife’s perceived 
adultery is nonchalant and “unrealistically devoid of emotion” – perhaps as an allusion to 
Robert’s stoic reaction to Emma’s deception in Betrayal. Andretta (1992:323) also agrees with 
Charlotte when she critiques “House of Cards” for failing to capture the authenticity and 
spontaneity of the actual world and describes “Max’s” dialogue and actions as “hardly 
credible.” This “sparklingly artificial fluency” in the dialogue of “House of Cards,” in the face 
of emotional disturbance, may alert the audience to the possibility that this is a parody or play 
within a play even before the metareference is explicitly exposed in the dialogue of Scene 
Two, as Smith (1987:105) aptly observes. Through parodying Betrayal, down to “Max’s” 
statement that he will not slap “Charlotte” since he “abhor[s] cliché” (14), “House of Cards” is 
a clear mise en abyme – although this is perhaps especially clear within the context of a 
postmodern study, as Limoges’ (2009) conditions for the perceptibility of metareference 
suggest.  
Furthermore, the interplay between these mise en abymes and the outer play “is often 
combined with a parodic appropriation of other works or genres” (Özdemir, 2004:417). As a 
result these extracompositional metareferences foreground the procedure of writing, or 
dramatise “the principle of iteration inherent in mimesis”, since the play “repeats literary 
history in repeating itself” (Boireau, 1997:136). The Real Thing, in consequence, becomes 
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“the mask that signals itself as a mask generating other masks” (Boireau, 1997:142). The 
intertexts in The Real Thing are numerous and mostly drawn from texts ranking high in the 
Western canon: Keats’ “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” (1816), Strindberg’s Miss 
Julie (1888), Ford’s ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore, Shakespeare’s Othello (1603), Noel Coward’s 
Private Lives (1930) and Henry James’ “The Real Thing” (1892).  
 Meyer (1989:114) points out how each intertext in Stoppard’s play serves to 
emphasise the main theme, the way in which words can be tied to human action. Miss Julie, 
for instance, investigates the “levels of discourse in language of sexual attraction,” while 
Othello explores the “role of language in the attractions and blindness of power,” and ’Tis Pity 
She’s a Whore connects the erotic and the political “in the convoluted language of palace 
intrigue.” The metareference in The Real Thing is therefore author-centred since it strengthens 
Stoppard’s treatment of the theme of language. 
 When Max and Annie’s cottage in Norfolk is alluded to in Scene Two, Stoppard 
acknowledges the reference to Noel Coward’s Private Lives in which the character Amanda 
remarks that Norfolk is “very flat” (1947:17), by causing Henry almost to trick Annie into 
saying “Norfolk is flat.” This, as well as having Max discovering Henry and Annie’s affair by 
finding Henry’s soiled handkerchief in his and Annie’s car – reminiscent of Desdemona’s 
scarf in Othello – underscores the fact that The Real Thing is positioned among various other 
texts about marital betrayal. These metareferences are thus also recipient-centred, since they 
rely on the audience to grasp the references to other texts. 
 As was the case with the comparisons between The Real Thing as outer play and 
“House of Cards” as inner play, the intertexts furthermore create accepted fictional texts with 
which one may compare the other levels of fictionality in the text (both the texts written by the 
characters, as well as the lives of the characters). Sammells (1988:139) regards these intertexts 
as flattering “the audience’s belief that it can distinguish between ‘good stuff and rubbish,’” 
and as therefore being recipient-centred. In addition he asserts that Stoppard uses these 
intertexts as a shield to hide behind: if his own art does not measure up to Ford, Strindberg, 
and Shakespeare, he can argue that it was intended as irony. Sammells (1988:139-140) 
consequently interprets the various plays-within-the-play as a lack of confidence by the author 
in his own work.  
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 Nonetheless I believe that the mise en abymes serve a different function, concurring 
with Zeifman (1983:147) who argues that an easy distinction between the “real” and 
“fictional” planes in the play is deceptive. Although the structural similarities between the 
“real” and “fictional” in The Real Thing appear to ironically emphasise “the disparity in 
emotional truth between theatre and life,” they, paradoxically, rather cloud the distinction 
between the real and the artificial than clarify it. Jenkins (1987:162) also emphasises a 
blurring, rather than sharpening, of the lines between the real and the actual in The Real 
Thing: “In mirroring scene against scene, Stoppard not only aims to point up the odd falsity of 
‘real’ life when compared with art’s convincing fable; but he also surveys a no man’s land 
between the two, where genuine and pictured feeling coalesce.” 
Although The Real Thing represents a situation where the fictional world (in the mise 
en abymes) imitates the actual world (or outer play) and vice versa, it remains a play. The 
fictional therefore actually imitates the fictional. Stoppard intimates the fictionality of the 
outer play in The Real Thing through its deus ex machina-like ending which can be interpreted 
as a covert metareference. Thomson (1987:547) considers the ending of The Real Thing as 
“theatrically self-referential to the point that it “verges on parody,” so that it is a fictio-
metareference intended to destabilise the illusion, to point to the fact that neither the fictional 
worlds in the mise en abymes or the outer play are actual. After Brodie has left in Scene 
Twelve, Annie declares that her affair is a thing of the past and the phone rings. Henry is then 
shown holding the following conversation with him: 
 
 (Suddenly relaxes.) Well, that’s fantastic Max! 
 (To ANNIE.) It’s your ex. He’s getting married. 
 (To phone.) Congratulations. Who is she? 
 (HENRY ferries this over to ANNIE with an expressive look, which she returns. 
 ANNIE moves to HENRY and embraces his shoulders from behind. She leans on him 
 tiredly while he deals with the phone.) 
 Oh, I think you’re very wise. To marry one actress is unfortunate, to marry two is 
 simply asking for it.  
 (ANNIE kisses him. He covers the mouthpiece with his hand.) 
 (To ANNIE.) You all right? 
 (She nods.) 
 (Into phone) Really? Across a crowded room, eh? (83) 
  
Henry impatiently finishes the phone conversation with Max while Annie switches off all the 
lights except for that coming from the bedroom. Still speaking to Max, Henry absentmindedly 
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switches on the radio which plays The Monkees’ “I’m a Believer,” which ends the play. Scene 
Twelve thus deploys the conventions of the romantic comedy in that the lovers are “out of the 
woods,” and their marriage renewed and strengthened by the rejection of the outsider, Brodie. 
Max’s engagement also ensures a happy ending for all the characters. Thomson (1987:547) 
continues: 
 
While Henry speaks to Max [at the very end of Scene Twelve], Stoppard’s overt use of 
the structural, verbal, and visual clichés of romantic comedy to emphasise the 
fundamental meaning, or reality, that they embody reaches its climax, creating a 
subtext which confirms that this is as real as theatrical representation can get. 
 
Although the perception is thereby created that the mise en abymes in the text are one step 
further removed from the actual world than the outer play, both possess the same ontological 
status. Stoppard is, above all, concerned with the conventions of stage adultery, and with 
emphasising the fact that it is fictional (Billington, 1987:147). 
 In addition he underscores the fictionality of The Real Thing by repeatedly teasing the 
audience in incidents that are almost metaleptic without actually breaking the fictional 
illusion. Özdemir (2004:432) points out that Stoppard creates ambiguity between fictionality 
and actuality in employing a realist method, unlike some of his plays such as The Real 
Inspector Hound which contain metalepsis. Instead, in The Real Thing, Stoppard uses a 
technique where he shows incidents which seem to be metaleptic, but then explains them 
immediately afterward. So, for example, the “pop record” which seems to be a bridge between 
Scene One and Scene Two, and therefore very definitely a theatrical device, turns out to be 
playing in Henry and Charlotte’s living room at the start of Scene Two. 
 Later in Scene Two, when Max asks after Debbie, Henry and Charlotte’s daughter, 
Charlotte replies: 
 
 CHARLOTTE: Who? 
 MAX:   Debbie. 
 CHARLOTTE: (Baffled.) Debbie? 
 MAX:   Your daughter. 
CHARLOTTE: Daughter? Daughter? Must be some mistake. No place for 
children. Smart talk, that’s the thing. Children are so unsmart. 
Before you know where you are, the chat is all about the price 
of sandals. Henry couldn’t do that. He doesn’t like research. 
(21) 
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While Charlotte is saying these words to criticise Henry’s play, “House of Cards,” her speech 
also mocks the convention of avoiding children, clocks and animals on stage (States, 
1985:377-378). It could refer to plays such as Peter Nichols’ Passion Play and Betrayal, 
within which The Real Thing has been situated and where the children are conveniently off 
stage. Just as Max conveniently cuts his finger off stage, Debbie also turns out to be seventeen 
when she is shown, and can therefore be represented by an adult actress. When Max refers to 
his and Annie’s marriage as an example of a childless one, “Lots of people don’t have 
children, in real life. Me and Annie…” (22) the statement is ironic since Max and Annie are 
also fictitious characters; this last statement can thus be taken to be covert intracompositional 
self-reference. 
Just as The Real Thing is the reality outside “House of Cards,” there is an actual world 
outside The Real Thing. Stoppard alludes to this by, for instance, borrowing the title of 
“House of Cards” from a film by John Guillermin and J. Arthur Rank, just as the title of The 
Real Thing was taken from James’ short story (Hu, 1989:213). The outer play and play within 
a play consequently also mimic each other in their author’s approach. This has led various 
critics to speculate on the autobiographical aspects of The Real Thing, as if Henry is 
Stoppard’s mouthpiece. 
As mentioned, Delaney (1985:50), Arndt (1997:490) and Teachout (2013) interpret 
Henry as voicing Stoppard’s own views on both art and infidelity, describing him as 
“Stoppard’s own fictional alter ego” (Teachout, 2013). Fleming (2001:176) identifies various 
similarities between Stoppard and Henry, such as that both are successful playwrights, 
intellectual rather than emotional, like fly-fishing and cricket, and like pop music while their 
wives try unsuccessfully to educate them in classical music.24  
It may, however, be more valid to regard Henry as “a sort of in-joke version of 
Stoppard-according-to-his-critics,” a possibility which Jenkins (1987:163) suggests. When 
Charlotte complains of the weak parts Henry writes for women, consisting of “drinks and 
                                                            
24 In an interview with Gussow (1995:89) Stoppard said: “I like music. I like pop music, certain kinds of jazz. 
There’s no music that I dislike, but there’s very little music I listen to with any degree of understanding or 
recognition. You know, Miriam [Stoppard’s wife at the time he wrote The Real Thing] is a great opera fan. I used 
to go to lots of operas with her. I would say, ‘Have I seen this one?’ ‘Of course you have.’ I would say ‘What did 
it look like?’ I’d remember them visually, not aurally. I’d remember the one that had a crosshatch design by 
David Hockney. I’m really a shameful object when it comes to ‘proper music.’” 
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feeds” (21), this does indeed resemble Findlater’s (in Page, 1986:70) criticism of The Real 
Thing and therefore becomes an unintended intracompositional self-reference: “Stoppard is 
still, it seems, unable to create a leading woman character who is a fully convincing human 
being, although he has shown on occasions that he can give good actresses interesting things 
to do and amusing lines to speak.” Fleming (2001:191-192) has also remarked that the 
criticism expressed by the characters in The Real Thing against “House of Cards,” that it 
contains lengthy, intricate and irrelevant speeches, unrealistic situations and linguistic 
craftsmanship to a fault, has also been used against Stoppard.  
Nonetheless, Thomson (1987:537), proposes that Stoppard should not be conflated 
with Henry, since, unlike Henry who struggles to “write love,” Stoppard has succeeded in 
doing so with The Real Thing. Corballis (1984:139) also remarks that Stoppard is much more 
involved in social causes (such as Charter 77) than Henry.  Stoppard (in Delaney, 1985:48) 
admits that he shares with Henry certain notions about writing, but resists the idea that the 
play is autobiographical. Elsewhere, Stoppard (in O’Connor, 1994:229) avers: 
 
Because The Real Thing had an English playwright editorialising about writing and 
love and marriage and all that, it was perfectly obvious that when he was waving his 
prejudices around, he was pretty much speaking for me. But then so are the people (in 
the play) who contradict him. That’s what playmaking is; you have to take 
everybody’s side. 
 
Therefore, although The Real Thing should not be interpreted as an autobiographical play, it 
does point to a reality outside itself. The Real Thing “as a commentary on something else in 
life affirms that the real thing in life, love, and art and its various verbal and written 
realizations are inseparable” (Meyer, 1989:112).  
 Since an audience is in attendance when The Real Thing is performed, the actual world 
outside the fictional world represented on stage is also present. As Kelly (2001b:11) points 
out, the audience is drawn into the dramatic process and needs to collaborate in order to create 
meaning. Amid the various theatrical ambushes in The Real Thing, Thomson (1987:538) 
suggests that the audience is encouraged, by the recipient-centred metareferential repetition of 
scenes and words, to compare and distinguish the mise en abymes from the outer play. 
Zeifman (1983:141) points out how the ambushes encountered by the audience are comic as 
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well as disconcerting, since these highlight the fact that it can never be sure when it is being 
conned. Therefore, its members experience the central debates in the play viscerally.  
 The confusion that they experience in Scene Two, when they need to fathom that 
Scene One was in fact a mise en abyme written by Henry, and thus have to re-examine their 
interpretation of that scene, points up how – as in Betrayal – a world can be created, or 
smashed, through words. In the second scene, the first scene “collapses like the house of cards 
Henry is building,” as Boireau (1997:138) puts it. The modality of this metareference, in that 
it is first encountered at the start of the play, should warn the audience to be prepared for 
repeated illusion breaking. Even so, Stoppard still manages to ambush the audience by setting 
up scenes that appear to be a mise en abyme yet turn out to be part of the outer play, adding to 
the levels of fictionality in the entire play.  
 For Özdemir (2004:417), this “complex manipulation of dramatic, linguistic and visual 
context and perspective” creates an interaction between the fictional and actual. This questions 
the demarcation between the “play” and “reality” since they are shown to fuse at times within 
The Real Thing. Stoppard’s drama therefore “deconstructs the mechanism of play as well as 
our own constructions of reality.” The implication of the games of ambush that Stoppard 
thereby plays with the audience is that their actual world is also inextricable from the fictional. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
Despite the criticism of Stoppard’s work in general as well as specifically of The Real Thing 
mentioned above, I do not consider this play to be conservative, emotionally cold, or weighed 
down by theoretical ideas. In The Real Thing, Stoppard utilises the form of the play as well as 
various debates between the characters to express interlinked ideas about authenticity, 
language, art, and theatre, which correspond with postmodern and poststructuralist theory in 
this regard, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. As was the case in Pinter’s Betrayal, 
Stoppard’s form encompasses the realist and the metatheatrical with ease. 
 The play, in other words, presents authenticity as something that cannot be established 
with certainty, although its inverse may be. This is illustrated through various debates in the 
play on the authenticity of writing, music appreciation, and political causes. Rather than 
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forcing any of these debates into a specific direction, Stoppard suspends them in a Chekhovian 
manner. 
 While it is, for example, possible to establish that Brodie’s writing is inferior, since it 
relies on insincere political ideals and is written in a naively clichéd way, it is not so easy to 
determine whether Henry’s, or for that matter Stoppard’s, writing is. Likewise, the 
relationship between Henry and Annie seems to be authentic and yet the reader or audience of 
the play can only speculate about this – it is never confirmed in the play itself. 
 The above debates are complicated by the way that Stoppard presents these characters 
to the audience. Every character represents, apart from him- or herself, some aspect of another 
character too. In this way, the characters become versions of each other. In the fictional world 
of The Real Thing, we can therefore agree with Nietzsche who perceives every identity as 
“haunted by a series of masks and simulacra” (Durham, 1998:11). 
 From Annie who wears the masks of her various roles as actress in her own life and is 
a less cynical version of Charlotte, to Henry’s carefully constructed public persona, it becomes 
difficult for the audience to distinguish between the characters and their masks. In the scenes 
between Billy and Annie, where their rehearsal of a mise en abyme becomes part of the outer 
play, a grey area between the fictional and the “actual” world of the characters is revealed. 
This situation is complicated by the fact that many facets of the play’s romantic relationships 
must be conveyed through body language and the chemistry between actors. Hence there are 
no clear cut answers to pin down the identity of the characters or their relationships with each 
other.  
 This is also the case with Stoppard’s presentation of the fictional worlds in his play. 
The mise en abymes mimic the outer play and vice versa, to the point that each scene carries 
the shadow of previous scenes. Consequently it also becomes difficult to distinguish scenes 
functioning on different fictional levels from each other. Furthermore, Stoppard does not 
reserve literary cliché for mise en abymes. By causing the last scene – which forms part of the 
outer play – to verge on the brink of parody in its depiction of Brodie and its deus ex machina-
like ending, Stoppard implies, firstly, that the audience should keep in mind that the outer play 
remains fictional, despite its representing the actual world of the characters. Secondly, he 
could also, paradoxically, be implying that actual and fictional worlds mimic each other 
continuously, and therefore that the actual world of the audience in some ways also mimics 
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fictional worlds, as a perplexing hall of mirrors. Stoppard remains, nonetheless, trapped in the 
fictional as he makes this point.  
 Although the audience is thus acutely aware of the fictionality of The Real Thing 
through the modality of the first overt metareference (the first mise en abyme, “House of 
Cards”), its members are pulled back into the fictional world(s) of the play since they share 
the characters’ inability to navigate through the various fictional levels in the play. The fact 
that many of the metareferences in The Real Thing also point outward to the actual world 
prompts the audience members to evaluate their actual world accordingly.  
 Although most of the metareference in this play is overt and explicit, it remains 
extracompositional for the most part. Through a mostly realist play that incorporates a 
proliferation of mimicking images, Stoppard consequently manages to pose self-reflexive 
questions about the line between the actual and the fictional.  
 Theatre is in this fashion demonstrated to be just one of many fictional media. In The 
Real Thing, Stoppard uses the medium as a convenient platform for the actual and the fictional 
to become blurred, with the implication that such muddling continues off stage. These 
concerns remained relevant to British audiences; Patrick Marber returned to them fifteen years 
later in his play, Closer, which is analysed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE CHARACTER AS MIRAGE  
IN PATRICK MARBER’S CLOSER 
 
 Being misrepresented is simply being presented with a version of ourselves – an invention – that we 
 cannot agree with. But we are daunted by other people making us up, by the number of people we seem 
 to be. We become frantic trying to keep the numbers down, trying to keep the true story of who we 
 really are in circulation. This, perhaps more than anything else, drives us into the arms of one special 
 partner. Monogamy is a way of getting the versions of ourselves down to a minimum. And, of course, a 
 way of convincing ourselves that some versions are truer than others – that some are special. – Adam 
 Phillips, Monogamy (1996)  
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
After two dramatists as notable as Harold Pinter and Tom Stoppard had associated the ideas of 
marital betrayal and the uncertainty of knowing, Patrick Marber also wrote on this topic. Set 
in the London of the 1990s, his version is, however, much more explicit, forming part of the 
in-yer-face aesthetic which was popular at the time. Marber’s characters attempt to navigate 
their romantic lives in a context that is presented as mediated, to the extent that the characters 
are not sure which versions of each other they can trust. They make use of different strategies 
to break through the artifice of mediation, without success. These characters remain spectres 
to each other, invented by their interlocutors, as Phillips (1996) suggests in the epigraph 
above. 
 In this chapter I shall investigate the theme of the body versus the mind, the use of 
mediation, the recycling and mimicry of surfaces, and the metatheatrical effect of Closer on 
the audience. 
 
5.2. Cool Britannia and the inspiration for Closer 
 
Patrick Marber is a London born playwright, actor and director. Like Pinter and Stoppard, he 
is also Jewish (Sierz, 2000:191). After his work as comic actor and writer in television shows 
such as “On the Hour” and “The Day Today,” Marber wrote his first play, Dealer’s Choice 
(1995), concerning the power relationships in an all-male poker game. He followed his second 
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play, Closer, with Howard Katz (2001), which deals with an actors’ agent’s failures and 
loneliness (Rebellato, 2005). His most recent play, Don Juan in Soho (2007) is a modern take 
on Moliere’s classic text. 
 Marber wrote Closer after visiting a lap dancing club while on tour in Atlanta with 
Dealer’s Choice. In Closer, he combines his exploration of the “extraordinary bacchanalian 
whirlpool of complex power relationships” in the sex industry with his desire to write a play 
“true to love” as he “and others felt it” (Marber in Sierz, 2000:191). Being written in a time 
when feminism and gender studies had already altered sexual politics to a great extent (Sierz, 
2000:191) and in a political climate in which sound bites were preferred to rigorous 
discussion, Closer is frank about sexual politics but concerned with trivial images 
(Karwowski, 2005:165). 
 Marber’s play, crude and shocking at times, is about four characters who continually 
betray each other with one another. The relationships between these characters break up and 
are patched back together repeatedly as they attract and repel each other like the balls on a 
Newton’s cradle – which is not only the image on the cover of the edition of the play that I 
studied – but also one of the props used in the play. Closer is structured in two acts, with six 
scenes each. Sierz (2000) and Rosenthal (2007) compare the structure to a dance. For 
Rosenthal (2007: xxvi), the elegant structure contrasts with the “rawness of the language and 
behaviour” of the characters in Closer, and lends the play its power. Sierz (2000:187) points 
out how the four characters are never in the same fictional space. The scenes are usually 
confrontations between two characters, which strengthen the interpretation of the play as a 
square dance. According to Marber (in Sierz, 2000:191), he wanted to “write about big ugly 
emotions contained within some formally beautiful structure: which makes it crueller.”  
 Closer has an episodic structure because Marber (in Rosenthal, 2007: xxv) wrote a 
commencement, development and conclusion for each scene, rather than for the play as a 
whole. Within this structure, the characters construct an image of each other in every scene, 
only to have it shattered in the next. These images are therefore arbitrarily constructed and 
compared to literary or photographic interpretations of identity. As the title in the comparative 
degree implies, the characters continually yearn to come closer to one another but are never 
able to reach the core identity of each other. 
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 The play opens with Dan and Alice, waiting to see a doctor after Alice has been run 
over. The exposition reveals that this occurred when the two characters, being complete 
strangers, made eye contact while walking in the streets of London just as Alice stepped in 
front of a taxi. They are instantly attracted to each other, although Dan is in a relationship with 
an off-stage character, Ruth. The second scene is set eighteen months later when Anna is to 
take Dan’s photograph for the dust jacket of the novel he wrote based on Alice’s life. We 
learn that Dan and Alice are now living together; Alice is a waitress, having given up her job 
as a stripper. However, Dan flirts with Anna. Alice arrives and asks Anna to take her portrait, 
sending Dan out to wait for her in a pub around the corner. She confronts Anna, having 
overheard the conversation between her and Dan. Just as Alice realises that Dan might pursue 
an affair with Anna, her photograph is taken.  
 Scene Three is set in an internet chat room. Dan and Larry, a dermatologist, are shown 
at their respective desks with a large screen above them. On this screen their online 
conversation is shown. The chat room in which this conversation takes place is called 
“LONDON FUCK” and Dan is seducing Larry by pretending to be Anna, or some 
pornography inspired version of her. He persuades Larry to meet “Anna” at the aquarium the 
next day, a place he knows Anna frequents, to play a prank on her. This backfires because 
Larry and Anna meet at the aquarium and, after realising that Dan has played a trick on them, 
hit it off.  
 By Scene Five, Larry and Anna are in a relationship; the four characters all attend the 
opening of Anna’s exhibition. The portrait that Anna took of Alice in Scene Two is on 
display. We first see Dan and Alice where Alice voices her fear that Dan is about to leave her. 
Dan then leaves for his father’s funeral, insisting on attending without Alice. Larry now 
appears on stage, and as he and Alice make small talk, she discovers that he is Anna’s 
boyfriend. After a mild flirtation between the two, they both exit separately while Dan and 
Anna enter. Dan does his best to persuade Anna to go with him to his father’s funeral. She 
resists his advances, although it is clear that there is a strong attraction between the characters.  
 Scene Six, set a year later, depicts the dissolution of Dan and Alice’s as well as Larry 
and Anna’s relationships. The stage is split in two, and all four characters are on stage for this 
scene, although not in the same fictional space. It becomes clear that Dan and Anna had been 
conducting an affair since the previous scene, despite the fact that Larry and Anna had 
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married each other. Scene Six ends where Alice leaves the flat she and Dan share without 
saying goodbye to Dan.  
 The second act starts in a lap dancing club where Alice is now working, again as a 
stripper. Larry has hired a private suite, where Alice strips for him. They flirt with each other, 
but Larry becomes frustrated with her when she tells him that her name is Jane Jones, and 
denies being called Alice. Scene Eight is set in a restaurant. We first observe Dan and Anna 
who meet there after Anna had met with Larry so that he could sign their divorce papers. 
When Dan leaves for the bathroom, the action of the play moves back in time as Larry enters, 
and the audience watches the meeting between him and Anna. He sets her an ultimatum for 
signing the divorce papers: he asks her to sleep with him one more time in return for his 
signature on the papers. Larry exits to go to the bar, as Dan re-enters, indicating another 
temporal shift. Anna confesses to having slept with Larry. Dan struggles to process this 
information, although they decide to remain together. The scene ends as Larry re-enters and 
signs the divorce papers.  
 One month later, in Scene Nine, Larry meets Alice at a museum and the audience 
learns that they are now in a relationship. Anna soon arrives and it is apparent that Alice had 
arranged this meeting. She leaves Larry and Anna alone. After Larry has departed, Alice and 
Anna discuss their relationships with the two men and Alice asks Anna to go back to Larry so 
that she and Dan can resume their relationship.  
 Scene Ten is again set one month later in Larry’s consulting rooms. Dan is begging 
him to leave Anna, presuming that she will then go back to him (Dan). After a confrontation 
between the two men, Larry reveals that he knows where Dan can find Alice and gives him 
the address of the lap dancing club where Alice works. In Scene Eleven, Alice and Dan are 
back together, about to depart on a vacation to celebrate their anniversary. Dan, however, 
continues to interrogate Alice about her relationship with Larry. She finally confesses to 
having slept with him, and declares that her relationship with Dan is now over. Dan slaps 
Alice across the face and the scene ends. The last scene is set six months later. Dan had asked 
Anna and Larry to meet him in Postman’s Park. Alice had died, having been hit by a car in 
New York and Dan is on his way there to identify her body. We learn that Alice’s real name 
was Jane Jones and that Anna and Larry are no longer together. Larry is dating a nurse named 
Polly and Anna is single. The play ends as each of the remaining characters go their own way.  
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Scene 
number 
Romantic links 
between 
characters 
Approximate 
time lapse 
Scene synopsis 
Act One 
Scene 1 Dan + Ruth 
Alice = single 
Larry = single 
Anna = separated 
-- Dan and Alice wait for a doctor at the 
hospital. Alice was run over by a taxicab 
and Dan brought her to the hospital. 
Scene 2 Dan + Alice 
Larry = single 
Anna = separated 
Eighteen 
months. 
Anna takes Dan’s photograph for the dust 
jacket of his novel. The characters are 
clearly attracted to each other. 
Scene 3 Dan + Alice 
Larry = single 
Anna = separated 
Six months. Dan and Larry interact in an internet chat 
room. Dan pretends to be Anna and 
arranges to meet Larry at an aquarium. 
Scene 4 Dan + Alice 
Larry = single 
Anna = separated 
One day. Larry and Anna meet at the aquarium. 
They are attracted to each other. 
Scene 5 Dan + Alice 
Larry + Anna 
Six months. The characters all attend the opening of 
Anna’s exhibition. A photograph of Alice 
which Anna took in Scene Two is 
exhibited. 
Scene 6 Dan + Alice 
Larry + Anna 
Dan + Anna (affair) 
One year. Dan and Anna end their respective 
relationships with Alice and Larry. Alice 
runs away. 
Act Two 
Scene 7 Dan + Anna 
Alice = single 
Larry = single 
Three months. Larry finds Alice in a lap dancing club. 
She strips for him and he tries to persuade 
her to go home with him. 
Scene 8 Dan + Anna 
Larry + Alice 
One month. Dan and Anna meet at a restaurant. A 
flashback shows how Anna and Larry met 
earlier at the same restaurant to sign their 
divorce papers. He persuades her to sleep 
with him in exchange for his signature. 
Scene 9 Dan + Anna 
Larry + Alice 
One month. Alice and Larry meet at a museum. Anna 
arrives and she and Larry discuss their 
respective relationships. Later Alice and 
Anna discuss Larry and Dan. 
Scene 10 Dan = single 
Alice = single 
Larry + Anna 
One month. Dan begs Larry to leave Anna. Larry gives 
Dan Alice’s work address and reveals that 
he had slept with her. 
Scene 11 Dan + Alice 
Larry + Anna 
One month. Dan and Alice are about to depart on a 
vacation. At Dan’s insistence, Alice 
confesses to have slept with Larry and 
ends their relationship. Dan slaps Alice 
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across the face. 
Scene 12 Larry + Polly 
Dan = single 
Anna = single 
Alice = dead 
Six months. The characters meet in Postman’s Park. 
Alice had died and Dan is on his way to 
New York to identify her body. Larry and 
Anna are divorced and Larry is dating a 
nurse named Polly. 
Figure 5: The sequence of events in Closer, showing the romantic links between characters, 
adapted from Rosenthal (2007: xxiv). 
 
 Closer therefore forms part of a discussion about infidelity, truth, and art, taking some 
of the concerns raised in Betrayal and The Real Thing further. Marber also cites his influences 
as Pinter, Mamet, Miller, and Stoppard (Sierz, 2000:190). Echoes of Mamet’s Sexual 
Perversity in Chicago are noted by some critics,25 while Sierz (2000:192) mentions the 
influence of Strindberg’s Miss Julie, a version of which Marber directed for BBC2, as well as 
The Real Thing, on his handling of jealousy and sexual betrayal in Closer. With regard to the 
impact of technology on sexuality, Marber was also influenced by Steven Soderbergh’s film 
Sex, lies and videotape (1989) (Rosenthal, 2007: xxi). 
 The most obvious influence on Closer is, however, Betrayal. Several critics have 
noticed the link between the two plays,26 both exploring the subject matter of love and deceit. 
Both plays are set in middle-class London, and consist of an episodic scene structure skipping 
months or years at a time (Shaw, 2008:112). Closer’s last scene, in which ex-lovers meet 
months after their relationships have ended, is reminiscent of Betrayal’s first, while its last 
scene, in which two characters are on the brink of an affair, reminds one of Betrayal’s last 
(Rosenthal, 2007: xxvii). In addition, Closer’s Scene Eight, which is set in a restaurant shortly 
after Anna has betrayed Dan, is reminiscent of Betrayal’s restaurant scene (Scene Seven) 
(Shaw, 2008:112).27 For Shaw (2008:119), the strongest link between the plays is, however, 
the way in which neither Marber nor Pinter consider their characters as having stable 
identities. Pinter’s characters “never reach a state of completion,” whereas Marber’s remain 
constructed, partially fictional, and unstable. For Macaulay (1997:675), the rhythm of the 
                                                            
25 See Benedict (1997), Sierz (2000) and Rosenthal (2007). 
26 See Edwardes (1998), Benedict (1997) and Macaulay (1997). 
27 Since Marber played the role of Robert in Betrayal in a university production, this is no coincidence (Shaw, 
2008:115). 
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dialogue, as well as the exposure of layers of guilt and complicity in Closer, reminds him of 
Betrayal.  
 Yet, being written almost two decades after Betrayal, Closer also departs significantly 
from Pinter’s play. Unlike Betrayal, Closer contains shocking language and sexual situations. 
According to Shaw (2008:6), it is more “sexy” and “glittering.” Closer is therefore a 
rejuvenation of Pinter’s original subject matter, adapted for a cynical audience, and constitutes 
part of various discourses in the politics, popular culture and arts scene of the 1990s. 
 Like the Angry Young Men of Pinter’s age, the playwrights of Marber’s generation 
also stood on the threshold between one era and a next (Shaw, 2008:4). In the mid-1990s, 
London was considered the urban capital of cool. Under the governance of Tony Blair and 
New Labour, Britain was managed as a brand, shaking off its image as “a backwards-looking 
island of stodgy tea parties and frumpy monarchs” (Urban, 2004:356). Cool Britannia was a 
cultural renaissance focused on promoting certain “lifestyles” and “creative industries.” Its 
most important exports in visual art, music and fashion were the works of Damien Hirst, the 
“Brit-pop” music of Oasis, Blur, and the Spice Girls, and the designs of Alexander McQueen 
(Urban, 2004:355).  
 In the field of theatre there emerged what Kenyan (in Urban, 2004:354) – agent and 
mentor to playwrights Sarah Kane and Mark Ravenhill – refers to as “an historical moment.” 
She alludes to the 1990s as “a time of fragmentation” and “complete uncertainty.” As a result, 
a sensibility, later to be known as in-yer-face theatre, developed. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the younger audiences of this theatre did not want a clear answer or thesis play when 
attending a performance. They were cynical and hardened (Shaw, 2008:99) and in 
consequence resonated with the sensibility of this form of theatre, known for its aggressive, 
confrontational and provocative style (Law, 2011:254).  
 As stated above, in-yer-face theatre depicts sexual relationships with unprecedented 
frankness (Sierz, 2000:205). Despite the notions of Girl Power, post feminism and “ladettes,” 
popular in the 1990s, the relationships between men and women were represented as 
problematic (Sierz, 2000:178). According to Sierz (2000:179), “the sex act was often seen less 
as an exploration of liberating eroticism than of a desperate attempt to communicate.” Within 
the aloofness of Cool Britannia, a nervousness exists.  
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 As mentioned in Chapter Two, the explicitly violent scenes of in-yer-face theatre 
therefore ripple the smooth surface of the hip cultural renaissance in Britain, while being 
inextricably part of it. Closer, with its unvarnished look at sexual relationships, clearly fits the 
bill of the in-yer-face sensibility and, together with Sarah Kane’s Blasted (1995), Mark 
Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking (1996) and Jez Butterworth’s Mojo (1995), forms part of a 
group of plays that have been canonised (Sierz, 2000:245). 
 According to Marber (in Rosenthal, 2007: xxiii), he “stole” the title of his play from 
the English rock band, Joy Division’s, album “Closer” (1980). Exploring issues of truth, trust, 
and betrayal, the album’s title was also “the best possible title for the play because the play is 
always aspiring to get closer to some kind of definitive truth about things but knows it can’t.” 
In addition, the play’s title also evokes the industrial rock band, Nine Inch Nails’, song 
“Closer” (1994), which contemplates isolation and dark, sexual obsession. The song caused 
controversy, not only because of its explicit lyrics, but also due to the disturbing images in its 
music video.  
 Falling within these uncomfortable discourses of desperation and sexual betrayal, it 
follows that Closer was received with mixed reviews. As mentioned in Chapter One, Dominic 
Dromgoole (2000:194) regards Closer as highly entertaining, but “not art.” His strongest point 
of critique is the bleak outlook on relationships that the play suggests. Gross (1997:675) 
criticises the play for being a soap opera with unbelievable characters. According to Benedict 
(1997:674) the audience loses faith in the characters as they repeatedly swap partners. 
 However, De Jongh (1998:418) describes Closer as “far more disturbing and raw than” 
a mere “blow by blow comedy of sexual exchange” while Spencer (1998:419) views it as 
technically and emotionally mature. Despite the above mentioned claims that Closer is 
unconvincing, Gore-Langton (1998:418) regards Marber’s greatest strength as a playwright as 
his ability to depict the dissolution of romantic relationships in “hellishly truthful detail.” For 
Macaulay (1998:420), the play is, simultaneously, naturalistically contemporary in its 
references to technology and vocabulary and “far from naturalistic” in the way that it is 
polished, witty and rhythmic.  
 According to De Jongh (1998:418) and Butler (1997:676) Closer is concerned with the 
“drama of truth-telling.” Butler (1997:677) declares that “in Marber’s fierce play, the desire 
for truth and intimacy appears to be as strong and reckless as the desire for sex.” Gore-
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Langton (1998:418), Macaulay (1998), Benedict (1997), Brown (1997), and Butler (1997) all 
interpret the play’s central theme as loneliness, isolation, and the fact that communication is 
unable to breach this divide. Macaulay (1998:420) points out how the play “charts some of the 
most ambiguous areas of emotional dependence and independence, and of the human need 
both to be known and to be knowable.” The contradictory need for both privacy and intimacy 
therefore causes an unresolvable conflict. Brown (1997:674) explains that “no matter how 
close love ties you to someone else, our lives, especially our love lives – are lived alone.”  
 There exists a gap, according to Benedict (1997:674), between “what the characters 
are saying and what they actually mean,” thereby contributing to their eternal isolation. Unlike 
Pinter’s characters who protect themselves at all costs, these characters never cease to stop 
trying to break out of their isolation through language, leading to great discomfort for 
themselves as well as the audience.  
 Most critics thus agree that watching Closer is an intensely uncomfortable experience. 
It is a play to which audiences react, in Gross’ (1998:419) words, “very strongly.” According 
to Marlowe (1998:420), audiences “wince in recognition” of Closer’s portrayal of romantic 
and sexual experiences. Chunn (1998:422) recounts the anecdote of an audience member who 
had to be removed from the auditorium by a sympathetic friend due to her uncontrollably loud 
sobbing.  
 The strong reaction to the play is, however, evoked not by nudity or “simulated sex, 
but something much stronger: language, raw, obscene, shocking, like a kick in the groin or a 
spit in the face” (Spencer, 1998:419), illustrating De Kock’s (2008) notion that a verbal insult 
can be experienced like a blow in the guts. Nathan (1998:418) describes Closer’s dialogue as 
“full frontal language likely to shock the shockable.” 
 In discussing these features and elements of soap opera, shock-factors, isolation, and 
deception Brown (1997:674) identifies the main themes of the play as the unreliability of 
surfaces, the relationship between truth and lies, as well as the soul and the body. Of the 
binary pairs that Sierz (2000:6) lists (discussed in Chapter Two) which in-yer-face theatre 
generally challenges, the binary pairs of the real versus the unreal and art versus life resonate 
most strongly with Closer. Hence I shall begin my discussion with an investigation of how the 
binary of the body versus the mind is compared to the real versus the unreal in this play. 
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5.3. The body versus the mind 
 
The dialectic between the body and the mind is probably most clearly illustrated through the 
occupations of the characters in Closer. Anna is a photographer while Dan is an obituarist and 
a failed novelist. Larry, on the other hand, is a dermatologist; Alice is a stripper. Although 
Anna and Dan are in more intellectual occupations than the more practical Larry and Alice, 
Rosenthal (2007: xl) points out how all four of the characters have only superficial contact 
with their subjects, patients, or customers.  
 Larry seems to be the most practical character, having described himself as “A 
FUCKING CAVEMAN” (61). He is a doctor of the skin, or the “human surface,” as 
Rosenthal (2007: xli) refers to it. Both in his working day and in his sex life he is concerned 
with the body, or the “flesh.” Alice, on the other hand, uses her body, or “flesh” to enact what 
she perceives to be a basic male sexual fantasy for clients who visit a lap dancing club for a 
few hours a night. Dan is only concerned with a few key details with which to summarise a 
person’s life when writing obituaries, but as a failed novelist, he places a high premium on the 
intellectual and convinces Anna that Larry will bore her, being too superficial to understand 
her artistic occupation (44). However, Anna is also preoccupied with appearances in her work 
as a photographer; as Rosenthal (2007:xli) puts it, she “takes pictures of strangers whom she 
need never meet again – the photographic equivalent of one-night stands.” It is clear that Anna 
prefers to work this way, since she titles the portrait that she takes of Alice anonymously as 
“Young woman, London,” although she knows Alice. 
 Although it might be tempting to judge the characters as superficial in their negation of 
their “authentic selves,” Closer illustrates that it is not as easy as it may seem to draw a line 
between the body and the mind, as the locus of a character’s authentic self. Anna, for 
example, regards emotional attachment as being more authentic than physical interaction. 
When Dan confronts her about having slept with Larry in return for his signature on the 
divorce papers, she denies that this necessarily affects her relationship with Dan: 
 
 ANNA: Dan, I did what he wanted and now he will leave us alone. 
   I love you, I didn’t give him anything. 
 DAN:  Your body? 
   DAN reaches for his cigarettes. 
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 ANNA: If Alice came to you… desperate… with all that love still between you 
   and she said she needed you to want her so that she could get over you, 
   you would do it. I wouldn’t like it either but I would forgive you  
   because it’s… a mercy fuck – a sympathy fuck. Moral rape, everyone 
   does it. It’s… kindness. 
   […] 
 ANNA: It was only sex. (77-79) 
 
Anna therefore does her best to separate the bodily from the emotional and sees the body as 
something that can be commodified and given away in an act of kindness, which leaves the 
giver unaffected. For her, the emotional is therefore the locus of authenticity. Nevertheless 
Dan cannot accept Anna’s explanation, so that this argument eventually ends their 
relationship. 
Larry, with his practical outlook on life, on the other hand, perceives the body as 
central to a romantic relationship. As a doctor, it could be argued, Larry interprets an event as 
“real” when it manifests in the body. In Scene Ten, Dan comes to Larry’s consultation room 
and confronts him about the way he had manipulated Anna into having sex with him: 
 
 DAN:  You’re an animal. 
 LARRY: Yes. What are you? 
 DAN:  You think love is simple? You think the heart is like a diagram? 
 LARRY: Ever seen a human heart? It looks like a fist wrapped in blood. GO  
   FUCK YOURSELF… you WRITER. You LIAR. Go check a few facts 
   while I get my hands dirty. 
 DAN:  She hates your hands. She hates your simplicity. (94) 
 
Larry is clearly prejudiced against Dan’s ephemeral concerns as a novelist. His bias is based 
on the nature/culture divide between medicine and writing as occupations. He thinks that Dan 
unnecessarily complicates things and sees writing as dishonest. 
 Despite Larry’s scorn of the intellectual as inauthentic, he is not necessarily 
superficial, since his preoccupation with the body sometimes leads him “to probe as deeply as 
a psychiatrist” (Rosenthal, 2007: xli). This is illustrated when Larry confronts Dan about his 
treatment of Alice and explains that he thinks that the scar on Alice’s leg, discussed in greater 
detail below, is the result of a self-inflicted wound. He tells Dan: “You were so busy feeling 
your grand artistic ‘feelings’ you couldn’t see what was in front of you. The girl is fragile and 
tender. She didn’t want to be put in a book, she wanted to be loved” (95). He is therefore “also 
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concerned with the innermost workings of the human heart and mind” because “the source of 
skin diseases may be hidden far beneath the surface,” as Rosenthal (2007: xli) points out.  
 In Scene Seven, when Larry encounters Alice at the lap dancing club, he also disputes 
the idea that the body can be commodified, reminiscent of Henry’s views in The Real Thing. 
When Alice tells Larry that the lap dancing club’s policy prescribes that the customer must 
pay the stripper, Larry replies: 
 
 LARRY: And what do we get in return? 
 ALICE: We’re nice to you. 
 LARRY: ‘And We Get To See You Naked.’ 
 ALICE: It’s beautiful. 
 LARRY: Except… you think you haven’t given us anything of yourselves. 
   You think because you don’t love us or desire us or even like us you 
   think you’ve won.  
 ALICE: It’s not a war. 
   LARRY laughs for some time. 
 LARRY: But you do give us something of yourselves: you give us… imagery… 
   and we do with that what we will. (71-72) 
 
Stripping is consequently, as Rosenthal (2007: xlii) suggests, not simply an “enjoyable 
empowering means to an end for Alice […], with no negative side effects on plain Jane 
Jones’s more vulnerable personality,” a point to which I shall return.  
 As discussed above, for Bakhtin (in Hitchcock, 1998:92) the body isolates individuals 
from each other. It is impossible ever to physically feel another’s pain; as a result we are all 
confined to our own bodies. Closer illustrates this, in Scene Three. When convincing Larry to 
meet “Anna” at the aquarium, Dan types: “We liv as we dream,ALONE” (29).28 This idea is 
once more emphasised when it becomes clear that Anna perceives arousal and sexual 
gratification as intensely personal, not even completely shared with an intimate partner. When 
Dan wants to know if Anna has ever faked an orgasm with him, she replies: “Occasionally…  
I have faked it. / It’s not important, you don’t make me come. I come… you’re… ‘in the 
area’… providing valiant assistance” (78). Only Anna can ever know if she has reached a 
sexual climax and although she can fake this for Dan’s benefit, she cannot fake it for her own. 
A clear line can, in other words, be drawn between a real orgasm and a fake one, which seems 
to suggest that the body is, after all, the locus of authenticity in human relationships.  
                                                            
28 Since the dialogue in Scene Three is not spoken, but projected on a screen in order to simulate an exchange in 
a virtual chat room, the text includes typos and informal abbreviations. 
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 Real arousal can, however, follow a fake stimulus. In Scene Three, Larry becomes 
aroused by Dan’s fictitious portrayal of “Anna.” When Anna tells Larry that Dan was behind 
the internet prank, Larry protests, on the grounds of his arousal:  
 
 LARRY: No, I was talking to a woman. 
 ANNA: How do you know? 
 LARRY: Because… believe me, she was a woman, I got a huge… She was a 
   woman. (33) 
 
Although a character may experience certainty about whether he or she is aroused or not, 
arousal cannot testify to the authenticity, or gender, of its source. Marber suspends this debate 
throughout the play; as a result the audience never receives an answer to the question of 
whether the body or the mind is the locus of what constitutes a character’s authentic identity, 
despite the different ways the characters argue for one side or the other.  
 There is, however, a different level on which the body, and its ability to be wounded or 
scarred, can be interpreted as the locus of existence. When Larry boasts that he would be able 
to beat Dan in a fist fight, “If it came to it” (46), he yet again reveals his bias towards nature 
rather than culture. Dan might be cleverer than him, or a better intellectual match for Anna, 
but, according to Larry, the fact that he would be able to physically overpower Dan more than 
compensates for this. Ironically, it is Dan who crosses the boundary of physical violence when 
he slaps Alice across the face in Scene Eleven. 
 This event foreshadows Alice’s death, which irrefutably ends her life. Although the 
body cannot conclusively be demonstrated to be the locus of a person’s identity, he or she 
ceases to exist if his or her body expires. In Scene One Marber repeatedly refers to death and 
mortality. The scene is set in a hospital, where various references are made to smoking as well 
as the fact that Dan’s mother died of some disease related to her smoking. Dan’s occupation as 
an obituarist also evokes death, as do the carcasses that are unloaded at the meat market where 
Alice had been going before she was hit by a taxi. By ending the play with Alice’s death, 
Marber therefore fulfils a suggestion which is raised in Scene One. 
 The body is thus, although not the locus of a person’s identity, integral to it. However, 
Larry’s bias against writing, on the basis that it is less “real,” should be investigated. 
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5.4. Mediation failing as authentic representation of the actual world 
 
5.4.1. Calling a spade a spade 
 
In the characters’ attempts to navigate to an imagined core “reality,” or “real thing,” they 
approach different ways of mediation as bringing them either closer to or further from this 
“reality.” The brutal vocabulary, used by Larry especially, is one of the ways in which Closer 
attempts to break through artifice. In line with Maturana (in De Kock, 2008:92), Sierz 
(2000:7) points out how “words often seem to cause more offence than the acts to which they 
refer,” since “humans are language animals.” Certain taboo words cause offence only because 
they are assigned that power by convention. According to Sierz (2000:30), those which cause 
the strongest offence are “cunt,” “motherfucker,” and “fuck,” ample examples of which may 
be found in Closer.  
 Larry interprets the discomfort that these words cause as proof of their authenticity. He 
does not shy away from them and uses them to uncover explicit details about Dan and Anna’s 
sex life. When Anna confesses to her affair with Dan in Scene Six, Larry demands to know 
the detail of this affair in the most non-euphemistic terms possible: 
 
  
 LARRY: Did you come? 
 ANNA: Why are you doing this? 
 LARRY: Because I want to know. 
   Beat. 
 ANNA: (softly) Yes… I came. 
 LARRY: How many times? 
 ANNA: Twice. 
 LARRY: How? 
 ANNA: First he went down on me and then we fucked.  
   Beat. 
 LARRY: Who was where?  
 ANNA: (tough) I was on top and then he fucked me from behind.  
 LARRY: And that’s when you came the second time? 
 ANNA: Why is the sex so important? 
 LARRY: BECAUSE I’M A FUCKING CAVEMAN. (60-61)  
 
When Larry discovers that he had been deceived by Anna, he demands these explicit details 
for three reasons. Firstly, he wants to humiliate her by confronting her with these intimate 
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details of her life. Secondly, this enables Larry to break the bond between Dan and Anna 
because he now shares in the knowledge of their intimate moments. This becomes evident 
again when Larry refers to some of the most secret details of Dan and Anna’s relationship to 
convince Dan that Anna does not love him any longer and that he should give up on her: 
 
 LARRY: Listen… I’ve spent the whole week talking about you. 
    
   Anna tells me you fucked her with your eyes closed. 
   She tells me you wake in the night, crying for your dead mother. 
  
   You mummy’s boy. 
  
   Shall we stop this? 
 
   It’s over. Accept it. (94) 
 
Knowledge, in this sense, becomes a weapon. The more Larry knows about Dan’s relationship 
with Anna, the more armour he acquires to use against Dan.  
 Thirdly, Larry aims to uncover the truth about Anna’s affair. For Sierz (2000:193), 
Larry’s insistence on graphic details is driven by his desire to know the truth as well as to 
“provoke Anna and go beyond the guilty politeness of her responses.” In Scene Nine, when 
trying to convince Anna to go back to Larry, Alice similarly provokes her until she explodes 
with “JUST FUCKING STOP IT” (88), at which Alice replies: “Now we’re talking” (88).  
 Both Alice and Larry thus consider crude language and explicit detail as conduits of 
authenticity, in a way reminiscent of Artaud’s theatre of cruelty, since Larry thanks Anna at 
the end of Scene Six for her honesty when she complies in recounting the detail of her sex life 
with Dan: 
 
 LARRY: THAT’s the spirit. Thank you. Thank you for your honesty. 
   Now fuck off and die. You fucked-up slag. (61) 
 
Larry indubitably uses the term “honesty” here with a hint of irony. Anna is honest in 
recounting the detail of acts about which she deceived Larry. Despite Larry’s insistence on 
honesty being expressed in clear, direct terms, he also uses his rough vocabulary in a distinctly 
creative way. He may not be a writer like Dan, but Larry is fond of alliterating crude 
suggestions such as “fancy a friendly poke?” (50), or “we christen the patient’s bed with our 
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final fuck” (76), making these catchy. This indicates how it becomes very difficult to regard 
some ways of speaking as more authentic since these are supposedly unstylised. Both Larry 
and Dan use poetic devices in their speech, whether their speech can be permitted in polite 
conversation or not.  
 
5.4.2. The narrative in memory 
 
While Larry aims for brutal honesty in the way he mediates his and the other characters’ acts 
and desires, Dan and Alice – like the characters in Betrayal – story themselves into being, or 
repeatedly recount and narrate key events in their relationship. As in Betrayal, the audience is 
not given direct access to the moment in which Dan and Alice met, but the incident is 
recounted by the characters throughout the play. This first occurs in Scene One, where the 
account functions not only to establish the characters’ intentions towards one another, but also 
as exposition in informing the audience of the events preceding the first scene: 
 
 ALICE: Thank you for scraping me off the road. 
 DAN:  My pleasure. 
 ALICE: You knight. 
   DAN looks at her. 
 DAN:  You damsel. 
   Why didn’t you look? 
 ALICE: I never look where I’m going. 
 DAN:  We stood at the lights, I looked into your eyes and then you… stepped 
   into the road. 
 ALICE: Then what? 
 DAN:  You were lying on the ground, you focused on me, you said, ‘Hallo, 
   stranger.’ 
 ALICE: What a slut. 
 DAN:  I noticed your leg was cut. 
 ALICE: Did you notice my legs? 
 DAN:  Quite possibly. 
 ALICE: Then what? 
 DAN:  The cabbie got out. He crossed himself. He said, ‘Thank fuck, I thought 
   I’d killed her.’ I said, ‘Let’s get her to a hospital.’ He hesitated… (I 
   think he thought there’d be paperwork and he’d be held ‘responsible’), 
   so I said, with a slight sneer, ‘Please, just drop us at the hospital.’ 
 ALICE: Show me the sneer. 
   DAN considers then sneers. (7-8) 
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It is clear that Dan has a way with words – he knows how to recount the events in an 
entertaining manner – a point which I shall return to below. By using terms such as “knight” 
and “damsel,” both Alice and Dan compare and liken their meeting to an old fashioned fairy 
tale. They mediate their circumstances and make sense of them in so doing. 
 It is interesting to note how Dan and Alice carefully consider which words best 
describe their meeting: 
 
 DAN:  You were murmuring, ‘I’m very sorry for all the inconvenience.’ I had 
   my arm around you… your head was on my shoulder. 
 ALICE: Was my head… lolling? 
 DAN:  That’s exactly what it was doing. (8) 
 
Dan and Alice therefore carefully construct “their” story and use it to strengthen their 
relationship and prove their commitment to each other. In Scene Eleven, for example, they 
quiz each other on the details of this story and/or the memory of their meeting: 
 
 DAN:  What was on my sandwiches? 
 ALICE: Tuna. 
 DAN:  What colour was my apple? 
 ALICE: Green. 
 DAN:  It was red. 
 ALICE: It was green and it was horrible. 
 DAN:  What were your first words to me? 
 ALICE: ‘Hallo, Stranger.’ 
 DAN:  What a slut. 
   Beat. 
 ALICE: Where had I been? 
 DAN:  ‘Clubbing’, then the meat market and then… the buried river. 
   Beat. 
 ALICE: The what? 
 DAN:  You went to Blackfriars Bridge to see where the Fleet river comes  
   out… the swimming pig… all that. 
 ALICE: You’ve lost the plot, Grandad. (101) 
 
This extract not only illustrates how Dan and Alice have made the recounting of their first 
meeting a game, to reinvigorate their commitment to each other, but also constitutes the first 
sign that all is not well in their relationship. Dan confuses the detail of his first meeting with 
Alice with his first meeting with Anna, who told him that the building which now houses her 
studio was built over a river, the estuary of which can still be seen from Blackfriars Bridge. 
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This is an easy mistake for him to make, since Alice had been walking from Blackfriars 
Bridge when she was hit by the taxi, but this confusion also points to Dan’s ambivalence 
towards his relationship with Alice.  
 In Scene Twelve, Dan again mistakes a conversation that he had held with Alice to 
have been with Anna: 
 
 DAN:  This is where we sat. 
 ANNA: Who? 
 DAN:  Me and my father, didn’t I tell you? 
 ANNA: No, wrong girl, you told Alice. (113) 
 
Anna correctly guesses that Dan shared with Alice the memory of the day his mother died and 
is confusing the latter with Anna. Anna’s slightly cynical correction of this detail also 
expresses her disillusionment with Dan and his inability to fully commit himself.  
 Although Alice eagerly engages in the retelling of the story of herself and Dan, there 
are points in the play when she is also uncomfortable with its retelling. In Scene Eleven they 
talk about the day that Dan found Alice, using Larry’s directions, in the lap dancing club: 
 
 ALICE: Loads of men came to the club. You came to the club. The look on your 
   face. 
 DAN:  The look on your face. 
   What a face. What a wig. 
   He gazes at her. 
   I love your face… I saw this face… this… vision. 
   And then you stepped into the road. 
   It was the moment of my life. 
 ALICE: This is the moment of your life. 
 DAN:  You were perfect. 
 ALICE: I still am. (104) 
 
In this extract, Dan and Alice are heading towards an argument which the audience can 
assume has been recurring in their relationship ever since Dan found Alice in the club where 
Larry said she would be. Dan already knows that Alice had slept with Larry after the latter 
came to the club, but Alice, not knowing that Larry had told Dan, still denies it at this point in 
the play. Alice realises that Dan has idealised the moment that he first saw her, and that his 
recollection of this idealised version of her significantly steers him away from their argument.  
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 She recognises that Dan had constructed an image of her in his mind, a mask which 
she cannot live up to. She does not, however, realise that she had done the same with him. In 
Scene Nine, Alice tells Anna that she had fallen in love with Dan because he cut the crusts off 
his sandwich: “I looked in his briefcase and I found this… sandwich… and I thought, ‘I will 
give all my love to this charming man who cuts off his crusts’” (89). Yet, in the final moments 
of the play, Dan reveals that his crust-less sandwich was a coincidence: “She told me that she 
fell in love with me because… I cut off my crusts… but it was just… it was only that day… 
because the bread… broke in my hands” (114). 
 Larry also misconstrues the facts about Dan available to him. When he sees Dan for 
the first time in Scene Five, Larry tells Anna: 
 
 LARRY: […] 
   He’s taller than his photo. 
 ANNA: The photo’s a head shot. 
 LARRY: Yeah, I know, but his head implied a short body… but in fact, his head 
   is… deceptive. 
 ANNA: Deceptive? 
 LARRY: Yes, because he’s actually got a long body. He’s a stringy fucker.  
 (45-46) 
 
Although Larry’s perception of Dan as short functions mostly as a joke, revealing Larry’s 
jealousy, it points to the manner in which characters construct images of each other based on 
arbitrary details. Dan’s perception of Anna as independent and, more specifically, not 
dependent on him is exposed to the audience as false. In Scene Six, Dan alludes to Anna’s 
independence as the reason he prefers her to Alice:  
 
 ALICE: Is it because she’s clever? 
 DAN:  No, it’s because… she doesn’t need me. (51) 
 
Yet, later in this same scene, when Larry questions Anna as to why she is leaving him for 
Dan, she replies: “I need him” (57). It is, however, unclear if Dan ever realises this, or if Anna 
knows that her independence is one of the reasons that Dan loved her.  
 Hence, while Larry’s seemingly straightforward vocabulary takes on a poetic turn, the 
narratives that Dan and Alice use to confirm their relationship, their intimacy, and their 
closeness to each other, are shown to be capricious. Language and communication do not, in 
fact, act as a conduit between the characters. However, the instances when the characters use 
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communication to consciously distance themselves from others turn out to be equally 
confusing. 
 
5.4.3. Written and visual media  
 
The internet – still somewhat novel to the average person in the 1990s – was a truly 
revolutionary technological advancement enabling completely anonymous social contact 
between people in the form of chat rooms. The anonymity of this medium has interesting 
paradoxical consequences. On the one hand it is a forum for deception – dramatised when Dan 
impersonates Anna in his chat with Larry. His impersonation is, as Shaw (2008:130) points 
out, a very obvious constructed copy, or mimicry, of Anna, adapted to be the “Sexual Ideal 
Woman,” or as Rosenthal (2007:xliv) puts it, “a porno version of Anna.”  
 On the other hand, the internet is, as Anna puts it, “the first great democratic medium” 
(34). Its anonymity presents the opportunity for strangers to be unusually frank with each 
other. In Closer, it offers Larry and Dan the chance to express their greatest sexual fantasies. 
For Sierz (2000:193), the honesty of this scene, is however, ironic since the truth is told in a 
deceptive context, because Dan is impersonating Anna. The internet thus brings the characters 
both closer to and further from an intimate connection with another human being. Although 
Larry is aroused by his encounter with Dan in the virtual chat room, the stimulus of this 
arousal turns out to be counterfeit – as discussed above.  
 But not only the technologically advanced media are unreliable. Dan is quite open 
about the fact that he is rather creative in the way he represents people when writing their 
obituaries. When describing his day to day duties as an obituarist to Alice, he confesses to 
using euphemisms to account for aspects of people’s lives that they would have preferred to 
stay private, referring to this as “polishing the prose.” 
 
 DAN:  ‘He was a convivial fellow,’ meaning he was an alcoholic. 
   ‘He valued his privacy’ – gay. 
   ‘He enjoyed his privacy’… raging queen. (10) 
 
Apart from subtly alluding to any addictions or hidden sexual orientations, these euphemisms 
also collapse a person’s entire life into a single paragraph – or even one word. This becomes 
clear when Alice asks Dan what her euphemism would be, and he replies “disarming,” while 
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his own is – at that point in the play – “reserved” (11). As these references to obituary writing 
make clear, while a paragraph with a few key facts about a person – albeit in some kind of 
code – may pay homage to a person, it is also a limited oversimplification.  
 Yet, the more artistic medium of the novel also fails in matching the expression plane 
to the content plane, since Dan’s novel about Alice proves to be no less distorting than an 
average obituary. When Anna learns in scene two that Dan’s novel is based on an actual 
person, she jokes that Dan had stolen Alice’s life to gain status as a novelist. Just as Alice 
resists Dan’s idealisation of her, she also rejects his novel about her life as an unsatisfactory 
mimicry, sharing Plato’s distrust of imitations. Alice and Larry discuss Dan’s novel in Scene 
Five, where Alice’s scepticism about its likeness to her actual life is clear: 
 
 LARRY: It’s about you, isn’t it? 
 ALICE: Some of me. 
 LARRY: Oh? What did he leave out? 
   Beat. 
 ALICE: The truth. (39-40) 
 
Shaw (2008:130) emphasises that Dan’s novel, “The Aquarium,” is his own creation, or 
version of Alice – just as his version of Anna in the internet chat room was his own construct.  
 However, as was noticed in the narratives that characters construct for themselves 
about their relationships, the play also suggests that interpretations and versions of people and 
events are as close as we can come to actual people and events. As Nietzsche (1998:83) 
theorises, these characters do not have access to the subjects or objects that they perceive, but 
only to their own perceptions. Dan’s novel is a commercial and critical failure and although 
this is not necessarily testimony to its merits, he summarises the significance of its reception 
aptly when he tells Anna: “It’s perceived to be [a failure], therefore it is” (42). Perception, no 
matter how skewed it may be, remains the closest one can come to actuality.  
 Dan is, however, not the only character to create an artistic version of Alice. Anna’s 
photographic portrait of her plays an equally central role in the play and is equally scrutinised 
by Alice. Just like Dan, Anna uses Alice’s image to build her career and make money. The 
well-known belief in some cultures that a photographer steals the soul of his or her subject is 
repeatedly evoked in Closer. In Scene Two when Dan is flirting with Alice, he jokes that 
Anna does so – as she joked that he stole Alice’s life with his novel. When Alice enters, she 
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also refers to this belief by asking Anna if she had stolen Dan’s soul, before requesting Anna 
to take her own portrait.  
 This photograph is significant since it is shot at the moment when Alice realises that 
Dan’s interest in her is waning and he might pursue Anna:  
 
 ALICE: […] 
   She stares at ANNA. 
   When he let me in… downstairs, he had… this… ‘look’. 
   I just listened to your… conversation. 
   Silence. 
 ANNA: I don’t know what to say. 
 ALICE: (gently) Take my picture. 
   Pause. 
 ANNA: I’m not a thief, Alice. 
   She looks down the lens. 
   Head up… 
   Alice raises her head, she is in tears. 
 ANNA: You look beautiful. Turn to me… 
   She takes her shots. They look at each other. 
   Good. 
   Blackout. (24-25) 
 
Although the resulting photograph is poignant, Alice still rejects the idea that it represents 
some version of her, just as René Magritte proclaimed that “this is not a pipe” (Kleiner, 
Mamiya & Tansey, 2001:1040). When Dan and Alice look at the portrait that Anna took of 
her at Anna’s exhibition in Scene Five, the following exchange takes place: 
 
 DAN:  Cheers. 
   She turns. They drink. DAN admires the photo. 
   You’re the belle of the bullshit. You look beautiful.  
 ALICE: I’m here. (35-36) 
 
Just as Alice rejects Dan’s idealisation of her, she also dismisses this poignant image of her. 
She elaborates on her reasons for her disdain of art as representing reality while talking to 
Larry later in this scene. When Larry asks Alice what she thinks of the exhibition, her answer 
provides a key to how she views the distinction between life and art: 
 
 ALICE: It’s a lie. 
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   It’s a bunch of sad strangers photographed beautifully and all the rich 
   fuckers who appreciate art say it’s beautiful because that’s what they 
   want to see.  
   But the people in the photos are sad and alone but the pictures make the 
   world seem beautiful. 
   So, the exhibition is reassuring, which makes it a lie, and everyone  
   loves a Big Fat Lie. (38) 
 
Having her own portrait as part of the exhibition, Alice can talk from experience when she 
proclaims that the pictures artistically gloss over real human pain. She notices a distinct 
difference between her actual life and artistic representations of it, interpreting the latter not 
only as unsatisfactory but a blatant lie, used to placate the wealthy into ignorance. 
 Just as Larry argues that he looks “like a criminal in photos” (35), Alice also rejects 
Anna’s portrait as a valid representation of her. Mimesis cannot, after all, replicate an exact 
copy. It necessarily differs from that which it mimics (Melberg, 1995). Nonetheless, Larry 
repeatedly refers to Alice either as her portrait or vice versa. In Scene Six, Larry informs 
Anna: “Hey, guess what, Alice was at the Paramount Hotel” (53), when he returns from a 
business trip to New York. Both Anna and the audience at first surmise that Larry encountered 
Alice in New York. Larry reveals that he is referring to Anna’s portrait of Alice, though, when 
he takes from his pocket a postcard with the photo printed on it. Later, upon meeting Alice at 
a museum in Scene Nine, Larry addresses her as “Young Woman, London” (82).  
 
5.4.4. Performative media 
 
Despite Alice’s (and Larry’s) scorn about artistic illusions, she cannot escape being 
interpreted either through Dan’s novel or Anna’s photograph of her. Yet, in her occupation as 
a stripper Alice also participates in the creation of illusions of herself. She does not resist the 
version of herself as a stripper, possibly because she considers it as a blatant lie which will not 
easily be mistaken for the truth. Stripping implies obvious dishonesty, as Alice admits when 
she explains to Dan in Scene One why she is an “exceptional” stripper: she knows “what men 
want” (14). Alice has a clear notion of this desire and enacts this when she strips.  
 However, it becomes evident in Scene Seven, when Larry visits a lap dancing club and 
finds Alice working there, that the strippers in the club are not merely selling a lie to 
customers, who willingly purchase it, but use these lies to protect themselves. As was noted 
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above when Larry points out how problematic it is to commodify the body, Alice (along with 
the other strippers in the club) utilises costumes, or “armour,” as he refers to it, to hide behind. 
He regards the fact that Alice asks him a question as a “chink” in her “armour” (66). When 
she protests that she is not wearing any armour, alluding to the fact that he can see her naked, 
he insists that she is, since she refuses to acknowledge that she does know him. When Larry 
questions the stage name she uses as a stripper, “Jane Jones,” Alice denies having any other 
name.  
 He interprets Alice’s aloof behaviour and alternative name as a protective mask, 
explaining to her: “All the girls in this hellhole; the pneumatic robots, the coked-up baby dolls 
– and you’re no different – you all use ‘stage names’ to con yourselves you’re someone else 
so that you don’t feel ashamed when you show your cunts and arseholes to Complete Fucking 
Strangers” (69). Larry, in other words, perceives Alice’s persona as a stripper to be a mask she 
wears, different from who she actually is, and begs her to talk to him “in real life,” telling her, 
“I know who you are.”  
 Nonetheless, here Larry disregards his own observation about Alice, in Scene Five, 
that she only seems open because “That’s how she wants to seem” (46). It is revealed later in 
the play that Alice, the character who appears most honest, reverses the moral code to which 
she apparently subscribes by having taken on a false identity. Alice’s name is indeed Jane 
Jones. The binary which Larry draws between Alice’s true identity and her persona as Jane 
Jones, the stripper, is thereby confused. In a manner similar to Dan, who expresses his sexual 
fantasies about Anna in the deceptive medium of an internet chat room, Alice is only honest 
about her true identity when she is in the deceptive milieu of a lap dancing club. Rosenthal 
(2007: xxxv-xxxvi) regards this as answering the central question asked negatively in the play: 
 
 The irony underpinning Alice’s truthfulness and rigid moral code is that the superficial 
 definition of her identity – her name – is an invention: Alice Ayres was really plain 
 Jane Jones after all. This final revelation of Alice’s ‘identity fraud’ presents the play’s 
 most negative response to Marber’s question: ‘Can you ever fully know someone 
 else?’ If you can share your life with a woman for years and not even know her real 
 name, then the answer must be ‘no.’  
 
Yet, for Karwowski (2005:166), Alice takes on a different persona to escape “humanity’s 
abiding susceptibility to illusion,” and in so doing resists giving in to artifice. Nonetheless, 
this disregards the fact that her persona is in itself an illusion, as Shaw (2008:134) argues: “we 
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discover that ‘Alice’ has been an act, a work of theatre herself, a life lived in quotation marks, 
and not just because of her stripper persona.” As Shaw (2008:134-135) aptly points out, 
Alice’s very obvious constructed identity points to the fact that all of the relationships in the 
play are constructed. Dan’s off-stage ex-girlfriend, Ruth, is revealed in the last scene of the 
play to have married a Spanish poet she met while translating his poems. Dan says that she 
“fell in love with a collection of poems” (114). Like Ruth, all of the characters have fallen in 
love with an image they created themselves.  
 
5.4.5. Love versus honesty 
 
It is perhaps because of this that the two men in the play place such a high premium on 
honesty, holding on to the comforting idea that it might, after all, be possible to know who 
another character actually is. Although Dan deceives Alice for a year about his affair with 
Anna, he does admit that it is cruel to do so when he eventually reveals the truth: “Deception 
is brutal, I’m not pretending otherwise” (52). In Scene Eleven, it is he who is demanding the 
truth about her relationship with Larry from Alice, telling her: “I just want the truth” (105); 
when she asks him why this is the case, he replies: “Because I’m addicted to it. Because 
without it we’re animals. Trust me, I love you” (105). Like Larry, Dan accordingly perceives 
Alice’s reluctance to confide in him about her relationship with Larry as self-protection.  
 Apart from wishing to hear the intimate details of Anna and Dan’s affair, and his 
insistence that Alice reveal her true identity to him, Larry is also shown to be vulnerable in his 
search for honesty. In the lap dancing club, he wants Alice to tell him if she desires him, and 
prefers to realise that she does not, to the lie that she does. When he confesses to Anna that he 
had been unfaithful to her with a sex worker in New York and she wonders why he did not 
keep this a secret, the following exchange occurs: 
 
 ANNA: Why did you tell me? 
 LARRY: I couldn’t lie to you. 
 ANNA: Why not? 
 LARRY: Because I love you. (56) 
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For Larry there remains a correlation between love and honesty, even if he uses honesty for 
other ends later in the same scene. But complete honesty is impossible, since language – just 
like artistic renderings of people – falls short in expressing actuality.  
 It is therefore not surprising that Alice dismisses language as easily as she does Anna’s 
photographs. When she is leaving Dan in Scene Eleven and he tries to persuade her to stay, 
she voices her scepticism at his words: 
 
 DAN:  I love you. 
 ALICE: Where? 
 DAN:  What? 
 ALICE: Show me. Where is this ‘love’? 
   I can’t see it, I can’t touch it, I can’t feel it. 
   I can hear it, I can hear some words but I can’t do anything with your 
   easy words. (107) 
 
For Alice, there is evidently a gap between Dan’s words and his true emotions towards her. 
When Alice finally confesses that she did sleep with Larry, Dan, infuriated because she had 
lied to him, asks her “WHO ARE YOU” (108). Both characters are therefore frustrated by 
their inability to know each other, language being a screen that obscures the truth rather than 
revealing it, as in Betrayal.  
 Bramwell (1999) points out how, in Closer, truth and honesty do not lead to intimacy, 
but rather recrimination and revenge, asserting that the title is ironic. Karwowski (2005:166) 
aptly summarises the lack of intimacy as follows: “For Closer does not refer to any emotional 
warmth that may or may not be felt by the characters in the course of their seesaw attractions. 
In fact, it is a reference to a proximity to reality, in this case, to the reality of personal 
relationships.”  
 Even when the characters perceive themselves as experiencing an authentic bond with 
each other, language still fails them. Dan, who supposedly has the best command of language 
of the characters, struggles to express himself when he tries to convince Anna to accompany 
him to his father’s funeral. When Anna expresses her sympathy that Dan’s father had passed 
away, he replies: 
 
 DAN:  It’s fine, I hated him – no, I didn’t – I don’t care, I care about THIS. 
   Come with me, spend a weekend with me, then decide. 
 ANNA: I don’t want to go to your father’s funeral. 
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   There’s nothing to… decide. 
   What about Alice? 
 DAN:  She’ll survive. 
 
   I can’t be her father any more.  
 
   Anna, you want to believe he’s… ‘the one’… it’s not real, you’re  
   scared of this. 
 ANNA: There is no ‘this.’ I love him. (44) 
 
When Dan is confronted by an emotion that he experiences as authentic, he cannot express it 
in language more specific than the word “this.” A little while later, Dan acknowledges this in 
a line reminiscent of the last scene of Betrayal: “All the language is old, there are no new 
words… I love you” (44). The recycling of language is additionally emphasised in Closer  by 
the way in which the characters are aware of the fact that they are using language as if in 
quotation marks, indicated in the text by single inverted commas. When Anna, for example, 
confesses to her affair with Dan, she tells Larry: “I’m… ‘sorry’…” (77). The characters also 
sometimes quote themselves, as Alice does when she leaves Dan in Scene Eleven. After 
recounting the manner in which she had left her previous lover, with the words “‘I don’t love 
you any more, goodbye’” (13) in Scene One, Alice quotes herself again in Scene Eleven, only, 
this time, directing the words to Dan.  
 The way that the characters mimic and recycle their own and other’s language is 
emulated in the manner Marber recycles and mimics various other images in Closer. 
 
5.5. Recycling and mimicry of various images in Closer 
 
As Aristotle (in Potolsky, 2006:37) suggests, mimicry is inherently ingrained in human 
existence. This is illustrated by the behaviour of the characters in Closer. Throughout the play, 
Marber emphasises a scar on Alice’s leg. It is fittingly noticed first by Larry, the 
dermatologist. In Scene One, while Dan and Alice are waiting for a doctor to tend to Alice, 
Larry walks by and draws the audience’s attention to the scar. Alice’s explanation for it at the 
time is simply the words: “In America. A truck” (11). In Scene Five, when Larry sees Alice at 
Anna’s exhibition, he asks about the scar again. This time Alice claims, “A mafia hit man 
broke my leg” (41), but Larry replies, in earnest, that the scar does not look like the result of a 
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break, but rather the result of a wound caused by something like a knife. Alice immediately 
offers the explanation that it was the result of a car crash she and her parents were involved in, 
which they did not survive.  
 Larry is, not surprisingly, much more interested in the scar than Dan. In fact, Alice 
informs Anna in Scene Nine that “Larry’s mad about” her scar and “licks it like a dog” (90). 
When Dan comes to Larry’s surgery to confront him about how the latter had lured Anna back 
to him, it is, on the contrary, Larry who confronts Dan about Alice. While Dan also offers the 
explanation of a car crash, Larry provides his own explanation: 
 
 There’s a condition called ‘dermatitis artefacta’. It’s a mental disorder manifested in 
 the skin. The patient manufactures his or her very own skin disease. They pour bleach 
 on themselves, gouge their skin, inject themselves with their own piss, sometimes their 
 own shit. They create their own disease with the same diabolical attention to detail as 
 the artist or the lover. It looks ‘real’ but its source is the deluded self. (95) 
 
In other words, Larry interprets Alice’s scar as a mimicry of a “real” scar. It is interesting that 
he compares the process followed by the sufferer who has “dermatitis artefacta” to that 
employed by an artist or a lover. At this point Larry’s disdain of the arts is already clear to the 
audience as well as Dan; hence his use of the word “diabolical” to describe the process. 
However, in his explanation of this condition he not only compares a love relationship to a 
work of art, but also implies that there is a level of artifice or deceit in both. Just as Jane Jones 
created the persona, Alice Ayres, she likewise created her scar, according to Larry. Yet he also 
concedes that although this scar is manufactured, its source is the disturbed self, as he has 
mentioned.  
 When Dan confronts Alice about her scar in Scene Eleven, she offers yet another 
explanation for it: that she fell off her bicycle because she “refused to use stabilisers” (103), 
denying that the wound that caused the scar was self-inflicted. Although Marber (in 
Rosenthal, 2007: lii) supports Alice’s explanation that she did fall off her bicycle, there is no 
substantiation for either of these accounts in the text. According to Sierz (2000:193-194), the 
different explanations given for Alice’s scar suggest “both the endless mutability of the stories 
we tell about ourselves and the emotional scars we carry.” Therefore these explanations point 
to the instability of identity, while simultaneously alluding to Nietzsche’s (in Durham, 1998:7) 
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notion of the role of mimicry in the construction of identity, by means of Larry’s hypothesis 
that Alice created the wound herself.  
 While Alice’s possible use of mimicry is rooted in emotional trauma, Dan’s is rooted 
in conformity. Within the first two pages of the play, it becomes clear that Dan prefers to fall 
back on social convention when unsure what to do. He asks Alice if he should put her leg up, 
and when she asks why he wants to do so, he answers: “That’s what people do in these 
situations” (6). According to Rosenthal (2007: xxxiii), Dan is clearly one of these “people.” 
His complacency is underscored by his preceding revelation that he had grown up in suburbia 
and his shocked response at learning Alice’s occupation. According to her, his “little eyes” 
were “popping out” as if he was “a cartoon” (13).  
 Dan, clearly a conformist to the point of parody, therefore borrows and fictionalises 
Alice’s identity to write his novel, “using her wealth of life experiences to make up for the 
poverty of his own,” according to Rosenthal (2007: xxxiii). However, he also borrows her 
“‘disarming’ sexual confidence” not only when making advances to Anna (Rosenthal, 2007: 
xxxiii), but also when he is seducing Larry in the internet chat room. The line with which Dan 
finally persuades Larry to meet “Anna” at the aquarium, “I’ll make u cum like a train” (29) is 
the same one Alice used to describe the ultimate male fantasy to Dan in Scene One. The line is 
also “recycled” from Mamet’s Sexual Perversity in Chicago. Marber (in Sierz, 2000:193) 
furthermore wanted Closer to be an update of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (1602) where 
Viola pretends to be a boy, with whom Olivia then falls in love by having Larry fall “in lust” 
with Dan’s impersonation of a woman.  
 Even when Dan is at his least complacent and slaps Alice across the face in Scene 
Eleven on hearing that she did have sex with Larry, his action is clichéd. It is this precise 
action that “Max” refuses to perform in “House of Cards,” exactly because it would be too 
banal to slap “Charlotte” when he suspects her of cheating on him. Alice is therefore 
prompted to ask Dan, “Do you have a single original thought in your head?” (108) before the 
blackout that ends the scene. 
 Larry, despite his reluctance to rise in status, continually reminding Anna of his 
working class origins, also emulates the middle class in dress and address once he begins 
dating Anna. Rosenthal (2007: xxxviii) points out that “just as Alice changes Dan, so Anna 
takes Larry up the social scale in how he dresses and where he lives. If he’s sleeping with an 
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acclaimed photographer, it’s more natural to trade up to private practice, to become a ‘sell-
out.’”  
 At Anna’s exhibition, Larry wears a new cashmere sweater and claims that he is 
“Cinderella at the ball” (46) since he had never worn this material previously. He is not 
entirely comfortable in the middle class setting of a photography exhibition. The sweater that 
Anna had bought him therefore remains a costume, in his view, and without qualms he gives it 
to Alice when they are in a relationship in Scene Nine.   
 Anna, on the other hand, also seems uncomfortable in London, preferring to roam the 
city guided by a book. On three occasions she is seen with a guide book: when she visits the 
aquarium at London Zoo in Scene Four, at the Victorian Museum in Scene Nine and in 
Postman’s Park in Scene Twelve. Larry mocks her about this at the Victorian Museum: “You 
love your guide books, you look like a tourist” (86). The theme of tourism is interesting in the 
context of Closer, since it implies a neat or convenient “packaging” of a certain place or time 
for sightseers. Chaudhuri (1995:170) describes it as a “fraudulent mode of engaging otherness 
by reinscribing its terms of sameness.” In other words, tourism aims to downplay cultural 
difference which cannot be branded as exotic and is therefore regarded as corrupt and 
insincere, a palatable mimicry suited to a paying tourist’s taste. 
 The Victorian Museum that the audience views in Scene Nine is therefore a simplified 
mediation, or mimicry, of actual Victorian life. Chaudhuri (1995:120) points out how exhibits 
that are found in museums belong either to a different time or to a different place. As a 
consequence the museum offers a simplified mimicry of that which has become inaccessible 
since it belongs to a different time. It is interesting, though, that Anna – who is not a tourist – 
uses guide books to try and understand her history and environment. Marber could be 
suggesting that she feels so daunted by her surroundings, experiencing them as inaccessible, 
that she needs a tourist’s guide to navigate through them.  
 Unlike Anna, who attempts to comprehend her inaccessible environment, albeit in a 
superficial manner, Larry resists understanding his surroundings and especially the way in 
which London was changing in the 1990s. While meeting Anna at the restaurant in Scene 
Eight to sign their divorce papers, he voices his dissatisfaction with the recycling and mimicry 
of the spaces in his city, complaining about Anna’s choice of restaurant: 
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 LARRY: I hate this place. 
 ANNA: At least it’s central. 
 LARRY: I hate central. The centre of London is a theme park. I hate ‘retro’ and I 
   hate the future. Where does that leave me? (75) 
 
According to Rosenthal (2007:lvi), a theme park, like a landmark repackaged in a tourist 
friendly way, “tries to offer all things to all people and none of its zones is real, so to Larry the 
city itself has no true identity.” Larry’s frustration with Anna’s deceit is now vented on the 
city which is no longer the London of his youth but mimics other places and eras.  
 The lap dancing club that Larry visits in Scene Seven is also – like Anna’s studio 
which used to be a refuge for fallen women – a recycled space. Larry remarks that the lap 
dancing club used to be a punk club that he had frequented twenty years earlier. But he cannot 
remember where the stage used to be, and gives up trying to guess, stating that “Everything is 
a Version of Something Else” (63). A punk club’s becoming a lap dancing club is, of course, 
ironic. Punk, being a subculture which wished to resist the imitation of mainstream culture, 
has now been converted into a lap dancing club: a place known for its imitation of that which 
is desirable.  
 According to Rosenthal (2007: lv) Marber consciously intended the setting of the play 
to mimic the deceit of the characters: 
 
 Thematically, the changing face of the capital in the mid-1990s preoccupied Marber, 
 as he explained to Nicholas Wright in a Platform Talk at the Cottesloe in May 1997, a 
 week after Closer had opened. ‘There are a lot of deceptions in the play. The 
 characters constantly lie to each other, deceive each other,’ he said. ‘I wanted the 
 backdrop, the city itself, to be in some way as deceptive as the characters, so that the 
 London of the play is not everything it seems.’ This image of an older, rougher 
 London transformed by 1990s money builds steadily through the play. 
 
Unlike Larry who gives his cashmere sweater away and gives up private practice, London 
does not resist the economic change of the 1990s, even if it is superficial and dishonest.  
 It is within this confusing environment where the characters are surrounded by 
Baudrillard’s (1994) postmodern simulacra without originals that the characters try to navigate 
not only their careers, but also their love lives. In Closer, even more so than in The Real 
Thing, it becomes impossible to tell which relationship is “the real thing.” 
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5.6. Metatheatrical implications of form and metareference 
 
The question of art, its authenticity, and its value recurs throughout Closer in various covert 
metatheatrical techniques. While Anna and Dan should obviously place a high value on art 
due to their occupations, they do tease each other when they first meet in Scene Two that the 
other is “stealing” the “lives” (17) of his or her subject(s). Despite Alice’s repetition of this 
joke when she asks Anna “Did you steal his soul?” (22), when she meets Dan at the studio, 
she and Larry hold very cynical views on art. 
 Alice regards art as representing life in an aesthetically improved way, idealising its 
subject, which then compares poorly to it. Larry’s views about Dan’s occupation have been 
discussed above, while his reluctance to be photographed because he looks “like a criminal in 
photos” (35) makes it clear that he also considers art as deceitful: a poor, distorted copy of 
reality. These views, being contained within a play, then beg, as critical metareferences, the 
audience members to consider if they agree with them or not. And if they do – what are the 
implications for Closer as a play? Is it also a poor, distorted representation of the actual 
world? 
 In considering these questions it is important to keep in mind that Closer is an in-yer-
face play. One of the aims of such theatre is to break through the fourth wall of representation. 
And yet, in-yer-face theatre inevitably and paradoxically questions the conventions of theatre 
as it does this, a point discussed in Chapter Two. According to Sierz (2000:4), this theatre 
questions moral norms and “affronts the ruling ideas of what can or should be shown 
onstage.” Therefore “it also taps into more primitive feelings, smashing taboos, mentioning 
the forbidden, creating discomfort” (Sierz, 2000:4).  
 It consequently exploits the live quality of theatre which creates heightened awareness, 
increasing the potential of embarrassment which “can make the representation of private pain 
on a public stage almost unendurable” (Sierz, 2000:7). As is the case with The Real Thing, the 
chemistry between the actors also adds a further layer to Closer. Rosenthal (2007: xc) 
describes the potential of performance in Closer as follows: 
 
 In a good stage production [the space between the words] will be constantly animated, 
 and at t imes electrified, by the body language and expressions of the actors, which, in 
 conjunction with the dialogue, ensure that the audience senses what the characters are 
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 thinking and feeling from moment to moment. […] The intensification [of certain 
 scenes] is conveyed as much by how the actors fill the gaps between the lines as by the 
 words themselves. 
 
The corporeality of the actors’ bodies and the energy between the actors may therefore add to 
the audience’s discomfort, as Hornby (1986) suggests.  Judging from the reviews of Closer 
cited above, the play did make audiences uncomfortable and embarrassed by staging taboos 
and divulging the most intimate details of its characters’ lives in the most unflattering and 
unadorned manner. Although the visceral experience of discomfort and mortification that the 
audience feels is authentic, the play simultaneously reminds its audience that it represents a 
manufactured fictional world. Closer thereby also draws the audience into the fictional world 
while simultaneously shoving them out of it, as Hutcheon (1984) argues is usually the case 
with metafiction. 
 The fictionality of Closer is underscored by three instances of covert metareference in 
the play. The audience may not always perceive these metareferences, but they do function as 
fictio-metareferences in destabilising the illusion of the play by reminding the audience of its 
fictionality. The first is encountered in Scene One (also quoted above), when Dan recounts to 
Alice – who was unconscious at the time – how she was hit by a taxi and what happened 
afterwards: 
 
 DAN:  We stood at the lights, I looked into your eyes and then you… stepped 
   into the road. 
 ALICE: Then what? 
 DAN:  You were lying on the ground, you focused on me, you said, ‘Hallo, 
   stranger.’ 
 ALICE: What a slut. 
 […] 
 ALICE: Then what? 
 DAN:  The cabbie got out. He crossed himself. He said, ‘Thank fuck, I thought 
   I’d killed her.’ I said, ‘Let’s get her to a hospital.’ He hesitated… (I 
   think he thought there’d be paperwork and he’d be held ‘responsible’), 
   so I said, with a slight sneer, ‘Please, just drop us at the hospital.’ 
 ALICE: Show me the sneer. 
   DAN considers then sneers. 
 ALICE: Very good. Buster. 
 DAN:  We put you in the cab and came here. 
 ALICE: What was I doing? 
 DAN:  You were murmuring, ‘I’m very sorry for all the inconvenience.’ I had 
   my arm round you… your head was on my shoulder. 
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 ALICE: Was my head… lolling? 
 DAN:  That’s exactly what it was doing. (7-8) 
 
The way that Dan re-enacts the events of the accident is a reminder of Brecht’s (1968:86) 
suggestion that the actor should act with detachment, as an eyewitness recounting an accident 
that he or she saw. Dan’s impersonation of both Alice and the taxi driver, along with Alice’s 
interjections and evaluation of Dan’s “performance”, emphasise the distance between Dan and 
the events that he is re-enacting. As was the case with the plays-within-the-play in The Real 
Thing, this draws attention to the fact that Dan and Alice are also portrayed by actors as well 
as to the further point that there is a distance between these characters and the actors who 
portray them. This idea is emphasised when these events are retold in subsequent scenes as if 
perpetually rehearsed, like theatre which has no original or final product, according to Blau (in 
Carlson, 2004:149-150). 
 The second metareference is observed in Scene Two, when Dan and Anna discuss a 
novel about love and sex while they are characters in a play about love and sex, functioning as 
transmedial metareference: 
 
 DAN:  You didn’t find it obscene? 
 ANNA: What? 
 DAN:  The book. 
 ANNA: No, I thought it was… accurate. 
   Shot. 
 DAN:  About what? 
 ANNA: About sex. About love. (18) 
 
This exchange within the fictional world of the play points outward towards the actual world 
of the audience, which is watching a play about love and sex. Its members might respond that 
the play is obscene – especially later in Anna’s explicit descriptions of sex – or they may feel 
that it is an accurate representation of love and sex. 
 Scene Five starts with the third, quite blatant, transmedial metareference in Closer, 
opening with Alice “looking at a huge photograph of herself” (35). The audience is thus 
looking at Alice, framed within the metaphorical proscenium arch, viewing a photograph of 
herself. This emphasises the act of looking and, causing the audience to scrutinise that which 
is looked at, again invites its members to consider if they find Closer to be a polished lie, 
making “the world seem beautiful” (38). 
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 Marber furthermore uses various distinctly theatrical devices, showing the author’s 
hand in the play. The play’s elegant structure, discussed above, makes it clear that the events 
as the audience sees them are carefully manipulated by the author, as was the case in Betrayal. 
Subtle repetitions within the structure, such as the situation of two strangers meeting and 
feeling an instant attraction to each other, repeated in Scenes One, Two, Four and Seven, 
emphasise the theme of mimicry in the play. This structure, with months elapsing between 
scenes, only portrays the beginnings and ends of the characters’ relationships. According to 
Rosenthal (2007: xliii), the “honeymoon periods” of these relationships mostly occur off-
stage, leaving the audience with only the brutal confrontations of love relationships turned 
sour. The result is that an impression emerges “of an apparently unbridgeable gulf between 
male and female attitudes to love and sex.”  
 The lack of emotional connection between the characters is further emphasised by the 
quick tempo of the play, which, according to Sierz (2000:195), “frequently touches intimacy,” 
but “never really lingers.” The ample moments of comic relief in the play function as a further 
distancing device, while they give the play its rhythm and exciting tension (Sierz, 2000:194-
195).  
 The metareference in this play is thus recipient-centred, with its audience left in a 
strange position. On the one hand it is viscerally drawn into the action of the play by the 
latter’s frankness and breaking of taboos. On the other hand, it is continually reminded of the 
fictionality of the play through various theatrical devices. The play poses a few uncomfortable 
questions, not only about love and sex, but also about how the audience perceives the play and 
whether any version of events can ever be trusted to be authentic – or the original. Despite 
Karwowski’s (2005:169) view, that Closer supports Alice’s argument about love being a 
choice, I agree with Sierz (2000:194) that the audience is never given an answer about the 
irrationality of desire. Closer resists a binary categorisation of its characters into right and 
wrong. Alice’s frankness and openness, which contrasts so sharply with her false identity,  
affords the clearest indication of this. 
 
  
174 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Despite Dromgoole’s (2000) limited evaluation of Closer, I have demonstrated that it 
investigates epistemological issues regarding authenticity in a fashion comparable to Pinter’s 
Betrayal and Stoppard’s The Real Thing. Closer sets out to dismantle the binary oppositions 
between the real and the unreal, art and life, and high art and low art. Like Betrayal and The 
Real Thing, Closer depicts authenticity as something elusive. In a manner similar to that of 
Stoppard, Marber sets up various debates about the locus of authenticity between the 
characters, but leaves them suspended. Although the body might seem to be the locus of what 
is real in that it is inextricably linked to a character’s emotional life, the body can also be 
manipulated. Though Alice’s scar is proof that she suffered a wound, this could also have 
been inflicted by her, with the aim of mimicking a different wound.  
Furthermore, Bakhtin (in Hitchcock, 1998:92) argues that we are also isolated within 
our own bodies, which makes complete identification with another impossible. Therefore, 
whatever a character may or may not physically experience, cannot be communicated to either 
the other characters or the audience. The images that characters form of each other remain 
invented mirages, or “expression planes.” This is also the case with any representations of the 
characters in artistic media. 
Furthermore, none of the ways in which the characters communicate seems to bring 
them closer to each other. Language is necessarily stylised and is either oversimplifying 
matters in conveying personal data or idealising them in novels and photographs. Mediation 
therefore does not seem to build bridges between characters, but instead appears to prevent 
them from moving closer to one another. It is accordingly understandable that Alice mistrusts 
mimicry on the grounds that the imitation of a subject always implies a diversion from the 
original (Potolsky, 2006). Nevertheless, Alice contradicts herself in her shunning of mimicry 
because she herself takes part in it. Within the proliferation of simulacra, mimicry is revealed 
to be inextricable from human existence, just as emotional experience is inextricable from the 
body. By these means, Closer dismantles the binaries between the real and the unreal as well 
as art and life. 
Since honesty can be used in this play either to attempt intimacy with another or as a 
weapon, the binary between honesty and dishonesty is further dismantled. Marber relies on 
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bodily experience to engage the audience, using the form of in-yer-face theatre to shock 
theatregoers out of their detached roles as onlookers, much like Artaud. Maturana’s (in De 
Kock, 2008:92) notion that language matters are as powerful as physical interactions is 
therefore embodied in this play. As observed in the reviews of Closer, the members of the 
audience do not leave a performance of this play unaffected. They experience great 
embarrassment, fits of hysterical crying and discomfort when watching it. They are thus 
pulled firmly into the fictional world of the play through their actual experience of the 
fictional events.  
And yet, unlike the plays of Artaud, Marber’s play drives the spectators back into the 
actual world by repeatedly reminding them, through covert metareference, that they are 
watching a play. This invites them to consider their own role in the interpretation of the play, 
suggesting that they created the play for themselves, just as the characters have created each 
other.  
Unlike The Real Thing which is aimed at a middle class audience, Closer is aimed at a 
younger one. In-yer-face theatre aims to bypass the intellectual and affect the audience 
viscerally, yet Closer does prompt the audience to consider epistemological issues. Although 
the metareference in this play is mostly covert and perhaps more easily perceived within the 
context of a postmodern analysis, as Limoges (2009) suggests, it is definitely present and 
markedly strengthened by the interpretation of the romantic relationships in the play as a trope 
for how the audience interprets the play.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Like a groupie incognito 
 posing as a real singer 
 Life imitates art 
 – Lana Del Rey, “Gods and Monsters.” (2012)  
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I set out to analyse Pinter’s Betrayal, Stoppard’s The Real Thing, 
and Marber’s Closer in terms of a theoretical framework drawing from postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, to investigate the epistemological question of “how can we trust what we 
know?” or, in other words, “how can we distinguish the actual from the fictional?” Since 
“nothing can lift us out of language,” as Hartman (1985: xii) points out, we live through 
language and create the world for ourselves through mediation. This includes a spectrum of 
communication ranging from everyday language to works of art. Through the research 
questions posed in Chapter One, I investigated how language and art function within these 
plays and the implications for the audience. 
 Authenticity is portrayed as elusive in all three of these plays. None of them aim to 
portray any authentic subject directly. Within the plots of the respective plays dealing with 
infidelity, the “authentic self,” or identity of a character, remains obscure. Therefore, these 
characters’ life companions become the Other, which Bakhtin (in Hitchcock, 1998:92) argues 
it is impossible to know. The characters either use language to cover up what they really think 
or feel, or unsuccessfully try to employ it to jolt sincerity from each other. Ultimately, though, 
they need to rely on mediation to attempt to access the supposedly authentic essence of each 
other and themselves. 
 In Betrayal, the on-stage characters use language as a protective barrier, as Pinter 
himself suggested when he described language as a stratagem to cover nakedness. Despite the 
personal turmoil that we can assume the characters each experience, they only indirectly refer 
to it, utilising language as an impenetrable screen between themselves and each other. When 
caught off guard, they sometimes accidentally drop this screen, but only for long enough to 
suggest to the audience that there is indeed a discrepancy between the characters’ unaffected 
appearance and their inner turmoil.  
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 Even so, Pinter does not suggest that the characters have access even to their own 
pasts. Jerry and Emma disagree on certain details of events that happened in their pasts. Like 
language and art, memory thus also mediates. Not even recollections of certain events can 
therefore be directly accessed. Furthermore, the off-stage character, Casey, also fails in his 
attempts to fictionalise his life and reproduce it as authentically as possible. His novels contain 
never ending mise en abymes since he consistently includes himself as the author in his works 
of fiction. The poststructuralist hall of mirrors that he thereby creates, still functions within 
fiction and cannot break through the boundary to the actual.  
 In addition to suggesting the elusiveness of authenticity through their behaviour, the 
characters in The Real Thing also address it directly by debating issues of authenticity in 
language and art. Yet, in neither their behaviour nor debates is the authenticity of any 
character’s identity or any piece of writing confirmed. Brodie’s writing, which Annie initially 
claims is more authentic than Henry’s because it is based on his own life experiences, turns 
out to be fraudulent. Additionally, Henry’s play, “House of Cards” is judged by Charlotte to 
be unrealistic to the point where it becomes difficult for the actors and audience to buy into 
the fictional world. The audience, however, never learns if Henry succeeds in writing a play 
that resonates appropriately with reality. The question of whether or not this is possible is left 
open.  
 Similarly, although it is shown that Annie’s affair with Billy was fleeting and based on 
flattery, the audience can only speculate on whether or not the relationship between Henry and 
Annie is authentic. Stoppard is also careful in not indulging the audience by claiming sincerity 
in any character’s commitment to a political cause – indicating how allegiance to a cause 
cannot guarantee a sense of social responsibility. The characters in The Real Thing all support 
political causes for their own personal benefit.  
 Unlike the characters in Betrayal, who try at all costs to conceal themselves, Larry in 
Closer desperately does his best to access the essence of things in a context where he is 
surrounded by a proliferation of illusions and mimicry. He uses the least euphemistic language 
that he can to uncover the truth about Dan and Anna’s affair. Yet, this language merely forms 
yet another screen or illusion. 
 Larry furthermore perceives the body as the locus of authenticity, interpreting bodily 
manifestations as confirmation. Even so, he does not reduce people to their bodies. Alice’s 
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supposedly self-inflicted scar is, for example, proof to Larry that she is emotionally disturbed. 
As a result, he sees bodily manifestations as the proverbial tip of the iceberg in getting to 
know another character.  
 But, the body, like the mind, is still ultimately private and able to be manipulated. The 
play, firstly, never confirms how Alice acquired her scar. She is the only character who knows 
this. Even as a dermatologist, Larry can only offer possible theories as to how the scar came 
about. Secondly, even if he could argue that it is possible to access authenticity through the 
body, there is no way of knowing another’s physical sensations, as Bakhtin (in Hitchcock, 
1998:92) suggests. Anna, for example, sometimes succeeded in deceiving Dan about her 
experience of their sex life. Thirdly, Anna and Alice consider physical interaction as 
commodifiable: Anna sleeps with Larry in return for his signature on their divorce papers 
while Alice earns her income by stripping. Hence no single part of a human being can be 
regarded as the locus of his or her authentic self. 
 Even if a character possesses an authentic self or essence, it is consequently impossible 
to directly access it. It is, however, feasible to make reasonable assumptions about the Other, 
as Eco (1999) suggests. When these assumptions are proven wrong, they are replaced by new 
assumptions which may in turn, also be discredited. No assumption can, as a result, be 
interpreted as definitive or authentic.  
 Furthermore, elements of mimicry permeate the entire existence of the characters in 
these plays. In The Real Thing the outer play not only mimics the various mise en abymes in 
the text (and vice versa), but the characters who are actors (such as Charlotte, Annie, and 
Max) also mimic the roles that they portray in the mise en abymes. But this mimicry is not 
limited to the characters who are actors. Every character mimics other characters in some way 
– be it in the mise en abymes or in the outer play. Mimicry thus infiltrates through the entire 
fictional world depicted in the play. 
 This makes it evident that, firstly, although the inauthentic might be pointed out, it is 
not possible to guarantee the authenticity of matters such as identity, art, or loyalty to a 
political cause. Secondly, mimicry should not necessarily be perceived as in opposition to 
authenticity in identity or art since it is part of human existence.  
 In Betrayal, Jerry claims that his words to Emma, “You’re lovely. I’m crazy about 
you.” (135) have never been said before. This statement can be taken to be both ironic and 
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sincere. On the one hand, these words evoke Eco’s (1983a:67) assertion that it is impossible to 
speak innocently. The words that Jerry uses have indeed been used in countless novels by, 
among others, Barbara Cartland. Jerry’s words would therefore seem ironic. On the other 
hand, as Bakhtin (in Todorov, 1984) and Maturana (1978) assert, no utterance can ever be 
repeated, or copied exactly. Although Jerry’s words have indeed been employed previously, 
they have never been used in that particular context. His statement is in consequence 
simultaneously ironic and sincere. Furthermore, by claiming that the words he is using have 
never been said before, Jerry implicitly offers the same kind of “disclaimer” as Eco’s 
hypothetical postmodern man. Mimicry cannot therefore be regarded as the basis of 
inauthenticity; on the contrary, it is essential in postmodern times where communication takes 
place through irony, parody, and citation. 
 When watching these three plays, the audience shares with the characters the 
predicament of not having any certainty in knowing the Other. Like the characters, the 
spectators also need to interpret what is shown to them on stage “in the succession of things,” 
in Calvino’s (1981:61) words, due to the plurisignation of theatre. The events of the plays are 
presented before the audience as through a kaleidoscope, a hall of mirrors or a mirage. Not 
only does the audience struggle to interpret the characters in a play, but also each play itself. 
The audience stands in relation to each work as the characters stand in relation to each other. 
In all three plays, the audience is simultaneously drawn into the fictional world and thrust 
back into the actual world. 
 In Betrayal, the audience can identify with the disillusionment of the characters as one 
screen of illusion is moved away to reveal yet another, by which the onlookers are drawn into 
the fictional world. On the other hand, the audience is also invited to evaluate and judge the 
play before it in the same way that the characters evaluate and judge works by W.B. Yeats, 
Ford Madox Ford, and the fictional Spinks and Casey. This notion is emphasised by the clear 
presence of the author’s hand in the play’s reverse chronology, indicated through clarifying 
the time interstices by using a display above the stage, suggesting that the audience should 
view the play in a detached manner.  
  In The Real Thing, the audience has trouble distinguishing the mise en abymes from 
the outer play. If the play is regarded as a set of Chinese boxes, where levels of fictionality 
become confused, it could be argued that the actual world forms the outermost box. In this 
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way the audience is dragged into the play as its members need to navigate through a myriad of 
fictions in which their own actual frame is also implied. They are, however, also pushed out of 
the fictional world by being continually reminded of the author’s presence through these very 
metatheatrical devices that pulled them into the fictional world in the first place.  
 Moreover, in Closer the audience is just as disillusioned by, for example, finding out 
that Alice’s identity was a lie. This yanks them into the play, but the discussions about art – 
and especially Dan’s novel and Anna’s photograph – encourage the audience to view the play 
as a fiction. The metareference which is created when the audience looks at Alice while she is 
viewing a picture of herself emphasises the act of looking, in which the audience and the 
characters are engaged.  
 The way in which the characters thus make reasonable (temporary) assumptions about 
each other, as Eco (1999) suggests, extends to the manner in which the audience interprets 
these plays. Just as the characters’ perceptions of each other can be invalidated and reformed, 
so the audience’s interpretation of the play can be invalidated and replaced, much like 
Billington’s (2001:129) initial reaction to Betrayal, which was revised (Billington, 1996:258). 
This suggests that there exists no such thing as a definitive interpretation – either of fictional 
characters, people in the actual world or literary texts.  
 These three plays therefore dismantle the binary between the authentic and the 
inauthentic with regard to the fictional and the actual. The fictional is revealed not to be 
inauthentic, but part of human existence, since authenticity cannot be accessed, only mediated. 
Therefore, theatre does not stand in opposition to the actual world (which could then be 
regarded as authentic), but functions within the actual world, despite the fact that it is 
necessarily fictional. The fact that these texts do not endeavour to hide their fictionality but 
take full advantage of theatre’s limitations, as Sartre (1976) suggests, positions them in direct 
opposition to postdramatic plays and verbatim drama which rely on popular notions of 
authenticity.  
 Although Betrayal and Closer have been made into successful films, it is as stage 
plays that they take on a more pronounced metatheatrical significance. As a play, Closer in 
particular includes the audience in ways which are impossible in any other genre and in 
consequence emphasises the epistemological questions that the play poses. In all three plays, 
the implications of performance underscore the interaction between the fictional and the 
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actual. In Betrayal the techniques of “veiling” that the actors utilise illustrate the tension 
between the expression plane and the content plane in language. Stoppard’s characters have to 
portray subtext as they themselves discuss the importance of subtext in conveying emotion on 
stage. In Closer, the audience is made viscerally uncomfortable due to the explicitness of the 
play.  
 By furthermore investigating epistemological issues through the plot line of a romantic 
relationship, usually associated with books in the Mills and Boon series, the plays also 
dismantle the binary opposition of the intellectual as opposed to the authentic, or “real.” The 
question of “how can I trust what I know?” permeates intellectual discussions as well as the 
love lives of people of all classes.  
 Just as language is not innocent in this postmodern context and carries with it the 
shadow of previous uses, these texts are not innocent either. Betrayal is a clear intertext in 
both The Real Thing and Closer. The opening scene of The Real Thing, which turns out to be 
the play within the play, “House of Cards,” mimics Betrayal. The Real Thing engages with 
Pinter’s play by further developing debates about authenticity in art and proliferating images 
which mimic each other at a new level. In so doing, Stoppard’s play mocks and questions the 
supposed stoicism with which the characters in Betrayal are sometimes perceived to approach 
the uncovering of infidelity. Closer, on the other hand, displays characters who desperately 
attempt to counter this stoicism. Hence the plays elaborate on concerns raised in the previous 
texts.  
 As a result each of these plays revitalises the similarity between infidelity and 
epistemological uncertainty for its own time. It would therefore be worthwhile to investigate 
this similarity in subsequent texts, such as Sam Holcroft’s Edgar and Annabel (2011), in 
which the content plane and expression plane of the characters’ dialogue deviate even further, 
as they are required to communicate with each other using set scripts. 
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